Lincoln Savings and Loan, Volume III by Assembly Committee on Finance and Insurance
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
California Assembly California Documents
1989
Lincoln Savings and Loan, Volume III
Assembly Committee on Finance and Insurance
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_assembly
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Hearing is brought to you for free and open access by the California Documents at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in California Assembly by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation


























Jtfiua:ure a:ub ~ttsura:ure 
A COMPILATION OF TESTIMONY 
AND EXHIBITS 
ON THE SUBJECT OF 
LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
for hearings held by the 











P.O. BOX 942849 
SACRAMENTO, CA 94249-0001 
(916) 445-9160 
ASSEMBLY FINANCE AND INSURANCE 





PATRICK JOHNSTON, CHAIRMAN 
August 31, 1989 
November 29, 1989 

























Qial ifnrttia 11Legifllature 
J\ssembltt Qlununiftce 
lltt 
Jlfhunlce uub ~usurauce 
A COMPILATION OF TESTIMONY 
AND EXHIBITS 
ON THE SUBJECT OF 
LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
for hearings held by the 











P.O. BOX 942849 
SACRAMENTO, CA 94249-0001 
(916)445-9160 
ASSEMBLY FINANCE AND INSURANCE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW AND REGULATION 
PATRICK JOHNSTON, CHAIRMAN 
August 31, 1989 
November 29, 1989 
December 20, 1989 
• 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Transcript, August 31, 1989 
Statement by William J. Crawford 
Statement by Christine W. Bender with Exhibits 
2. Transcript, November 29, 1989 
Statement by Karl Samuelian 
Statement by Richard E. Newsom with Exhibits 
Statement by Christine W. Bender with Exhibits 
3. Transcript, December 20, 1989 
Statement by Carol H. Rehm, Jr. 
Statement by Gene Stelzer 
Statement by Shirley M. Thayer 














ASSEMBLY FINANCE AND INSURANCE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW AND REGULATION 
Hearing on the Subject of 
THE SALE OF AMERICAN CONTINENTAL SUBORDINATE DEBENTURES 
TO LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN CUSTOMERS 
by 
Chairman Patrick Johnston 
on 




SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW AND REGULATION 
DECEMBER 20, 1989 
STATE CAPITOL, ROOM 4202 
PATRICK JOHNSTON, CHAIRMAN 
CHAIRMAN PATRICK JOHNSTON: Good morning, I'm Pat 
Johnston, Chairman of the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee 
and the Subcommittee on Savings and Loan Law and Regulation. With 
me is Assemblyman Bill Lancaster. This is the third Subcommittee 
hearing on Lincoln Savings and Loan and the fifth hearing on the 
savings and loan crisis in California. We're here this morning to 
hear testimony concerning the cease and desist order issued to 
Lincoln Savings and American Continental Corporation on 
December 21, 1988 and to hear testimony from Mr. Lawrence Taggart, 
former Savings and Loan Commissioner. The State Department of 
Savings and Loan was the primary regulator of Lincoln Savings 
until it was taken over by federal regulators. Lincoln Savings 
was acquired by American Continental Corporation in February of 
1984. American Continental Corporation is controlled by Charles 
Keuting, Jr. At the time of acquisition, Lincoln was a 
traditional savings and loan engaged in making horne loans. After 
acquisition, Lincoln turned completely around and began to make 
higher risk investments, deemphasizing residential real estate 
lending. Lincoln Savings took full advantage of California's 
liberal and investment lending powers. Federal and state 
requlators identified numerous problems in Lincoln Savings, 
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including overvaluation of assets, improper or questionable 
accounting practices, self-dealing, excessive investments in junk 
bonds, overconcentration of loans, lack of underwriting 
practices for investments in loans, and other violat of law. 
The State Department of Savings and Loan e Lincoln Savings 
or participated in examinations with federal regulators six 
times between 1984 and 1989. Lincoln's failure will cost over 
$2 billion and investors in American Continental Corporation 
subordinate debentures stand to lose over $200 million. The 
subordinate debentures, which were so in Lincoln Savings 
branches, were rendered nearly worthless by American Continental's 
filing for reorganization under ruptcy laws the failure of 
Lincoln Savings. In regar to the cease desis order iss 
to American Continental Corporation and Lincoln Savi s on 
December 21, 1988, there have been disagreements as to the 
deletion of language concerning mis ing o e roneous 
information in public disclosure documents. Prior drafts of the 
cease and desist order included language which r American 
Continental Corporation and Lincoln Savings from tting 
erroneous, incomplete, misleading or inaccurate information in 
public reports, offering circulars, proxy materials and other 
public information. This informat is the eli upon 
investors. The cease desist r final is did not 
include the language rbidding Lincoln and American Continental 
from including such information in the public disclosure 
documents. This ttee has heard testimony that inclus 
of the deleted would have put a s to the subordinate 
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debenture sales, which ended in February 1989, and that this 
language was removed at the request of the Deputy Attorney General 
assigned to work with the Department of Savings and Loan on this 
matter. The Subcommittee has also received information that the 
language was removed by the Department of Savings and Loan after 
internal discussions. We have requested persons involved in this 
matter to testify before the Subcommittee today. Following that 
portion of the hearing related to the cease and desist order, we 
will invite Mr. Larry Taggart, who was Savings and Loan 
Commissioner in 1983 and 1984, which were years of great change 
and upheaval in the savings and loan industry. In 1983 and 1984, 
the Department approved over 200 applications for new state 
savings and loans and began to supervise institutions under 
California's more liberal savings and loan law. At the same time, 
Department staffing dropped considerably, to a low point of 55 
personnel in July of 1983. In February of 1984, the Department 
approved the acquisition of Lincoln Savings by American 
Continental Corporation. We wish to hear from Mr. Taggart today 
about his role as regulator of state savings and loans. 
As has been the custom in these oversight hearings, we 
will ask Legislative Counsel to make some advisory comments and to 
swear in our witnesses. I'd ask those witnesses that have 
prepared remarks to provide them to the Sergeant and as copies 
allow, we'll make them available as well to the press and the 
public. 
MR. ROBERT MILLER: For purposes of advising you of your 
rights before a legislative committee, I need to determine which 
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witnesses are in the hearing room at the present time. Is Ms. 
Thayer here please? Mr. Rehm, Mr. Newsom, Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. 
Harvey, Mr. Stelzer, Ms. Mori, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Crawford. 
Mr. Crawford is absent? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: He must have stepped out, he is 
here. 
MR. MILLER: And Mr. Taggart, is Mr. Taggart available? 
Well, with regard to those witnesses that are here, the Government 
Code contains provisions which explain your rights as a witness 
before a legislative committee, and I'm going to read the required 
statement that is to read to witnesses as they appear before 
committees. When you come up and testify, at that time I will ask 
you if you understood what I read, and then we will swear you in 
as a witness. Section 9410 of the Government Code provides that a 
person sworn in and examined before the Senate, Assembly or 
legislative committee cannot be held to answer criminally or be 
subject criminally to any penalty or forfeiture for any factor or 
act touching which he or she is required to testify, other than 
for perjury committed in testifying or contempt. However, this 
Committee will not require your testimony. The Committee does not 
wish to be placed in a position where it would be claimed that you 
received immunity from any possible criminal prosecution because 
of your testimony before the Committee. Because you are not being 
given immunity from criminal prosecution, you have a 
constitutional right to refuse to testify before this Committee. 
If you desire to waive this right and to testify voluntarily, you 




conditions. If you do not wish to answer any question, you will 
so state. In the absence of such a statement, your answer to each 
question will be entirely voluntary. If you choose to testify, 
you will be sworn under oath and will be therefore subject to 
criminal prosecution for perjury committed in testifying. If you 
choose to so testify voluntarily, you are reminded that any 
self-incriminating statements you make can be used against you in 
criminal proceedings. That's it, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Crawford came in during that 
statement. You've heard this before, I think. All right, good. 
I'd like to begin, then, with Shirley Thayer, Counsel for the 
Department of Savings and Loan. Ms. Thayer if you would come 
forward to the podium please, and Mr. Miller will swear you in. 
MR. MILLER: Good morning, Ms. Thayer. Did you 
understand the statements that I read to you regarding your rights 
as a witness? 
MS. SHIRLEY THAYER: I did. 
MR. MILLER: Do you wish to testify voluntarily under 
those conditions? 
MS. THAYER: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise your right hand, please? 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give 
before the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth? 
MS. THAYER: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Would you state your name and position for 
the record please? 
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MS. THAYER: My name is Shirley Thayer. I'm Senior 
Staff Counsel Specialist for the Department of Savings and Loan. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Thayer and the other witnesses 
to follow, we appreciate your written statements. The Committee 
has them, they'll be entered into the record. I would prefer if 
the statements are long, that you highlight in your testimony 
those portions that you want us to particularly focus on, make any 
remarks that you feel are appropriate, but it is not necessary to 
read every word of your statement unless you feel it is important 
to our understanding of this issue. 
MS. THAYER: All right, thank you. I do elect to read 
what I have. I think it takes about ten minutes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
MS. THAYER: Okay. I am Senior Staff Counsel Specialist 
for the Department and in this capacity I am asked to look at, 
review and make comments and suggestions on a variety of matters 
to staff and to the Commissioner. I am not in a job 
classification that authorizes me to make final decisions or 
policy decisions. I do provide legal advice and give opinions 
From prior testimony given by Commissioner Crawford, you are aware 
that the Department has taken a vigorous stance with Lincoln 
Savings and Loan and American Continental Corporat through 
examination and enforcement actions. I also do not need to tell 
the Committee again how much effort the Department made to curta 
the sale of the bonds. As I understand it, the purpose of today' 
hearing is to accept testimony regarding the cease and desist 




ACC because there have been inconsistent statements as to who 
made the decision to remove certain language from that order. 
Mr. Newsom, an examiner with the Department, gave testimony on 
November 29, 1989, that reportedly certain language was removed at 
the request of Deputy Attorney General C. H. Rehm. Mr. Newsom 
also indicated that he was informed indirectly through me that the 
reason for the request was because Mr. Rehm felt he lacked 
securities law expertise to effectively deal with any court 
challenge by ACC of the Department's Order. He also testified he 
was very upset about it and stated, "This would have dropped an 
atomic bomb on their subdebt sales program." Please keep in mind 
that this order was issued December 21, 1988, and the bond sales 
were discontinued in February of 1989. Most of the sales had 
already occurred. I want to say that although Mr. Newsom was only 
repeating something that someone else had told him, he did not 
verify whether or not what he was saying was accurate. I say now 
that the reasons communicated to and by Mr. Newsom are not 
accurate. I also disagree that the deleted language would have 
significantly affected ACC's subdebt program. Obviously there's a 
dispute concerning memories of what happened over a year ago. 
Your attention is also called to the fact that no one had 
requested a follow-up on the deleted language and the 
dissatisfaction with this order was raised for the first time at 
the hearing on November 29, 1989. I'm saying that perhaps, if 
research had been done to determine what specific securities law 
was being violated, another order could have been issued. The 
Department was not ignoring the information deleted from the 
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order, as all findings had already been sent to the Secu iti s 
Exchange Commission in November with a cover r l 
Davis, Chief Deputy. Additional information has fo r 
throughout 1989. But, as of December 15, 1989 tt is 
still under investigation by the SEC and no rm i has 
made as to whether or not the findings are a securiti s law 
violation. By naming ACC in the order, this could have trigge ed 
the requirement to file an B(k) with the SEC, which ld make he 
order available to the public, and alert anyone inte sted in 
finding out that Lincoln was being ordered to divest the loans 
that, the specific loan that was associated with the tential" 
securities law violation. Had the language relat to the 
"potential" securities law violation remained in the 
would have been easily challenged and I have grave 
r, it 
ts that a 
court would have enforced a "potential" violation. ACC wou 
likely have requested the court to seal the reco , thus 
most 
depriving access by the public. If it was not chal 
and had the Department tried to enforce the o r thr a cou 
action, I would surmise a similar result from the cour Had 
tried to use it as a basis for a conservatorship, 
whether a court would have confirmed it. The SEC 
publicly traded companies to report what are 1 





but what is reported, what is considered to a s gnificant 
is left up to the company and it's not mandat are 
time limits for filing the 8(k)'s. ACC did not f its annual 




describe the mechanics of issuing and enforcing an order and the 
background leading to this particular order. By statute adopted 
by this Legislature, the Commissioner is authorized to issue an 
order when an association, holding company or subsidiary is 
violating or has violated a law or is engaging in or has engaged 
in an unsafe or unsound business practice. And just as an aside, 
this past tense language was added effective January 1, 1989. The 
order must first state the violation of practice and then facts 
must be stated in support of the violation of practice. The 
Commissioner then orders discontinuance of the violation or 
practice and then orders conformance with all requirements of law. 
The order is a two-pronged document with the "order" portion of 
the order linked to the violation. You can't order someone to 
stop doing something if there is no violation. The order is a 
confidential document and not available to the public unless taken 
into court. An order is considered to be a very serious action 
and is to be issued only as a final resort to stop specifically 
identified violations or practices. The decision to issue this 
order during the examination of Lincoln and ACC was, as I 
understand it, without precedent and there was a considerable 
amount of concern with taking this action before the standard 
examination procedures were completed. The seriousness of the 
situation related to certain loans created a great sense or 
urgency to get an Order out as soon as possible, but it was 
extremely important to issue an Order that would be enforceable if 
taken to court and which complied completely with the law. This 
Department takes regulatory actions and issues orders, but is not 
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authorized to litigate. Therefore the Attorney Gene l's office 
is contacted when litigation is anticipated or cont 
my knowledge no Deputy Attorney General has ever 
~n the merits of a regulatory action, but 
give opinions on what has a chance of being 
Since a Deputy Attorney General is requir 
enforce this Department's orders if we go to 







the r . 
fend r 
sometimes 
vJOuld be a 
othe s 
the Or r 
problem defending or enforcing it, and I'm awa e 
requests during the year of 1989. When the d aft 
issue was given to me for review, it contained sc 0 
order. I "potential" securities law violation as the si 
expressed concern over the ability to enforce en ia 
violation. The Department had some prior rience nvolvi 
Universal Savings in a conservatorship action which 1 
language about a potential violation. The Cou rm 
the appointment of the conservator, so I t r 
, H. 
be a problem in this situation. Orders is 
have always been for violations, not "pote 
draft of the Order was sent to Deputy Attor 
for review. Since there was only a brief tel 
with him over a year ago, I have no recollect 
conversat on 
exac t 
was said, but remember generally that we di s p ob ems 
defending a "potential" violation. We talk about he 
specific. I do recall that he mentioned that he t an 
in securities law, but I made no request to h to any resear 
to determine whether the omissions were in t a securities law 
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violation because this would take time and the Commissioner was 
very anxious to issue this order. There was no discussion related 
to specific language being removed or left in; therefore, I can 
conclude that Mr. Rehm made no request to remove language from the 
order. I would also like to add that it is my belief that a 
litigator does not need to have preexisting expertise in an area 
of law to be a good litigator, because research and preparation 
will enable an adequate defense. The allegation that I said 
something that a reasonable person would conclude that Mr. Rehm 
requested the language at issue to be removed because ''he lacked 
securities law expertise to effectively deal with any court 
challenge by ACC of the Department's order" is just simply without 
merit. At a subsequent meeting with management staff linked to 
San Francisco on a conference call, all arguments pro and con for 
leaving in or taking out the "potential" violation language was 
discussed. There was support for both positions from staff 
members. I did communicate that Mr. Rehm said there would be 
problems with enforcing a "potential" violation. The Commissioner 
made the final decision to remove the language about "potential" 
violations and the attendant order language after listening to and 
considering all input from the staff and not upon instructions 
from the Deputy Attorney General. Additional language was also 
added to the order after Mr. Rehm reviewed it which would make 
Lincoln divest itself of the loans at issue. In my opinion, the 
removal of the language that could be easily challenged and the 
language added made the order much stronger, not weaker. After 
the November 29th hearing, since the Deputy Attorney General had 
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not made a request to remove any language from the or r, and 
since it was I who supposedly made the allegat t 
I felt it was imperative that the press be info 
t he had, 
that this 
information was not accurate. The Commissioner and Chief Depu 
authorized me to make appropriate contacts. I a so tacted 
Steve Suchil the following morning. I read a statement for TV 
Channels 2 and 7 on November 30th. I specifical s ated that 
''Mr. Newsom only repeated what he had been told, but what he had 
been told was not accurate.'' A press release was al dr Et the 
same day which clearly said Mr. Newsom had no first-hand 
knowledge. This press release was drafted by Duane terson 
Press Secretary for the Attorney General, for release to the news 
media. Our Department is small and has no press office and no 
capability to contact a central news release agency. We have 
always used other agencies to send out our news releases. 
Mr. Peterson faxed us a copy, a draft, and Mr. Dav s nd e 
reviewed it, edited it to our satisfaction, and to 
be distributed. In a printed submission from Mr. Newsom to Steve 
Suchil and labeled as additional testimony da ember 5, 1989, 
allegations were made that, "I have reason to bel eve a cover 
is in process." In addition to Mr. Newsom's references elated to 
the order which he alleges created a conflict of i erest with the 
Attorney General, I am accused of having att tamper with 
his testimony to be presented before the Congressional Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee on October 31, 989. He 
stated that I attempted to discourage him from inc ing hundr 
of pages of supporting exhibits. Since an attempt to tamper with 
12 
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or any actual tampering with testimony before a legislative body 
is a very serious matter, I wish to make a short statement 
relating to the extent of my involvement with 
Mr, Newsom's testimony. Briefly, I had helped Gene Stelzer and 
the Commissioner edit their written statement without changing 
content, and was requested to look at Mr. Newsom's statement on 
October 26, 1989, in a time period before a subpoena had been 
served and it was unknown whether it would be a subpoena for 
testimony only or a subpoena duces tecum. The only conversation 
that I recall having with him was over the phone and was related 
to what appeared to be a draft of his statement. I told him that 
it needed to be cleaned up, but after he protested I said I 
wouldn't touch it. At no time was reference made to specific 
language to him. Sheila Sakamoto worked with Mr. Newsom to 
finalize his statement which was considerably different from the 
draft, and I did include these in the exhibits to the Committee. 
I also participated in a discussion that same day and gave an 
opinion that it would be a violation of California Financial Code 
Section 8009 to voluntarily submit confidential documents without 
a subpoena duces tecum. This is a position I have consistently 
taken with this Committee, and I'm sure Mr. Suchil can confirm 
that. In fact, in my opinion the confidential documents 
Mr. Newsom had submitted to the Committee without a subpoena duces 
tecum had violated Section 8009, and I have expressed that 
opinion. Later that day, after this discussion took place, a 
subpoena duces tecum was served by the Congressional Committee and 
there was no longer an issue of him submitting whatever documents 
13 
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he wanted to. My actions most certainly should not be considered 
to be an "attempt to tamper" with testimony. 
like to say that the Department of Savings 
In closing, I wou 
Loan t 
participated in a cover-up on any matters involvi Lincoln or 
ACC. We have at all times tried to do what we could to s 
sale of the bonds being issued by ACC, but a 
framework of the law. If you have any quest 
to answer them. 
w~ in the 
, I ill 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Wright. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN CATHIE WRIGHT: I have a r em in 
gl 
several areas and one of them is, do you always have the Attorney 
General public relations staff write your press releases? 
MS. THAYER: This was the first time in this instance, 
but we have always used other agencies. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: So you've never wri 
your own press releases? 
n any f 
MS. THAYER: All right, we have written press releas s, 
but we've used other agencies to disseminate them, to send them 
out. And in this instar,ce, although they drafted a ess release 
just for expediency purposes, we had another very critical issue 
going on in the office on that very same day in a receivership 
situation, the fact that they drafted the initial language, 
Mr. Davis and myself went over it and made rna 
conformed with what we wanted to go out. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: My understand 
cha es so that it 
Attorney General had some conversations or interview with rs 




MS. THAYER: I'm sorry, what was the question again? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I said I was also informed that 
the Attorney General's office had either discussions or interviews 
with members who were of the Department who were subpoenaed to 
ap9ear before this Committee? 
MS. THAYER: My understanding is that they came into the 
office to look at certain documentation, but I also understand 
from the paper that they are starting an investigation of their 
own. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, Ms. Thayer, why don't you 
answer Ms. Wright's question to the extent of your knowledge and 
if you don't know about any other contacts, then perhaps 
Ms. Wright's question can be answered by another witness. 
MS. THAYER: Okay, no one interviewed me from the 
Attorney General's Office. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I just think it's strange that 
the Attorney General and other witnesses probably can address it, 
that the Attorney General would suddenly come in and request to go 
over testimony before coming before this committee. I think it's 
strange that they do press releases for your agency, whether you 
are part and parcel of it, I think you should do your own, no 
matter how lacking of expertise you seem to think you have, and I 
am concerned that there seems to be conflict between your 
testimony and testimonies we received on the 29th also under 
subpoena and in sworn testimony. 
MS. THAYER: That's why I'm here to give my side of the 
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story which I feel is accurate. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: So you feel t e be 
conflict and yet both of you could be accurate? 
MS. THAYER: I think that I have said that I don't agree 
with the prior testimony which apparently was g th r 
testimony. He admitted that it was not, that he had no first-hand 
knowledge. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I'm not an a to but his 
duces tecum, you said . 
MS. THAYER: Subpoena duces tecum . 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Is that basi 1 
broad, in layman's terms, that's a broad 
MS. THAYER: It is a subpoena that r e 
be provided this Committee. You can either is ue a 
testimony only or a subpoena which includes 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: In my te 
an attorney, I would call it a broad . 
MS. THAYER: That requests documen 








didn't have a subpoena at all, and we did not know whether it was 
going to be just for testimony only or whether it was i to be 
for documents. As soon as we found out t it was for documents, 
I had no problems. But as a lawyer, I had to call tention to 
the fact that we have a Financial Code Section that prohibits th2 
giving out of confidential documents or informat in the 
of a subpoena duces tecum. So as an attorney I'm obliga to 
give that opinion, which I did and I have to Steve Suchil on 
16 
83 
numerous occasions, that we're more than happy to submit the 
documents once we have the subpoena, but if we don't have the 
subpoena requesting documents, we can't do it or we would be in 
violation of the law this Legislature has adopted. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Just one more question, Mr. 
Chairman. And you feel that if the cease and desist order had 
been issued in December of 1988 as requested by your examiners or 
your Department, that it would not have prevented any sale of 
these bonds? 
MS. THAYER: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You feel all the bonds were sold 
before that December date? 
MS. THAYER: Not before. The sales didn't stop until 
February, but my testimony is that this cease and desist would not 
have had any impact on those sales. ASSEMBLYWOMAN 
WRIGHT: I think if we prevented one sale of a bond it would have 
protected one of our constituents here in the State of California 
from investing money and losing it. So I think the cease and 
desist order in December would have made some impact. 
MS. THAYER: But it was not, all right, an order has to 
state a violation. If a policeman pulled you over and said you're 
going 55, but I think you are going to speed and I'm going to give 
you a ticket for a "potential'' violation, I don't think you would 
like that, and I think that would be considered an abuse of power, 
so by trying to issue an order that only contained a "potential'' 
violation that was not identified, I think that we were subject to 
real strong challenge and perhaps even sanctions. 
17 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You were so invo as a 
savings and loan agency, you were so deep i s 1 
thing, I don't see why you didn't see there s on for 
simple reason it seems to Attorney General now s ng hat 
didn't have license to sell these bonds e re 
violations, and you being involved in it, I 
didn't notice this back in 1988. 
MS. THAYER: But this order only re at ti lar 
bond transaction, and the failures to disclos relat t 
believe, the Ponchartrain loan situation. These o ssue r 
not brought into, there was no awareness of 0 s 
having happened that the Attorney General is 
that the order was only alleging "potential" 
a particular loan, but no one had provided any resea 
anything in writing to identify the securit 
violated. In fact, the SEC as of r 
them, have taken all of this information, ent a 1 
of this information to them in November of 19 s i 
have not been able to determine whether ther lat on 
They are people who have a tremendous amount o secu ities law 
expertise. This Department does not, the no e fort 
to try to determine what the specific law s. 
very, and this didn't real become an issue 
draft, and we were very anxious to t th r r 
these loans to tell them to not make anymore loans se 
borrowers and also to divest those loans, so there was an u 
As I indicated, we've never, ever issued an r ing an 
18 
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examination. This was totally Nithout precedent. It's only as a 
last resort. We issue orders after an examination has been done 
and management has been notified as to what the findings are, 
they've had a chance to respond, but here we were in the middle of 
an examination, and these loans to these particular three 
borrowers were so flagrant that the Commissioner was most anxious 
to get an order out immediately, and it v1as felt like to put 
something in that was a "potential" violation that could be easily 
challenged, just was not an appropriate thing to do. The staff 
that recommended taking it out, today looking at that language, 
they would still make the same recommendation, and I would too. 
Because the law just requires us to identify the violation. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Lancaster. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BILL LANCASTER: Yes, Ms. Thayer, I have a 
couple of thoughts that have come to mind during your testimony 
and I would like to clarify them if I might. You were made aware, 
I guess, by Mr. Rehm, is that correct that the Department 
regulatory aspects have asked for language of a cease and desist 
order and you have advised the Department that it would not be a 
wise move, is that what you're saying? 
MS. THAYER: I'm saying when I was given this order and 
I saw language that said a "potential" violation, that I had 
problems as an attorney. To me it did not comply with Financial 
Code Section 8200. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: My question is, did you advise 
the Department of Savings and Loan that this would be an irregular 
act, that it should not happen. 
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MS. THAYER: Yes, my advice in the staff meeting with 
management, it was my opinion, and I r 
out, as did other management staff. They 
feelings. 
that it be take 
some the same 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Let's tal 
with management staff. 
MS. THAYER: All right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: When we're 
management staff, are we talking about Attor 
l i 
staff or Department of Savings and Loan and the At r 
staff? 
s 
MS. THAYER: No, absolutely not. No j st the 





Attorney General was sending the documents to, as i turned i 
was C. H. Rehm that was assigned to the case, ther s one b ief 
conversation on the phone with him, myself and h , i which 
discussed the problems of the "potential" violation the 
to be specific. That was the end of the Attor General's 
involvement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So you're saying that the 
Department of Savings and Loan did not have a written request for 
a cease and desist order that you could hang on 1 1 
and defend, is that what you're saying? 
MS. THAYER: That's what I felt. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And you r 
of Savings and Loan, is that a fact, in r n 
MS. THAYER: That's my opinion. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I see, and your opinion was 
based upon a "potential" violation which you say at this point the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has not determined whether or 
not there was a violation or not? 
MS. THAYER: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: But the fact of the matter is, 
there was a potential violation, you then were alerted to the fact 
that there was a problem? 
MS. THAYER: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: My next question goes along the 
line just exactly what the Attorney General's office did after 
they were alerted to the fact there was a problem, and the 
Department was concerned enough to try to issue a "potential" 
cease and desist order, which you say is unorthodox. I don't know 
that any 11 potential" cease and desist orders have been issued 
before, but you say that's . 
MS. THAYER: We're not aware of any. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: That's not the proper way to go, 
but what did the Attorney General's office do after they became 
alerted to the fact there was a "potential" problem? 
MS. THAYER: I have no idea, I can't respond for them, 
because we made no further request to them to do research. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, that's not what I've been 
reading. Some place along the line, the Attorney General's office 
was supposed to do some research, in fact, Mr. Rehm I believe was 
going to look into the matter. 
MS. THAYER: We made no request of them. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So you just dropped it? 
MS. THAYER: It was just dropped in that we 
of the information to the SEC 
sent all 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So, therefore at hat point the 
Attorney General's office, your Department, was out the picture 
as far as the Lincoln Savings and Loan problem was concer ? 
MS. THAYER: Well, I don't think we're out of the 
picture. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: At that t ? 
MS. THAYER: Well, no, because we were still the pr ry 
regulator and I have said that if anyone had a r st to 
follow-up on it, that we could have issued an order the next 
two days later, if someone would have done re 
with a specific violation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I got the direct 
though, at the previous meeting that the At 
is the one that ordered the cease and desi r 
and you say he advised it be removed. 
i 
MS. THAYER: He did not advise. i that we 
1 
talked about the problem of enforcing a "potent al securities law 
violation. At no time did we even talk about specific language. 
At no time did he advise removing any language. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And you carne w th no 
substitute language that you could legally defend? 
MS. THAYER: No. There was such sense ur to 
get this Order out that to delay it, to do research at that int 




ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: As you know, Ms. Thayer, we have 
a definite conflict in remarks. 
MS. THAYER: That's why this hearing is being held. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Thayer, the Department of 
Savings and Loan, as you indicated, was the primary regulator of 
Lincoln Savings, is that correct? 
MS. THAYER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And Mr. Keating purchased Lincoln 
Savings in February of 1984? 
MS. THAYER: Yes, that's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And from 1984 forward to 1989, it's 
been the responsibility of the Department to examine and supervise 
Lincoln Savings? 
MS. THAYER: Correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When did Mr. Newsom assume his 
responsibilities in the examination of Lincoln? 
MS. THAYER: Since I have no personal knowledge on the 
assignments, but just from listening to the testimony, I believe 
it was in late fall of 1988. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Of 1988. The bonds were approved 
for sale by the Department of Corporations in November of 1986 and 
May of 1988, is that correct? 
MS. THAYER: Just again, it's from memory, those just 
seem to be the appropriate dates. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Approximately $200 million of the 
bonds were sold by the late fall of 1988, is that right? 
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MS. THAYER: I don't know, that I can't r to. I 
don't know the dollar figure. I do know that the fi t issuance 
of bonds that we issued the order to stop the sal the bonds 
the branches by August the lst, and they never s 
sell the bonds that were qualified for sale n 988. 
bonds were never qualified to be sold in the off ces. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The Department f Savi and Loan 
specified that they had to be sold at another location, but not in 
the branch offices, is that correct? 
MS. THAYER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In the decision a cease and 
desist order, what staff persons would be invo i that 
decision? 
MS. THAYER: The examination staff pr res the document 
and all . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: By the document n the cease 
and desist order? 
MS. THAYER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But how would it come to be 
document would be drawn up, would that be at the estion or 
instigation of the examiner, or . 
MS. THAYER: Usually the Cornmissione ssione 
takes that action. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: How did this one t 
MS. THAYER: Again, since I have no rs nd 
knowledge, only hearsay, that 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, I just want to know what 
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were involved in. Is it fair to say you're the chief attorney of 
the Department? 
MS. THAYER: No, I'm senior counsel, there is a chief 
counsel. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. So your responsibilities with 
respect to the issuance of the Cease and desist order were to 
review it, is that correct? 
MS. THAYER: This particular order, because the 
Commissioner had asked a northern examiner to draft it, the 
• northern attorneys were involved in the drafting process. I was 
only peripherally involved in looking at it. I did not read it in 
total until that final draft was ready to go to the Attorney 
General. That's when I read it through and raised the issue of 
the "potential" violation. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: All right, that draft, on page 3 of 
the draft that was submitted as an exhibit, I believe, by 
Mr. Newsom in his testimony before the House Banking Committee in 
Washington, says in part, "Furthermore, public disclosure 
statements lack complete and accurate disclosures regarding the 
above-referenced Ponchatrain transaction which, in addition to 
being "potential" securities violation laws, may result in 
• liability to ACC and thereby may adversely affect the safety and 
soundness of Lincoln." That is part of the finding, is it not? 
MS. THAYER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That then leads to the actual order? 
MS. THAYER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And it is the use of the term 
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"potential" and "may result" that concerned as an attar 
le le MS. THAYER: Yes. I felt that would 
very challengeable, and actually perhaps subject us 
because we had not identified the violation. 
o sanctions 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Page 6 listi f the actual ceas 
and desist provisions, number 4, "permitti erroneou , 
incomplete, misleading or inaccurate information of any kind to be 
included in public reports, including Form l s Fo l 
MS. THAYER: I personally don't n 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: A reporting r reme 
quarterly reporting requirement? 
MS. THAYER: That's what I surmise, p 
do not know specifically. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
MS. THAYER: But it's interesting to not i 
with the SEC this week, that there's a cat r cal 
"significant events" and it is optional as to what 
considers to be "significant events" and when 
would report a cease and desist order issued 
agency, they really couldn't give me any answe a 





CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We're going to hear rom Mr. Newsom 
but from his prior testimony and I believe the test t he's 
going to give today, I don't want to misstate it, t as I 
understand it, Mr. Newsom felt that the issuance a cease 
desist order, even one that was going to be challenged, inevi 
by ACC and Lincoln, would be worth doing as a strat , I think 
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"strategy" is his word, in order to raise the issue ultimately 
publicly in a court of law, and to encourage or compel federal 
regulators to act more aggressively with respect to Lincoln. Was 
there any discussion that you're aware of, of the use of the cease 
and desist order with this unusual provision dealing with 
"potential" violation of law, as a strategy? 
MS. THAYER: Subsequently, I know, I can't recall 
specifically at that point in time whether that argument was 
presented, but I know subsequently I've been told that that was 
what was discussed. But since our law requires us to do certain 
things and I find it legally offensive to deliberately violate our 
law, even though it might have a positive effect, I think that 
we're obligated to comply with our law, regardless of the fallout, 
and I still sincerely feel that. I feel the Legislature adopts 
laws and they anticipate that the regulatory agency will comply 
with that law. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: It's your testimony that the 
Department of Savings and Loan had independent, clear authority to 
issue a cease and desist order, is that correct? 
MS. THAYER: Yes, it's under Financial Code Section 
8200. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did the Department of Justice limit 
you or fail to provide information or opinion that you requested 
that interfered with your ability to make a decision with respect 
to the issuance of the cease and desist order? 
MS. THAYER: Absolutely not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you very much. 
27 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Just one more ques 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Wright. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I just noticed in one of the 
newspaper articles, it stated that, and I'll just r the 
paragraph and you can respond to it, because you're sayi that 
you advised not to go forward the cease and desist order? 
MS. THAYER: As did several other management members of 
the staff. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Because it here in this 
article that "But, S&L Department Counsel Shirley r, who 
discussed the order with Rehm, confirmed that Rehm d scour the 
proposed order." 
MS. THAYER: And that's an absolute I don't 
believe everything I read in the paper, do you believe everything 
you read in the paper about yourself? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: No, I don't lieve 
that's under oath. (laughter) 
MS. THAYER: I was aghast. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you ver 
MS. THAYER: You're welcome. 
thi 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I'd like to call Mr. C. H. Rehm, 
Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Miller. 
and 
MR. MILLER: Mr. Rehm, you were in the room earlier when 
I read you the statement regarding your ri s as a witness for 
this committee? 
MR. C. H. REHM: Yes, sir, I was. 
MR. MILLER: Do you understand the particular statement? 
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MR. REHM: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Do you wish to testify voluntarily under 
the conditions? 
MR. REHM: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise your right hand, please, do 
you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give before 
the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth? 
MR. REHM: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Will you please state your name and 
position for the record, please. 
MR. REHM: My name is C. H. Rehm, I'm a Deputy Attorney 
General with the Department of Justice of the State of California. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Rehm, thank you for being with 
us. Let me just ask you, since this is your first appearance 
before this Committee, how long have you been with the Attorney 
General's office? 
MR. REHM: Approximately seven years. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Seven years, and prior to that, what 
place were you employed? 
MR. REHM: I was employed in political public relations. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I see. 
MR. REHM: Various candidates. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Various candidates. Okay. Could 
you name one that we would be familiar with? 
MR. REHM: Gerald Ford. Evelle Younger. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
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MR. REHM: I have an opening statement, Mr, Johnston. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: All right, don' hear that. 
MR. REHM: I'm a Deputy Attorney General i the Civil 
Division, Business and Tax Section, in Los le . is sect 
serves client agencies which include the Stat f 
Equalization, Franchise Tax Board, Employment Deve 
Department, and the Departments of Insurance, Real Estate and 
Savings and Loan. The Attorney General's ffice pr des 
litigation services to these client agencies and lled to 
defend them in court. The office does not ss on client 
activities in the sense that it approves or disapproves the 
regulatory actions. When requested, the office does rev ew 
proposed actions to provide the client with a view of the 
likelihood of success from a litigation sta int. The client i 
free to accept or reject our view. In Decembe Shirley 
Thayer, Legal Counsel for the Department l n, 
I had a telephone conversation to discuss a p 
desist Order concerning Lincoln Savings and 
forwarded a copy of the proposed order and s 
which I have reviewed. Ms. Thayer asked if I hared her concern 
over language regarding "potential securities l iolations. I 
told her that I did because these violations were no specifically 
alleged. I was not asked to research any matter did not 
direct the deletion of any language in the pr order. I did 
not state that I or the office lacked securit law rtise to 
defend a challenge to the order. I told her that we would f 
in court any action the Department was to take. I was not 
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contacted again by the Department concerning this matter, and 
returned their materials on December 22, 1988. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Lancaster. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: How did you, or if you did not, 
say so, how did your Department, which is a legal advisor to the 
Savings and Loan in this circumstance, how did you transmit this 
concern the Attorney General's office had regarding the use of 
"potential" violations, how did you transmit this information to 
the Department? 
MR. REHM: Ms. Thayer and I discussed it during our 
telephone conversation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, how did it get to the 
Department of Savings and Loan? 
and Loan. 
MR. REHM: Ms. Thayer is with the Department of Savings 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And it got through to her? 
MR. REHM: Yes, Sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I see, so basically you advised, 
did you advise her of the potential problem? In other words, 
according to your testimony, you said, in effect, I told her we 
would defend any court action the Department decided to do. 
MR. REHM: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: But the fact is, did you advise 
her that there would be a very difficult thing to defend 
"potential"? 
MR. REHM: I told her that nonspecifically alleged 
statements, such as ''potential" securities laws violations, was 
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subject to a challenge in court, that's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So basically Ms r, then, 
was relying upon your advice and counsel, not necessarily yours, 
the Department's advice and counsel, that if t pr it 
would be at their own risk? You didn't know whether or not 'd 
be able to enforce it? 
MR. REHM: I think they proceeded with the knowledge 
that this could be a problem if it was challeng in r ' t's 
correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And that knowl e s 
transmitted, I assume, by your Department? 
Ms. Thayer during our telephone call, that's rr 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And so you ised inst is 
"potential" problem? 
MR. REHM: No, that's not correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I'm tryi Ei out whether 
you advised not to do it, or to do it. 
MR. REHM: I understand The Attor Gene a 's office 
does not involve itself in the regulatory process. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, you ce tai ly advised them 
on the regulatory process, isn't it your job to make sure 
don't jump out of line, so to speak? 
MR. REHM: That's correct, we advise them of the risks 
in litigation of various actions they are proposi on taking,but 
the client is free to accept or reject our advice and they do so, 
so when I explained to Ms. Thayer that there was a risk in doing 
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that, I wanted her to understand that this was something that was 
subject to a challenge in court. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So it's clearly, your Department 
did advise the Department of Savings and Loan that this language 
was at risk, but you at no time said they shouldn't do it, is that 
what you're saying? 
MR. REHM: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you have a question, Ms. Wright? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I just have one question for you. 
Don't you think, and probably this is more for your opinion, that 
if you did not feel that this could be, or it could be challenged 
if taken to court, wouldn't it be under the same circumstances, 
and I'll go back to the fact that we have these stops for 
supposedly trying to check out if people are drunk drivers, and 
they have been proven to be legal in court, wouldn't this be the 
same? You're basically assuming that someone is a drunk driver 
when you pull them over and they have these, as I call them, traps 
along the highways. Don't you feel this could have been the same 
situation? 
MR. REHM: I'm not sure if I follow your question. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, it is an alleged and you're 
saying that there wasn't enough information or enough legal basis 
to go forward with the cease and desist order? 
MR. REHM: No, I didn't say that there wasn't enough 
legal basis. I said that based on the unspecified language of 
"potential" securities laws violation, that this was subject to 
challenge in court. It's the regulator's decision whether or not 
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to accept or reject our advice. And as far as whethe this is 
some kind of, should be some kind of an analogous s to 
traffic stops for drunk drivers, I really think that's somethi 
for the Legislature to address, not the Attorney General's office. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: That's 1 ese. Thank you. 
Well, I mean, the Attorney General is going to jump in now and do 
an investigation. When this was raised in December of '88, why 
wouldn't you have jumped in and started an investi t then? It 
seems something was going on that wasn't ri t. 
MR. REHM: Try and recall that no matter much 
Lincoln is emblazoned on everyone's consciousness so much 
so that you probably look twice at a $5 bill, at this t Lincoln 
was just another name of another troubled savi s and l ent y, 
and it was one of a number in the State of California, the 
clients that the Business and Tax Section ith 
individuals and companies involved in confli t ith 
business laws every day. If we did a sepa ate and 
investigation of every case that we were prese 
get anything done. It just isn't feasible to s 





ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, do you know, o a other 
savings and loans that might be just another case ing 
through your office that could possibly all of a n 
another Lincoln Savings and Loan. 
MR. REHM: No, Ma'am. And obviously if we 20-20 
hindsight, this would never have happened. It obably would 




what they know now, they probably would have closed Lincoln years 
ago. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Lancaster. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Mr. Rehm, I have to ask this 
question, because one of the things I've detected throughout this 
whole hearing process is the hesitancy on the part of the 
regulators because of the fact that Lincoln Savings or ACC have a 
history of challenging in court the regulators, and I have a 
difficult time, frankly, in understanding why any agency would be 
that gun shy and not recognize the potential danger. I mean, it 
is difficult for me to understand how they could be, I'm not 
saying they were scared off, because I don't think that is 
necessarily the case, but you're obviously cognizant of the fact 
that you were going to be challenged? 
MR. REHM: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And so, therefore, everybody 
became gun shy. You can talk about the Department. You can talk 
about the Attorney General's office, everybody became gun shy of 
having to go to court. 
MR. REHM: I don't think ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And what could we do, you see, 
that's part of the process of this hearing process, is what can we 
do as a legislative body to try to eliminate that fear, because 
you can see what happens when the regulatory thing breaks down, in 
effect. It's inconceivable to me, frankly, that a "potential'' 
problem out there, you don't have the ability to go out and say, 
potentially this could be at risk. I just don't understand that 
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because it's done all the time, you can label everything in the 
world around here, potentially something is going to n. 
MR. REHM: Well, I don't think the Attar General's 
office was gun shy and the Department of Savings and Loan 
certainly wasn't gun shy because they did issue the ceas a 
desist order. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Yes, they issued the cease and 
desist order lacking what you felt would be challe 
MR. REHM: Well, I that's prudent 1 any kind f 
activity. If you want some suggestions, I'm sure the rtment 
of Savings and Loan could provide the Legislature w th lots 
suggestions as to how laws could be c 
of problems. 
to r ss the e kinds 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So the cease sis r 
that was issued was not challenged. 
MR. REHM: Not that I know of. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And it also d n't s it. 
MR. REHM: Didn't stop 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: As I under tand 
again and violated it, is that right? 
went ahead 
MR. REHM: Didn't stop what? 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Didn't s 
their instruments. 
them om se l ng 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I think they violated the cease 
desist order. 





MR. REHM: Well, I wasn't part of the final cease and 
desist order. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: My problem really is one, here 
we have a potential problem out there and obviously everybody was 
aware of it, they tried to make the public aware of it, and all of 
a sudden, boom, nothing happened and they just went on. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Rehm, you're an attorney in the 
Civil Division of the Department of Justice? 
MR. REHM: That's correct. Yes, sir . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Your responsibilities are to advise 
the Department of Savings and Loan and other departments, as well? 
MR. REHM: That's correct. The Departments of Savings 
and Loan, Insurance, Real Estate, as well as the tax ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Corporations? 
MR. REHM: No. Corporations we do occasionally, but not 
on a regular basis, no, Ma'am. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Is it within your jurisdiction or 
your responsibility to conduct an investigation into a problem 
savings and loan? 
MR. REHM: If we were requested by any of our client 
agencies, we would conduct an investigation. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How would that occur in the 
Department of Justice, who would make that decision? 
MR. REHM: The requesting agency would present it to the 
appropriate section and that 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I'm asking would that be you since 
you work with the Department of Savings and Loan? 
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MR. REHM: No. This would be a supervisi 
Attorney General above who would make the decision. 
Deputy 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: All right, so in r le 1 give 
legal advice to the Department of Savings and Loan and ther 
departments. 
MR. REHM: That's correct, as do l of the ties. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And if an order such as the one 
under discussion is challenged in court by the sub ec of the 
order, in this case ACC and Lincoln, then it would r 
responsibility to represent the State, the rtment n 
defending that order, is that correct? 
MR. REHM: That's correct, but I would not necessarily 
have been the deputy who would have been assi ned s se had 
it been challenged in court and, as a matter of fact . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But at the fron end, eason I 
assume that Ms. Thayer, Counsel for the rtment cal 
up is to get your advice before the Departmen made a decis as 
to whether to issue that order? 
MR. REHM: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In your experience, have other 
orders been challenged either by Lincoln or by other financial 
institutions in court? 
MR. REHM: I'm not familiar with Lincoln, in this 
instance. There was I believe Universal Savings and Loan did 
challenge their cease and desist order in court. that I 
can't recall. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did at any time in r conversat 
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with Ms. Thayer, did you indicate an unwillingness to defend the 
State should a cease and desist order be issued, even one that had 
language that you thought was problematic? 
MR. REHM: Not at all. Our responsibility is simply to 
inform the client agency of the risks. They make their own 
decision as to accept our advice or not to, and they make both 
decisions all the time. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was there any discussion with you 
and Ms. Thayer about Mr. Newsom's strategy of challenging Lincoln 
in a cease and desist order that might stretch the bounds of what 
was defensible? 
MR. REHM: Absolutely not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you speak to anyone other than 
Ms. Thayer about this matter prior to the issuance of the cease 
and desist order in the Department of Savings and Loan? 
MR. REHM: I don't recall doing so, it's possible I may 
have. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, do you recall speaking with 
Mr. Newsom? 
MR. REHM: No, I've never spoken to Mr. Newsom with the 
exception of just recently. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Recently being just prior to our 
last hearing of this Committee, is that correct? 
MR. REHM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you discuss with your superiors 




MR. REHM: No, not at all. This was such an absolutely, 
low-level, routine contact that I didn't r it 
supervisory staff or the management staff or the execu 
it was just one of those mundane daily things. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Has your test 
prepared with the advice or under any cons rai s r 
supervisor? 
MR. REHM: No, sir, not at all. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you coach o advise it sses 
prior to the testimony before this legislativ Commi tee? 
MR. REHM: I assume you're talking t Depa tmen 
of Corporations and the Department of Savings and ? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That's correc . 
MR. REHM: Prior to their appearance here, we did offer 
them the opportunity because we are their at r to sit down 
with us and review the process that they could c here, 
procedures. It's the same sort of review process we provide 
anyone who was having a deposition taken. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What is the reason for talking with 
your client agencies in state government before they would testi 
before a legislative Committee? 
MR. REHM: To give them an idea of he process. give 
them an idea of the fact that they should be to te 1 the 
truth, understand the questions. As I said, 's 
procedure we provide for any of our clients who are i 
deposed. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you propose t that you 
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thought the Committee might ask and did they discuss what their 
answers would be? 
MR. REHM: We did propose the type of questions that we 
thought the Committee might ask. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you ask them to give you their 
answers? 
MR. REHM: They gave us sample answers to that, that's 
correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you indicate that those answers 
ought to be modified in some fashion? 
MR. REHM: Not at all. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When you say we, who else, in 
addition to yourself, was involved in that process? 
MR. REHM: There were other deputies from our office who 
were involved in the defense of the State in the number of cases 
that have been filed. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Is the reason for your consulting 
with agency personnel prior to a legislative hearing that the 
State is the subject of civil lawsuits growing out of the Lincoln 
matter? 
MR. REHM: That's correct, the defendants. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And what is your fear as an attorney 
in their testimony, that somehow they will say things that will 
jeopardize the State's position in the lawsuit? 
MR. REHM: Certainly there is that fear that they make a 
conflicting statement simply because they haven't thought through 
things, that they might be tempted not to be forthcoming, the 
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usual kind of concerns that you have in preparing any witness in a 
case that's going to trial. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Wright. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: That brings up ano po nt. 
Did you go through the same process before red before 
the Congressional hearing? 
MR. REHM: No, Ma'am. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Why not. 
MR. REHM: I don't know that the lawsu t been fil 
against the State at that time. I'm not ce tain about that, but I 
don't recall that the lawsuit had been filed 
that time. 
inst he State at 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, it jus seems st to me 
that it would be the, say, Commissioner of Savings and Loan, the 
Corporations, Ms. Bender, why these people who are for 
committees constantly in the State Legislature, shou 
have to be rehearsed before they came befo i 
MR. REHM: I don't think rehear a 
exactly the same sort of service we prov 
Legislature if they asked us, simp an 
the process, experience some of the kinds of t 
prepared for their testimony. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Only because it was to iss 
under oath, was that the reason? 
MR. REHM: No, the reason was because the Stat 
has been named in the lawsuit, they are defendants. 




the Attorney General continues with this so-called investigation 
that he's going to do on Lincoln Savings and Loan. How is that 
going to influence this case against the State? 
MR. REHM: I don't know that I follow your question. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, you were concerned about 
the case before the State in doing your, I call it rehearsal, you 
have another term for it, which is fine and we're not going to 
play on words, but for them to go through this process before they 
appeared before the Committee, you were concerned because of the 
case. Now the Attorney General is going to do this great 
investigation, both civil and criminal. Well what bearing is that 
going to have upon the case? 
MR. REHM: I 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Should he not, he should not be 
involved in this investigation. Can't you hire someone or 
contract with someone to do the investigation rather than do it 
yourself? 
MR. REHM: You're asking me to tell my boss what to do, 
is that correct? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yeah, that's right, aren't you an 
advisor? Advise him. [laughter] 
MR. REHM: I'm sure the office has thought through all 
of the aspects of this and made the decision that they feel best. 
I'm not in a position to make policy. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I think the investigation is more 




ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Mr. Chairman, if I 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yes, Mr. Lancas r. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: You know r i e 
understand that anybody that has come before a Committee r 
anything of this nature, that he should have om 
so I think that is a proper procedure as far as I am concerned 
personally, but to go ahead and let them know at least our 
n. Bu one of the 
e 
procedures and what potentially could 
concerns that I have and I use that word 
we go, one of the concerns that I have, 
t ia ly i here 
I have 
all sincerity, your Department was obvious made 
fact that there was a potential problem, yet as far 
that's as far as it went. The t of the mat e s 
is in 
the 
I can tell, 
any further and anything, investigation went to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission from the Department, bu s far 
there was no effort to try to come up with some 
would fit the need. They just simply said the war 
created a problem, and therefore my advice is not se t, 
can te 1, 
t 
because you've lost some cases in the past from that same 
language, I don't know, but still, as far as I can tell, there was 
no effort made by anybody in the Attorney General's f ice to try 
to come around with a solution to their 
Department was trying to come up with a 
can't maybe, I just can't detect any if ther 
MR. REHM: First of all, I did not 




them was not to use it, to use the word 11 tential " in, I 




ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Let me respond this way, I can 
understand what you're saying, I did not advise you not to do that 
and if you do it, I'll defend you, but if I'm asking the attorney, 
you know, I hire an attorney to tell me what the problem is with 
something and you say, if you use the word "potential" you could 
be subject to a very extreme lawsuit circumstance, I would 
certainly listen to that advice. 
MR. REHM: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Okay, but the second step is, 
once that was made aware of what happened within your Department 
or any Department of the Attorney General's office, relating to 
this, trying to come up with some language to help the Department, 
obviously was aware there was a problem in trying to stop it. 
MR. REHM: We weren't asked to come up with any 
language. As I said before, all of our client agencies regulate 
individuals and corporations who are in conflict with business and 
tax laws. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I see, so what you're saying, in 
effect, is once you made them aware of the problem, that that was 
it as far as you were concerned because you weren't asked to 
proceed any further, is that what you're saying? 
MR. REHM: That's correct . 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: So the Attorney General's office 
at that point was out of the picture? 
MR. REHM: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you very much, Mr. Rehm, 
r your testimony. We're pleased to have Senator Hart join 
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us today who is interested in these issues. We appreciate the 
Senate involvement as well in rectifying some 
the past with respect to the savings and loans. 
the p oblems of 
I' su e Senator 
Hart probably represents some of the investors in those 
You are most welcome to ask any questions, Se 
have you here. I'd like to invite Mr. Richard Newsom ner, 
Department of Savings and Loan, to come up. Mr. Newsom was w th 
us at our prior hearing and has submitted for the ecord a 
statement and some background material which is avai le to the 
Committee and I think there are some addit l ies, are there 
not, Mr. Newsom. We'll make those avai 
Miller to swear you in. 
le. Let' as Mr. 
MR. MILLER: Mr. Newsom, you were pr sen earlie 
read the statement regarding your rights as a witness? 
MR. RICHARD NEWSOM: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: You understand that par 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
l staterne 
MR. MILLER: Do you wish to testify voluntarily under 
the conditions stated? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise your right ease. 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're to give 
before the Committee will be the truth, the who e truth 
nothing but the truth? 
MR. NEWSOM: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Okay, state your name 





MR. NEWSOM: My name is Richard Newsom. I'm an Examiner 
4 - Specialist with the California Department of Savings and Loan. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Newsom, you submitted a 22-page 
written statement, and I don't want to constrain your ability to 
tell this Committee what you feel is important. We are 
particularly looking at the issue that you raised in the last 
hearing that we were not previously aware of, you brought to our 
attention, and that is the process by which a cease and desist 
order was requested and sought by the Department of Savings and 
Loan, drafted by you, and ultimately modified before issuance and 
the process involved in that approval. Subsequent to that event 
and your testimony, there were conflicting statements about the 
process of issuance of the cease and desist order and who met with 
whom and what was said to whom and what limitations, if any, were 
placed on, or constraints, placed on your testimony, issues that 
you raised in a memo to the Coromittee. We are primarily 
interested in covering the ground that you raised on the issuance 
of the cease and desist order. You've had an opportunity to hear 
from Ms. Thayer and Mr. Rehm and we would welcome any response you 
would have to their testimony. With respect to the great detail 
that you provide, some of which replicates your testimony both in 
written form and orally that you gave before, I would just hope 
that you would summarize it and know that it is included in the 
record and we may ask questions based on it. 
MR. NEWSOM: I'll try to summarize it as much as 
possible. However, new contradictions have come up today and it 
will be difficult to take a lot out without leaving more questions 
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unanswered and you have a witness panel here who, I think, is in a 
position with fresh memories and a once in a ifet rtunity 
to corroborate or get to the bottom of this, so I get into 
more detail, I may be repetitive because some the wit sses 
have not heard the detail that it will be necessary r them to 
corroborate. I have - there are other conce ns here in 
addition to the C&D to certain actions taken 
General's office, as well as the officials of 
subsequent to my last testimony that I wou 
the State Attorney 
tme 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why don't you p 
MR. NEWSOM: It is clear that addit 
i cus also. 
, then. 
necessary because of disputes that have arisen r 
relating to the changes made to the cease and desi 
eliminating an important clause that in my n on 
have directly or indirectly stopped subordinat 
American Continental Corp. in December 198 . 
emerging of deliberate attempts by state off 








discredit or intimidate witnesses or potent a wi t t s 
contrary to the public interest. As late as three weeks 
Commissioner Crawford and Mr. Davis s to t action 
and public disclosures relative to the Li matt Something 
profound seems to have occurred since that t to e that 
position. A series of conflicting, inaccurate and believe 
deliberately misleading press releases and statements have 
put out by the California Attorney General's office and the 




how the change occurred and cast doubt on the credibility of my 
previous testimony. Stories have changed within hours and then 
flip-flopped again. Explanations have been offered that are 
inconsistent with multiple witnesses, documentation and standard 
operating procedures of the California Department of Savings and 
Loan. The A.G. 's office, which has a serious conflict of interest 
in any case drafted a self-serving, misleading press release with 
officials of CDS, ... my Department that attempted to minimize 
the A.G. 's role in the mess, at the expense of my credibility, 
only to be embarrassed within hours by contradictory admissions by 
the A.G. 's office reported in newspapers. Specifically, that they 
did see the C&D and review it. There now appears to be little 
dispute that the A.G.'s office had and looked at the draft order, 
and influenced the CDSL to weaken the order. It is clear to me 
that the A.G.'s office exhibited at least incredibly poor 
judgment, escalated problems and acted improperly contrary to the 
client's best interest. And that was the California Department of 
Savings and Loan and myself as an employee of that Department. 
The result has been detrimental to the public interest and a slap 
in the face to the subordinated debt holders who are the public 
most affected by this disaster. My previous testimony was very 
clear in stating that I was advised indirectly by California 
Department of Savings and Loan counsel in San Francisco of Ms. 
Thayer's explanation to them regarding the cause of the change in 
the cease and desist order. During the testimony, I clearly 
advised Assemblywoman Wright that it would be necessary for the 
Committee to talk to others to find out directly their story on 
49 
n~o~l" ~u 1 o 
what happened. Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto are the referenced San 
Francisco counsel and hopefully are present to testif ess 
the issue of credibility. I believe that I have been t in a 
vicious squeeze between public policy concerns warranting ull 
disclosure to the public versus tort liability conce ns and 
political concerns which require no disclosure or outright 
denials. My belief is that when 20,000 plus citizens, including 
many senior citizens, lose $250 million in a d saster r the 
conditions that existed at Lincoln, public i concern should 
override all others. I have no doubt in my mind tha some of 
these victims may end up eating pet food in what shou have been 
their retirement years because of a combinat of unconscionable 
greed and arrogance of the Lincoln/ACC empire and a total 
breakdown of the political regulatory process that should have 
protected the public. State employees who try to something to 
protect the public should not be muzzled, smeared or int dated 
when they provide a Congressional or Assemb tee 
information that may be politically or bureaucratical 
embarrassing. In conducting the hearing today, I hope the 
Committee understands that the committee's actions may be 
scrutinized by other state employees who may wish to 
about what they saw, heard and knew. If these pot 
feel that they will face the humiliation, re aliat 
out 
tial witnesses 
o la ion 
for telling the truth to the Committee that I have felt, I 't 
need to tell you that this will stifle your invest 
information from public scrutiny that should be known. The 
taxpayers and subordinated debt holders have paid their dues and 
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deserve to see all the cards face up and uncensored. The collapse 
of the Keating empire and other institutions that have 
back-scratching arrangements with Lincoln-Ace is continuing to 
create problems for our citizens beyond the obvious damage to the 
taxpayers and the wipeout of subordinated debt holders, the shark 
victims referred to earlier. Last week, a sizable insurance 
company, Pacific Standard located in Davis, California, only 20 
miles from here, was taken over by state insurance regulators with 
what was reported in the newspapers as a substantial deficit net 
worth. The National Thrift News, December 18th, 1989, stated 
that, "The failure of Pacific Standard Life will result in the 
single largest insurance company losses in the state's history, 
regulators say." Further, since California has no insurance 
guarantee fund, those losses will be borne largely by the 
company's unsecured creditors like Lincoln and its thl·usands of 
policyholders. Pacific Standard was referenced in the unsafe and 
unsound Southmark concentration of credit repeatedly referenced in 
Congressional testimony and which I included in our cease and 
desist order. I have attached copies of Southmark exhibits which 
I've placed in the Congressional record. Please note that Lincoln 
exfended almost $50 million in loans on the security of Pacific 
Standard top stock which presumably may now be worthless. 
Subsequent to the Lincoln examination, I expressed concern about 
Southmark's insurance activities to FHLB personnel, including Mr. 
Barabalak, the FHLB examiner in charge of American Continental who 
was equally concerned about Southmark and was a tremendous help in 
having a regulatory meeting in San Francisco, California. I 
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gathered that Washington was less concerned about Southmark than 
we were. Healthy insurance subsidiaries s inconsistent with 
alluded holding company and a subsequent review of Pacific 
Standard's financial statements by myself s 
inter-company receivables and investments related to its bankrupt 
parent. At Lincoln, nearly everything was worse than it looke~. 
I drafted the attached warning letter which is Exhibit A-29/30, 
dated August 16, 1989, which I drafted for Mr. Davis to the 
Department of Insurance. Receipt was subsequently acknowledged. 
This is an example of why this Committee needs to encourage 
witnesses to tell what they know about Lincoln. The pieces of the 
Lincoln puzzle and related back-scratching transactions need to be 
brought into public view and it may take years to do so. The 
information about Southmark was made available to the ic 
because it was placed in my Congressional testimony on October 
31st. My testimony will focus on three main areas, all that 
relate directly and indirectly to the cease and desist or r, C&D 
issues, the self-serving breakdown in professional respons ility 
by the A.G. 's office, tampering incidents involving Congressional 
testimony. Just to ensure that the witnesses who include several 
attorneys from my Department are able to answer questions, I would 
ask the Chairman at the appropriate time to ask the Senior CDSL 
official present to authorize the attor s to fully answer 
questions without concern over attorney-client privilege. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When we have the other witnesses 
appear following you, we'll discuss whether or not there's any 
limitation on their testimony. 
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MR. NEWSOM: Okay. I'll go to drafting the order, that 
seems to be the area of particular concern and how this carne 
about. My Congressional testimony, which I put in here as an 
exhibit . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That would be page 6, Mr. Newsom, 
you're moving over to? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you, we appreciate the 
way your going through this . 
• MR. NEWSOM: My Congressional testimony, which is an 
exhibit in this package, contains considerable information on the 
preparation of the C&D and other efforts to stop subdebt sales. 
The facts are that this order was drafted by me, starting 
approximately November 8, 1988 at the delegated request of 
Commissioner Crawford, with the staff legal support of both 
Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto. This was the day after Mr. Keating 
advised state and federal regulators that a takeover of Lincoln 
would cost FSLIC $2 billion. The shark victims were the 
subordinated debt holders - had little chance in those waters. 
The strategy of the order was that, l) violation of a cease and 
desist order would provide legal grounds for conservatorship which 
• we didn't have under existing law . 2) ordering Lincoln-Ace to 
cease and desist for making unsafe and unsound loans, engaging in 
conflict of interest transactions, and making misleading or 
inaccurate public disclosures would likely stop the subdebt sales 
indirectly because accurate disclosures are fundamental of 
securities laws. Further, because of Lincoln's pattern of doing 
53 
nno700 ut; ~ 
business, reviewing new loans made after the order would likely 
find violations that would quickly reveal grounds for a 
conservatorship. Violation of an order was grounds for 
conservatorship. 3) A cease and desist order would help paint the 
Federal Home Loan Bank ORA in Washington into a corner. They hc>.d 
the power to stop subdebt sales and we hoped the C&D would 
pressure them to do so. I kept the FHLB holding company examiners 
informed of our intentions, including the section dealing with 
misleading disclosures as they were allies in attempting to get 
ORA in Washington to stop subdebt sales. There's an Exhibit in 
here also attached to that effect. I also felt that such an order 
would put pressure on the SEC and the Department of Corporations. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Newsom, ORA stands for? 
MR. NEWSOM: Office of Regulatory Affairs, I believe, 
that's the arm under Danny Wall in Washington. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But prior to the reorganization 
under FIRREA, it would be under the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board, 
is that right? 
MR. NEWSOM: ORA was then ... I am not sure. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Now we have the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, right? OTS? 
MR. NEWSOM: FHLB preceded OTS and ORA was . • . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Anyway, it's the federalies, okay. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. Yes. Mr. Wall's boys. Speed was of 
the essence. Subordinated debt was being sold at the rate of 




to pages 848-856 which tells you what we knew in October of 1988 
about how bad this place was. The supervising examiner for the 
jou, Mr. Mare, was working at a different speed than Mr. Stelzer, 
who is the examiner in charge of Lincoln, and myself, and I 
believed it might be months before an examination report went out, 
if at all. And I believed unless I fought it through the system, 
no enforcement action would occur at all. At the outset of the 
examination, I was advised that Mr. Mare was relieved of his 
duties as supervising examiner of Lincoln for the apparent reason 
that several previous Lincoln examination reports had, in fact, 
never left his desk or been mailed to the association. I would 
emphasize this is indirect information, everybody out there, so. 
He was inexplicably reappointed during examination which created 
problems for both myself and Mr. Stelzer in conducting the 
examination and in getting a cease and desist order processed. I 
have references of this documentation here also. Both Mr. Stelzer 
and myself took exception with the management about Mr. Mare's 
resumption of supervising examiner duties on several occasions. 
As detailed in my Congressional testimony, the transactions 
supporting the cease and desist order were so appalling that I 
felt even an unsophisticated judge would understand Lincoln-ACe 
was out of control. Further, if Lincoln thought to challenge the 
order, the challenge would likely be in court, open to the public 
view. This and the fact that appallingly unsafe and unsound and 
self-dealing transactions would become public would create a 
no-lose situation for the public in terms of disclosure, even if 
we lost in court to an army of ACC attorneys. I'd like to add one 
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note here that we did discuss the possibility at the time that the 
court might be sealed. The problem is American Continental 
couldn't know before they challenged it whether it would be or not 
which gave them an additional problem to deal with in terms of our 
actions. The orders themselves appear so innocuous that I 
believed that it would sway a judge in our favor. My rationale 
was that no reasonable judge would block an order that merely told 
a publicly traded company to stop including inaccurate and 
misleading information in public reports. Even their own 
securities law firm admitted in writing to a $10 million 
disclosure error to us. The Exhibit is attached to that effect. 
And there were numerous other documented errors on which 
documentation had already been reviewed and oved by the 
Department of Savings and Loan management at the time. While 
state C&D's are supposedly confidential, I saw it discussed along 
with the federal directive issued approx tely the same time in a 
newspaper article about ACC in approximately December 1988 or 
January 1989. 
MR. NEWSOM: U.S. Representative Na Pelosi read a 
similar L.A. Times article addressing particularly the federal 
directive into the record of the House Banking Committee in 
approximately January of 1989. Now there's a lot of public 
information at that time. An important objective of the order was 
to stop, if possible, the sale of subdebt by addressing some 
disclosure errors in the order. The relevant excerpt of the 
findings which could be described as what they did wrong in the 
draft order is as follows: "Furthermore, public disclosure 
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statements lacked complete, accurate disclosures regarding the 
above-referenced Ponchartrain transaction which, in addition to 
being potential securities law violations, may result in liability 
to ACC and thereby may adversely affect the safety and soundness 
of Lincoln. Material omissions and/or inaccuracies in these 
reports include: l) Failure to disclose that the Ponchartrain 
Hotel was heavily encumbered by a $35 million mortgage with 
another lender. 2) Failure to disclose a $5 million guarantee by 
ACC of the $35 million first mortgage held by another lender on 
Ponchatrane Hotel. An additional $9 million secured guarantee 
was later provided by ACC in 1988. 3) Failure to disclose the 
below market interest rate, the preferential terms and the unsafe 
and unsound risk characteristics of the above-referenced 
Ponchartrain loan. I should note that that's the section dealing 
with those characteristics survived in the order. There's a 
footnote that relates to where we found these errors in 
disclosure. There's a proxy material dated April 8, 1988, a lO(k) 
report dated December 31, 1987, and offe~ing circulars for $300 
million in subordinated debt filed with the SEC on April 14, 1988. 
4) Investors and potential investors were advised in one report, 
footnote number four, that the management believes the terms of 
the transaction set forth in the preceding paragraphs were as 
favorable to the company as those which could be obtained in 
similar transactions with unaffiliated parties. This statement is 
misleading given the facts of the transaction. One thing that 
should be noted is American Continental in its securities public 
offerings had the practice of incorporating by reference many, 
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many other documents so that the problem they had was once they 
incorporated a lie into it, it was spread throughout the system 
like the computer virus. 5) Due to an error descri as 
typographical by American Continental's counsel, ACC's proxy 
statement dated April 8, 1988~ erroneously disc that ACC and 
a subsidiary advanced a total of $6 million to a 1 t 
partnership in which officers and directors had an interest when 
in fact the total amount was $16 million under the $20 million 
line of credit hereinbefore referenced. These findi s are very 
specific and linked to multiple documentary support. Further, the 
serious conflict of interest findings on the same transaction, the 
Ponchartrain transaction, survived legal review and were included 
in the final order. This added to my surprise regarding the 
reason for the change in the order. In essence, if it is accepted 
that the evidence shows that you can prove that insiders 
misappropriated $20 million contrary to federal regulations in an 
unsafe and unsound transaction, proving disclosure problems given 
all the evidence doesn't seem that difficult. Please note that 
the underscored section in the written testimony relative to 
"potential securities law violations" was really superfluous to 
the order and could have been taken out without effect and not 
altering the rest of that section. The relevant excerpt from the 
order part of the C&D, what they are supposed to stop doing, 
follows: 4) Permitting erroneous, incomplete, misleading or 
inaccurate information of any kind to be included in public 
reports, including Form lO(k), offering circulars, proxy materials 
or any other public information. This order includes, but is not 
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limited to, material omissions regarding related or affiliated 
parties. Please note that there is no reference to securities 
laws in this section. Therefore, the findings, what they did 
wrong, supported the order, what they are supposed to stop doing 
without regard to securities laws. This had been repeatedly 
expressed to Ms. Thayer by Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto and myself 
prior to the draft order going to the A.G. and Ms. Thayer did not 
seem to like this section. The strategies of the order were all 
known to myself, Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto, and communicated to 
CDSL's management in L.A. at the time. While we did not bring 
this up at the time, Mr. Keating was already a one-time loser with 
a previous SEC problem that might have made him particularly 
sus8eptible to pressure related to disclosure problems. 
Congressional testimony has suggested that Mr. Keating was 
particularly concerned about staying out of jail. In drafting the 
order, I used transactions that I personally reviewed myself 
involving the Hotel Ponchartrain, R.A. Holmes, and Southmark 
Corporation. I knew we had the documentation on these 
transactions and, in fact, had through Mr. Stelzer, junior 
examiners Xerox whole files related to these transactions and 
index every page, a mammoth task done in anticipation of an 
anticipated court challenge. My Congressional testimony addresses 
this in more detail. I had advised Mr. Stelzer on my fifth day 
assigned to Lincoln that enforcement action was necessary based on 
the Hotel Ponchartrain transaction alone and he had concurred. 
After drafting the order and discussing disputes with L.A. staff 
over documentation, I spent a whole day with Los Angeles 
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management. At roughly the beginning of December, and that 
included Ms. Thayer going through the order, which I had footnoted 
with over 100 footnotes linked to supporting documentation, which 
I produced to the group as requested. That included Ms. Thayer, 
Mr. Sumimoto of Los Angeles, Mr. Travis of Los Angeles, Mr. Shames 
of Los Angeles, Mr. Stelzer who is here, Mr. Mare of Los Angeles 
who left early for an emergency, and Mr. Davis who came in and out 
of the meeting. The footnoted draft C&D was included as an 
exhibit to Congressional testimony and included approximately 25 
footnoted pieces of documentation dealing with the disclosure 
problems alone. These are referenced as exhibits A-69 through 
A-83. The level of review at this meeting was extremely detailed. 
I was amazed that Mr. Mare wished to delete the whole finding 
relative to the $10 million disclosure problem because it was 
alleged to be a typographical error by American Continental's 
attorneys. The attendees represented the whole Los Angeles chain 
of command at the time and the whole purpose of the meeting was to 
satisfy management that we had the documentation to support the 
order and move forward. My impression was that was satisfied, and 
we made minor changes to satisfy the group. An E-Mail from Ms. 
Thayer, refer to page A-84, to Ms. Sakamoto followed the meeting 
which somewhat confirms that, as an exhibit. The documentation 
was indexed in several files and filled a box. Every page and 
every file was actually numbered by hand to totally organize the 
files and facilitate the review. I sent a follow-up memorandum to 
Los Angeles taking exception to suggested minor changes that 
seemed to intentionally favor American Continental Corp., which is 
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an exhibit also. The issue of adequacy of documentation was 
satisfied by CDSL management before it went to the A.G., which is 
the normal procedure. It is obvious from contemporaneous 
memorandums, referenced here as exhibits, that the intent all 
along was to take this draft to the A.G. for review which is the 
normal procedure on issuing C&D's that may result in litigation 
when time permits. That was particularly true in this case 
because of the litigious nature of ACC. My written and oral 
statements to Congress, plus exhibits to that testimony, 
• specifically addressing disclosure problems, clearly indicates my 
strategy from the beginning of using disclosure problems by ACC as 
a means to put pressure on Lincoln-ACC as well as the Federal Home 
Loan Bank in Washington, Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the Department of Corporations, to whom they were also provided. 
This was a very explicit letter to Mr. Kietty, that addressed in 
considerable detail all these errors and omissions in disclosure, 
and it's here as an exhibit. It should be particularly emphasized 
that the ''SEC securities law" violations issue seems to be raised 
as the joint Thayer/Rhem basis for removing the entire disclosure 
section as a smoke screen and was argued internally before the 
draft order even went to the A.G. Please draw your own conclusion 
• as to whether the deletion of the whole disclosure section was 
justified by "SEC securities law" red herring. With the written 
admission by ACC's own attorney of a $10 million error in 
disclosures on the Ponchatrane transaction proving that there was 
an error in disclosure, at least, appeared to be a slam-dunk. I 
hope the Co~~ittee understands that this was a fatal flaw in the 
61 
SEC regulation violations arguments. My impression through much 
of the C&D preparation process was that Mr. Mare and others were 
reluctant to issue an order and wished to water the order down as 
much as possible. I recall one heated conference call with Mr. 
Harvey and myself in San Francisco, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mare, Mr. 
Shames and perhaps others in L.A., before I went on vacation. Mr. 
Mare and others argued to weaken the order and we prevailed in 
convincing Mr. Crawford that the order should be issued including 
the section on disclosure. There had been later instances of 
difference of opinion with Ms. Thayer seeming to unreasonably 
favor ACC-Lincoln, I have indexed exhibits on that. There are 
other instances of Mr. Mare's seeming to unreasonably oppose the 
whole C&D process, I've indexed exhibits on that. I have also 
become aware that other Thayer legal interpretations unusually 
favorable to industry have caused CDSL off c als consternation, 
including one related to 1 tations on junk bonds at a large 
institution specializing in junk bonds. I would request that you 
ask Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto about this, and other telephone 
calls they had with L.A. personnel where they learned of the 
proposed change and the final change in the C&D. As noted, 
documentation indicated that prior to when the order went to the 
A.G. it was blessed by CDSL management and will be issued as per 
the memorandum from Harvey Shames, Assistant Chief Examiner in 
San Francisco supervising Lincoln, which stated, "The final L.A. 
version was delivered to the A.G. yesterday", and "I expect if the 
A.G. passes on this, we will issue it next week." This was the 
exhibit provided to the Committee on November 29, 1989. This 
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would also be the normal procedure at CDSL. The events and other 
facts addressed in this testimony have lead me to the conclusion 
that I was the victim of a deliberate campaign by the Attorney 
General's office to mislead and distort the truth at my expense, 
countenanced by Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis at the California 
Department of Savings and Loan, who so far have been unwilling to 
issue correcting news releases in spite of admissions by A.G. 
personnel, referenced in newspapers, that the A.G. 's earlier 
statements about my testimony were in error. It appears there is 
some agency involvement with that business transportation. It is 
clear to me that there has been a breakdown in the professional 
responsibility and ethics by the Attorney General's office due to 
the conflicting involvement of the A.G. 's office in the Lincoln 
matter involving their own interests. The A.G. 's actions may have 
adverse affects on serious state and federal litigation in which I 
have been, am now, or will be called as a state or federal 
witness. Neither the A.G.'s office or the California Department 
of Savings and Loan has shown any inclination to correct erroneous 
news releases. Prior to this incident, I was highly regarded by 
state and federal regulators with an outstanding track record that 
included involvement in some of the most difficult examinations 
and enforcement actions in California. I invite you to ask 
Mr. Mori to confirm that as the Assistant Commissioner in charge 
of San Francisco. To facilitate the Committee's review of this 
matter, I am providing the following testimony. On November 27, 
1989, approximately 9:00a.m., I initiated a squawk box telephone 
conference call to our Los Angeles office. Mr. H. R. Harvey, S.F. 
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staff counsel and Ms. Sakamoto, S.F. staff counsel, were present 
in San Francisco with Commissioner Crawford and his assistant, 
William Davis from L.A. present in L.A. I believe Mr. Wright of 
the L.A. legal department also attended in L.A. I stated my 
opinion that I thought it was i r riate to use the A.G. 's 
office for my proposed briefing on Tuesday by the A.G. 's office in 
L.A. relative to my pending testimony. I am disturbed that 
Mr. Crawford and Ms. Bender had spent extensive time with multiple 
A.G.'s in preparation for testimony. I stat my reason to be 
that there was a conflict of interest with the A.G. 's office 
representing us. I advised that it would pr ly come out in 
testimony in words to the effect that the cease and desist order 
had been weakened at the A.G. 's suggestion based on concerns 
reportedly expressed by the Deputy A.G., Mr. Rehm, about his 
expertise to handle litigation that might involve complicated 
securities issues. This informat had been provided to me 
indirectly by Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey, who had recollection of 
December 1988 events. Ms. Sakamoto had rais specific 
recollection of December 1988 conversations with Ms. Thayer. I 
would invite you to confirm today with these people to get rid cf 
any credibility concern here. I stat that because the weakening 
of the order may have resulted in large losses to subsequent 
purchasers of subdebt, there was potential conflict of interest 
involving the CDS versus the A.G. 's responsibility for the change. 
That seems to have understated what has happened. Mr. Crawford 
rejected my suggestion because the A.G.'s office frequently has 
similar conflicts to deal th. It should be understood that I 
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was extremely sensitive about the possibility of tampering with 
testimony. I had then indicated that I did not want to go to L.A. 
in any case because my testimony was already well known from the 
Congressional record. Mr. Davis agreed. Immediately upon hanging 
up, I called Deputy Attorney General C.H. Rehm in Los Angeles with 
Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto remaining present. I advised him with 
words to the effect that the modification of the Lincoln C&D, at 
his suggestion, based on his lack of specialized securities 
expertise, might come up in testimony on Wednesday. Initially he 
indicated that he didn't recall it. Later he indicated he did 
have some recollection of it. I don't recall the specific words, 
but I was certain that he had confirmed the foregoing statement, 
re: securities expertise. I advised him also that I could not see 
the purpose of traveling to L.A. which he agreed. As we left it, 
if the A.G.'s office had any questions, they would call me the 
following day. Mr. Rehm asked me at the end of the conversation 
if I had any thoughts or suggestions for the Corporations people 
which I took to mean to refer to Department of Corporations 
personnel testifying on Wednesday and I advised him, yes, pray. 
When we hung up, Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto and myself discussed his 
response and they also indicated they felt he generally had 
confirmed seeing the C&D and modifying the C&D because of his lack 
of securities expertise issue. That was my last direct contact to 
date with Mr. Rehm relative to this matter. Actually the first, 
too On Wednesday morning, I delivered with Ms. Sakamoto present, 
copies of my testimony to your Committee and one copy of the 
Harvey Shames memo with the attached draft of the C&D which is 
65 
attached here again to Mr. Suchil. On Wednesday I made it very 
clear in my oral testimony that I was testi ing to having been 
informed by San Francisco counsel relative to Ms. Thayer's 
comments relative to the A.G. 's role in influencing the Department 
to weaken the order. The counsel were in fact Ms. Sakamoto and 
Mr. Harvey, both of whom had confirmed their own recollections of 
the December 1988 events, re: the change to the C&D. Shortly 
after the hearing, Ms. Thayer advi me that I sstated what 
she had said. I said no, I testifi to what Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. 
Harvey had recounted to me in Dec r 1988 and which they still 
recalled. I didn't say you had told me that directly, as a 
matter of fact, we confirmed it with C.H. Rehm Monday. I don't 
recall her responding and I left. Ms. to was present for 
that. On Thursday morning, I read quotes in the San Francisco 
Chronicle attributed to Attorney General Van Kamp that "Newsom 
Was Wrong" or words to that effect. I have seen even more 
appalling quotes attributed to Mr. Duane Peterson, Mr. Van de 
Kamp's press secretary, that Newsom "either sn't now what he's 
talking about or is a liar." As I recall, the r r of thes2 
stories would be led to believe that no draft order or 
documentation had ever been provided to the Attorney General's 
office, nor would it have been the normal ocedure to do so. Mr. 
Davis advised me on Thursday morning that Thayer was claiming that 
I perjured myself on Wednesday morning during the hearing. Davis 
agreed that I had not and indicated that he remembered I very 
clearly advised the Committee that I received my information 
indirectly which is confirmed by the Committee's own transcript. 
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At 11:15 on Thursday morning, a statement was purported to have 
been read to Channel 2 and Channel 7 by Thayer which stated, in 
part, "Mr. Richard Newsom at the hearing yesterday before the 
Finance and Insurance Committee read a statement in which he 
indicated that he was informed indirectly through myself that the 
Deputy Attorney General felt that he lacked securities law 
expertise to effectively deal with any court challenge by ACC of 
the Department's order. Mr. Newsom only repeated what he was 
told, but what he was told was not accurate. It should be noted 
that Mr. Davis advised myself, Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto of this 
and provided us a copy of this on December 13, almost two weeks 
later. This statement is far less misleading than the earlier 
A.G. 's news release or the CDSL news release drafted by the A.G. 
and CDSL management issued four hours later, but still contains 
inaccuracies. Heated discussions occurred all day on Thursday, 
November 30, in which myself, Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey were 
generally involved in conversations with Mr. Crawford, Mr. Davis 
and Ms. Thayer in the L.A. office. At one of these, Ms. Thayer 
related to us the substance of Thayer's, November 29, 1989, 
conversation with C.H. Rehm wherein Thayer related several reasons 
why the order was changed. Thayer related to myself, Mr. Harvey, 
Ms. Sakamoto in San Francisco and Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis in 
L.A. that she had spoken with C.H. Rehm and what our understanding 
was on November 29 and he had told her that he recalled his 
concerns at the time he reviewed the C&D order as follows: 1) The 
SL's lack of jurisdiction authority to issue orders based on 
securities law; 2) The C&D only alleged potential violations of 
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security laws and specific violations should be alleged; 3) His 
personal lack of background in securities law, and 4) The SL 
lacked sufficient factual basis or documentation for the orders. 
I was surprised because we were back again to the initial premise 
that the lack of specific securities expert se the assigned 
A.G. was at least an admitted factor in modifying the order which 
seemed contrary to the Thayer statement read to television at 
virtually the same time. I believe Mr. Har and Ms. Sakamoto 
were also surprised from their comments and Ms. Sakamoto kept 
notes, made notes, of the meeting, of the comments. Please ask 
Mr. Rehm and everybody else to testi about this conversation. I 
don't want to have any more credibility problem here. On December 
13, 1989, two weeks later, Mr. Davis made myself, Ms. Sakamoto and 
Mr. Harvey aware of the short statement that was read by Thayer 
noted above. Mr. Davis indicated also that they had Thayer call 
all the people she called on Wednes afternoon to correct her 
statements. At about 2:00 p.m. Thursday, November 30, Mr. Davis 
advised me that a news release was being drafted by the Attorney 
General's office for the CDSL. As r to me the draft included 
a section that indicated no documentation was provided to the 
A.G.'s office which Mr. Davis indicated was being taken out at the 
Department's request. I assume that clause had been inserted by 
the A.G. 's office to be consistent with alleged denials in 
newspapers by the A.G. 's office that they even saw the order at 
that time. It is a very serious indicator that "someone" included 
an affirmative denial that documents never went to the A.G. when 




intent to do so. I put Mr. Davis on hold, gathered Ms. Sakamoto 
and Mr. Harvey on a conference call, briefed them and continued 
the conversation. On December 5, 1989, with Mr. Crawford, Mr. 
Davis, Ms. Thayer, Sumimoto and lawyer present in L.A., Shirley 
Thayer confirmed that the press release was drafted by the A.G. 's 
office, with editing by Shirley Thayer. Mr. Mori and then Ms. 
Sakamoto were present in San Francisco in addition to myself for 
this. I objected to the fact that the press release was carefully 
crafted to avoid mentioning all corroborating evidence, including 
the corroborating memo and draft C&D which was the exhibit 
provided to your Committee on Wednesday that clearly indicated 
that a copy of the order was at the A.G. 's for review. I stated 
that the press release also failed to emphasize that I had, in 
fact, accurately testified to indirect sources of information. 
The press release also failed to mention our Monday morning 
confirmation with C.H. Rehm, noted previously, and the lack of 
return phone calls from the A.G. 's office. The release referenced 
only ''a call" to the A.G. 's office and emphasized alleged 
inaccuracies in my statement. I advised that my testimony clearly 
stated that I was advised indirectly and that Mr. Harvey and Ms. 
Sakamoto had specific recollection of what they heard and related 
to me. Thus, my testimony was not inaccurate. Mr. Davis did not 
dispute any of this, but said nobody in L.A. could remember taking 
the C&D to the A.G. 's office. These alleged inaccuracies are, in 
fact, not inaccuracies in my testimony, but appear to be 
subsequently disputed recollections between Ms. Thayer, Mr. Rehm 
Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey. Subsequent events have revealed 
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inaccuracies in the recollection of Ms. Thayer and Mr. Rehm. 
These disputes did not affect the accuracy of my specific 
testimony. As indicated earlier, in my opinion, the press release 
was carefully and artfully crafted by the A.G. 's office to give 
the misleading impression in conjunction with the A.G.'s denials 
quoted in the newspapers that I was a "know nothing liar." In 
reviewing both releases, I believe that the insertion of federal 
SEC regulations in both press releases, page A-1 and A-3 of these 
exhibits, which appears no where in either the draft order or the 
final order, was a red herring possibly included to divert 
attention from the fact that in December 1988 a Department of 
State government had provided to a deputy attorney general a 
document alleging unsafe and unsound actions, conflict of 
interest, disclosure problems, as well as potential security law 
violations, that presumably might involve referral of the matter 
internally in the Attorney General's office to law enforcement 
officials, notwithstanding any separate C&D action taken by the 
CDSL. Since Department of Corporations personnel had already been 
advised of these specific disclosure concerns in November 1988, it 
added to the Attorney General's problem with the conflict of 
interest as the A.G. is defending the Department of Corporations 
against the subordinated debt shark victims. The implications of 
this are rather negative as the Attorney General's office joined 
the Department of Corporations, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Federal Home Loan Bank as agencies to which we 
sent specific information on disclosure problems while subdebt was 
still being sold. On December 1, 1989, the L.A. Daily News and on 
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December 2, 1989, the San Jose Mercury News and the San Francisco 
Chronicle published alleged recanting statements by A.G. 
officials, the location of a memorandum from Mr. Rehm to 
Ms. Thayer, that documented Mr. Rehm's review of the draft order 
which he earlier denied seeing it in other information. This was 
out of newspapers. On December 4, 1989, Mr. Davis confirmed to 
Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. Mori and myself his October 27, 
1989, statement to me on the telephone relative to his telling 
Janice Brown at agency that tampering with testimony was not okay 
because of the sensitivity of the matter. This relates to 
pre-Congressional hearing testimony. He added that agency wanted 
my testimony ''toned down." Mr. Harvey described the brief reign 
of terror that occurred when I resisted the tampering attempt. On 
December 5, 1989, a series of events occurred which triggered 
submission of the December 5th clarifying testimony to the 
Committee. In essence, the cumulative effect of the tampering 
incident and the events of the last few days led me to believe 
that a progressive attempt was being made to cover up government 
actions. The events include, but are not limited to, 
1) Mr. Crawford and Davis had earlier approved a press release on 
November 30, 1989, that mischaracterized my testimony and falsely 
claimed inaccuracies in my testimony, and questioned my 
credibility in sworn testimony, even when these facts were brought 
to the attention of Mr. Davis. We were led to believe in 
San Francisco by Mr. Davis that we would get to review the draft 
before it went out. Contrarily, when we received a copy in 
San Francisco, I called back and found Davis and Crawford had left 
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for the day and the press release was processed. I was unaware of 
any action taken by Davis and Crawford to stop the dissemination 
of misleading and self-serving information by the A.G. 's office. 
3) The press release proposed by Crawford and Davis on the 5th, 
included nothing that would correct the earlier press releases' 
adverse reflection on my credibility, even after newspapers broke 
correcting stories. 4) Mr. Crawford on December 5th about 9:30 in 
the morning said, "Don't send it," i.e., the additional testimony 
to the Committee after I faxed him a draft. I was shocked because 
that was the first time Mr. Crawford ever obstructed by testimony. 
Mr. Mori and Ms. Sakamoto found it equally surprising in their 
comments at the time. I later that day became aware that Davis 
and Crawford contacted Mr. Suchil, which I took to mean they were 
trying to short-stop my testimony going to the Committee. On 
December 13, Mr. Davis advised me, Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto 
that they did call Mr. Suchil and yourself, the Chairman of this 
Committee, and requested that information going to the Committee 
should be "channeled or funneled, through Crawford or Davis so 
they could see it." Mr. Davis indicated he did not know that 
Crawford had told me not to send it, and I assume the Committee 
was not told that fact. But in t I had sent a draft to 
Crawford that morning just for that purpose on my own volition. 
Davis also indicated that he had also spoken to Chairman Johnston 
who, and I emphasize, this is second-hand information, that that 
was a reasonable request. I assume something was lost in relating 
it to us as I can't believe . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The first-hand information is I 
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didn't speak with Mr. Davis. 
MR. NEWSOM: Okay. I assume there was something lost in 
relating it which is the next sentence because I couldn't believe 
that the Committee would do that. I asked Mr. Davis words to the 
effect, "Why did you go behind my back to the Committee when I 
already volunteered and faxed a draft to Crawford. Why not call 
me direct and discuss it. Until that day when these facts 
occurred, I'd never given you any reason to believe I would go 
behind your back.'' Mr. Davis advised us that if he knew the facts 
as I saw them, knowing that Mr. Crawford had said not to send it, 
he probably would have made the same assumption, a cover-up, as I 
had, although he said Mr. Crawford would never cover up anything 
to his knowledge. I stated that evidence for the last two weeks 
has been to the contrary. It should be particularly emphasized 
that requiring sensitive information going to an Assembly 
Committee to be "funneled" through Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis is 
inconsistent with regulations established by Mr. Crawford for the 
savings and loan industry which guarantee confidential access by 
savings and loan staff to the Department of Savings and Loan or 
the institutions outside directors. There is a copy of the 
regulation as an exhibit. I believe this is another indicator of 
an attitude change in the last three weeks. 6) Mr. Crawford's 
draft memo, which is attached here, if approved, would have 
rescricted access to the Committee, contrary to Government Code 
Section 19251, which I have also attached, and been in essence a 
gag order. I understand that Laura, Commissioner Crawford's 
secretary, advised northern California CDSL personnel, that the 
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decision not to finalize the gag order, came from Mr. Geoshegan's 
office or staff on December 5th, 1989, which seems strange. In a 
meeting on the 13th, Mr. Davis declined to identify who made the 
decision to not finalize the order to Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. Harvey and 
myself. He also confirmed that he had ordered 25 L.A. staff 
members to write down their recollections of everything they knew 
about the C&D. Mr. Harvey advised him that under the tense 
circumstances, Harvey referenced a reign of terror that might be 
viewed as intimidation, i.e., pinning down people to stories that 
they might be discouraged from changing, if their recollections 
improved or if they wished to amend. Mr. Davis stated he hadn't 
thought of that, which seems strange to me, since I understood 
Mr. Stelzer had protested that it was intimidation when he was one 
of the people asked to write the letter. At this meeting with 
Mr. Davis, Mr. Harvey also discussed a conversation he had with 
Mr. Stelzer which I understood addressed the intimidation felt by 
Mr. Stelzer, tampering with Congressional testimony. Mr. Stelzer 
told me on October 25, 1989, that he had been told that his 
pending Congressional testimony could not have supporting 
exhibits, which he planned to insert. Since the exhibits 
supporting my testimony were so numerous and so critical to both 
the credibility and the documentary support of my testimony, I 
included a "poison pill clause" in my testimony which I believe 
would discourage attempts to remove exhibits from, or otherwise 
make other than typographical changes, to my testimony. This 
clause stated, "A draft of this testimony has been provided to 
senior 
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MR. NEWSOM: CDSL officials and I understand to the 
State Attorney General's office, as well as our parent agency in 
Sacramento, however, I have requested by inclusion in this letter, 
that any material changes or requested changes, other than 
typographical or clerical, must include the name and initials of 
the requester along with any reasons to avoid tampering with 
testimony. It should be emphasized that rumors of tampering with 
testimony were widespread because of the whistle blower nature of 
the witness panel and Chairman Gonzales of the House Banking 
Committee had made it very clear in newspaper quotes that he would 
not tolerate tampering with testimony. I also understood that 
changes have been made to Commissioner Crawford's earlier 
testimony at the request or suggestion of agency. I would 
emphasize this is indirect information and I invite you to confirm 
it directly with Mr. Crawford. I have no direct knowledge as to 
whether there were changes or, if so, that ~hey were substantive. 
On October 26, 1989, the tampering incident described in my 
testimony occurred involving a bitter argument with Ms. Thayer who 
told me I would not be permitted to include exhibits with my 
testimony. At this time I had not yet faxed my testimony to L.A., 
but I believe I may have warned Mr. Mori that I was including the 
''poison pill~ clause because of Mr. Stelzer's warning to me. Now, 
again, I would like to emphasize this was before I sent the 
testimony down there, we had the argument. I told Thayer that the 
exhibits were critical to my testimony and absolutely essential. 
She told me that she would decide if exhibits were to be permitted 
and ordered a copy of the exhibits and a draft of the testimony to 
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be sent to L.A. for her review and also the review of agency, 
which I took to mean editing, "toning down" as Mr. Davis described 
on December 13th, 1989. Ms. Sakamoto was present in San Francisco 
and on the squawk box and argued against the tampering attempt. I 
advised Thayer that do you understand that what you're going 
constitutes tampering with Congressional testimony. It is me 
personally subpoenaed, not the Department, and the testimony will 
be mine. Gonzales has made it clear - no tampering with 
testimony. If anybody makes changes, I will advise Chairman 
Gonzales of the changes and who changed it. She argued, but I do 
not recall her citing a legal defense for her position. Now, as a 
little background information, Commissioner Crawford had testified 
the week earlier and he had exhibits to his testimony, so we were 
somewhat at a loss why the confusion as far as mine. I advised 
that the testimony described such bizarre events that I felt that 
the credibility of the testimony was totally ndent on placing 
the hundreds of pages of contemporaneous exhibits in the 
Congressional record for public scrutiny. I later faxed the 
testimony to L.A. with the "poison pill" clause described in 
exhibit 20, which I understood caused considerable consternation 
with CDSL management and with age I have specific 
recollection of discussing with Ms. Sakamoto before the issue of 
leaving this in or taking it out and the timing is very clear in 
my mind that L.A. did not have the document in their hands when we 
had the fight. I believe Ms. Sakamoto had arguments or 
discussions defending my position with CDSL personnel in L.A. 




conclusions, however, you would need to discuss that with her as 
it is indirect. Mr. Davis and Mr. Crawford supported me the 
following day, however, if I had caved in, it would have been too 
late on Friday to revise the testimony which was very lengthy. 
Mr. Davis advised me by telephone on October 27th that he had 
called Janice Brown at agency and advised them that the matter was 
too sensitive and that no tampering would be permitted. He was 
extraordinarily traumatic having to challenge Ms. Thayer, who I 
believed to be operating with agency instructions, that neither 
she nor anyone else could take out exhibits or make substantive 
changes. As I mentioned to federal examiners in Washington, I 
thought a royal dog house would be prepared for me in Sacramento. 
Mr. Stelzer was eventually permitted to include his exhibits to 
his testimony after I took my stand. After returning from 
Washington, D.C., I became aware of an unusual letter to the 
Commissioner from Corporations, Commissioner Bender dated 
November 2nd, 1988, inquiring as to what proof my Department might 
have that the subdebt sales were a scam as I described in my 
Congressional testimony on October 31. I was amazed. Seeing this 
letter at this point in time led me to believe that Corporations' 
approach was to totally deny history. The date stamps into the 
rtment of Corporations were also suspicious, as were 
mismatched exhibits attached to the letter. I felt that the 
tampering attempt with Congressional testimony comments by agency 
was linked somehow with Corporations' approach to denying the 
obvious, and I decided that if they tried to tamper with our 
testimony at CDSL, they almost certainly would try at 
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Corporations. I prepared a memorandum briefly summarizing the 
event, and I eventually requested to Mr. Harvey to send it to the 
FBI, because I told Congress I did not intend to be part of the 
cover-up. Following is an excerpt from that memorandum. "Given a 
subsequent letter from Corporations Commissioner Bender dated 
November 2, 1989, whom my testimony seems to have put in an 
awkward position, I am requesting a discreet, if possible, 
investigation by you to determine whether the actions of Thayer, 
Janice Brown and perhaps others, potentially violated state or 
federal laws or regulations." It was my opinion that this was a 
serious tampering attempt and that the text and all the exhibits 
would have gutted without my personal and harsh stand. State 
employees should not have to fight so hard just to tell the truth. 
As an attached exhibit, there was a contemporaneous E-Mail sent 
down the afternoon of the tampering incident to Ms. Thayer which 
essentially says that I'll take anything out, but only if the 
State Attorney General will give an opinion that it's not legal to 
take it. I got no response and that was when I asked that 
question during the discussion, I got no response on legal 
reasons, I kept trying to find legal reasons. With all due 
respect to the Committee and the seriousness of referring to a 
government cover-up, I believe the facts indicate the probable 
cover-up and warrant referral to whatever government agencies 
monitor governmental and political abuses for further 
investigation. That's it, thank you for your patience. I just 
wanted to get it all out. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you, Mr. Newsom, and for the 
78 
supporting documents. It will probably take us some time to 
thoroughly review the materials you've given us. I wanted to 
cover a couple things with you. On November 29, 1989, at our 
prior hearing, you raised the issue of the change in the cease and 
desist order. I had looked for sorn•~ prior rai~1inq o[ that~ is~;up 
in your Congressional testimony and didn't find it. 
MR. NEWSOM: The exhibits themselves 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What I was going to say is today, 
just in trying to keep up with you in your exhibits, indicate that 
you did have some internal conversations about that, is that 
right? 
MR. NEWSOM: You mean, at our Department? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yes, after the decision was made to 
issue the Cease and Desist order, is that right. 
MR. NEWSOM: To back up, you mean the decision made to 
issue the cease and desist order was Mr. Crawford told me on 
November 8, or I got the word from Mr. Stelzer indirectly, to do 
the order. The order actually took seven weeks approximately of 
processing and arguing. The documentation discussion that 
everybody attended was at the beginning of December because 
there's an E-Mail dated December 2, I believe, in here from 
• Ms. Thayer that follows up that meeting, so we had discussed this 
potential securities law thing. That was in it from the beginning 
and it was in it at that point when documentation was specifically 
discussed. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That was December 1988 . 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, December 2 - just prior to December 2. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The first time you raised this issue 
publicly, at least, was November 29, 1989. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You did not raise it or allude to it 
in your Congressional testimony. 
MR. NEWSOM: Right. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why was that? 
MR. NEWSOM: It didn't seem significant enough in 
relation to what Congress was looking for. I put both documents 
in, but at that point, and I think my written testimony, frankly, 
I'm really surprised, in a sense, of the reaction over this. I 
think it was a horrendous fight we had, but I believe we discussed 
it with the Congressional staff person at the time, I think that 
came up, my recollection is vague, but we had two days or so, 
actually I got the subpoena Thursday night from Congress, so a lot 
of things ended up on the cutting room floor. One of the things I 
found on Lincoln is that what seems important now may not have 
seemed so important two months ago because it seems like there are 
efforts to recreate history, or to argue what over what we thought 
had occurred. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How long have you been with the 
Department of Savings and Loan. 
MR. NEWSOM: Five years. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Five years - 1984, 1985 
MR. NEWSOM: December - the day after Pearl Harbor Day 
in 1984 - December 8. 




it! (laughter] You had not previously been assigned to the 
Lincoln case until the fall of 1988. 
MR. NEWSOM: Right, September 1988. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When you took your responsibilities 
on, did you consult with the people in your Department who had 
already specifically worked on the Lincoln matter? 
MR. NEWSOM: Let's see, I spent approximately a whole 
week down in Los Angeles with Mr. Stelzer. It was almost an 
orientation deciding scope, because my real role was to be in 
Phoenix, so the first week assigned to Lincoln was actually with 
Mr. Stelzer, reading over reports, familiarizing myself with what 
was going on. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In Mr. Crawford's testimony at our 
last hearing was that one of the tricks of ACC was to move the 
books to Arizona, and that made it more difficult to examine the 
savings and loan unit. Your job was to follow those books to 
Arizona, is that right? 
MR. NEWSOM: Well, no, my real, I had several duties 
that the holding company records were in Phoenix, and my 
particular responsibilities were to examine the holding company, 
although that quickly changed when we realized that there were 
major holes in the Federal Home Loan Bank examination, Lincoln 
examination. So I essentially became a spy in Arizona for 
Mr. Stelzer, and also my job was to attempt to get things done. 
Actually, at the time, I felt I had a mandate, also, from 
Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis that they definitely wanted something 
to happen on this institution at this time, so that's why ... 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did your belief that they wanted to 
have something done with respect to Lincoln change? 
MR. NEWSOM: Well, my only beliefs have changed 1n the 
last three weeks based on what happened after the last hearing and 
what has come out. Prior to that we had problems with 
lower-level, with the supervising examiner on the job, and 
frankly . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Who was that? 
MR. NEWSOM: Mr. Mare who testified last time. We also 
had problems getting things through the chain of command in terms 
of there was a lot of resistance to ideas, to new approaches on 
getting something done. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You link the examination of the 
investments made by ACC and the Ponchartrain Hotel, specifically, 
to the viability of ACC to pay back the bond holders, right? 
MR. NEWSOM: As part of it, yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: As part of it, I mean not solely, 
because we relate it to the bond issue. 
MR. NEWSOM: By the end of October, early November, I 
had identified about $50 million in loans that were just de~d 
losses. Mr. Stelzer was finding more. By the beginning of 
December, the tentative loss numbers were $140 million on 
Lincoln's books, which was substantially more than American 
Continental's whole net worth 1 so they are effectively gone. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When you came on the job in 
September of 1988, is that right, September of 1988 ... 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
82 
C00749 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In your view, you would have looked 
at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board examination from 1986, 1987? 
MR. NEWSOM: I believe I did, yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And other examinations that the 
Department had been involved in . 
MR. NEWSOM: I'm not sure I saw those because I don't 
believe, it's my recollection that some of the reports hadn't gone 
out, so mainly I relied on the Federal Home Loan Bank examination 
report. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Wasn't there a considerable body of 
evidence that had been accumulating, much of it produced by people 
in your own Department, to indicate serious problems with Lincoln 
and ACC? 
MR. NEWSOM: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The bonds were approved first in 
November, December of 1986, and then again in May of 1988 for 
sale, not by your Department but by the Department of 
Corporations. Since that's not your job, you're an examiner, 
there would be no reason why you would have taken particular note 
of that, I assume? 
MR. NEWSOM: Lincoln wasn't even, I'm in San Francisco 
so it wasn't even one that was assigned to us, so all I knew about 
Lincoln was what I 3aw in the newspapers and an occasional 
document addressing the dispute between the . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Once you started working on the file 
beginning in September, you realized, I assume, that there had 
been a whole history both of examinations of Lincoln and approval 
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of the bond offerings? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That caused you some concern, did 
it? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, it blew me away. In fact, as one of 
the exhibits in here is dated in mid-October, it was an interim 
report of examination, and . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: October of 1988? 
MR. NEWSOM: October 1988, and the problem in early 
September, the Federal Home Loan Bank in Washington, ORA, had shut 
off all tax-sharing payments going to American Continental from 
Lincoln which was about the last viable source of cash, if you 
call that a viable source. Essentially from that point on, the 
way we looked at it with the losses that we were seeing, there's 
no way there's going to be dividends going up, there's no way 
there's going to be income to throw off tax-sharing payments and 
those were cut off also. By mid-October, it appeared to us that 
there was no way that these subdebtholders had a chance. Everyone 
from October on . . . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was that the view of your colleagues 
and superiors that you talked with about? 
MR. NEWSOM: It was the view of Gene Stelzer. We had 
several meetings, I believe, and Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis, I 
think, also felt that the whole thing was, that they were had, it 
was gone. The problem was proving it. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Right. You were here for Mr. 
Crawford's testimony last time and he said that he had advised the 
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Department of Corporations, prior to their approval of the bonds 
in May of 1988, the kinds of problems you describe . 
MR. NEWSOM: I saw you hold up the Federal Home Loan 
Bank report with $30 million in losses. Also, I saw Christine 
Bender said she admit that she saw it, too. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Correct. So in November, December, 
is it fair to say that you devised the strategy that you refer to 
on page 6 of your statement today, the strategy to . 
MR. NEWSOM: Include the disclosure? 
• CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Include the disclosures? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: As a way of doing a number of 
things, right? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, we were trying to build a fire under 
the behinds of other regulatory agencies. We were also trying to 
put the . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did that include the State 
Department of Corporations? 
MR. NEWSOM: Absolutely. One of the exhibits in here is 
a letter dated mid-October to Mr. Kielty, Chief Counsel from 
American Continental Corp., which addresses in detail all the 
disclosure problems we saw. In fact, there were several, I wrote 
three letters, let's see, there's an early October letter dealing 
with the horrendous problems, I believe October 6th letter, which 
is referenced in the letter that I provided to you. You have the 
October 6 letter in the Congressional testimony. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We have the October 18th letter that 
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you provided today. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: To Mr. Kielty and your earlier 
October 6 letter. My point here, really, what I wanted you to 
perhaps amplify on was this - development of a strategy to cripple 
the ability of Lincoln to sell bonds, right. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: ACC to sell the subordinate 
debentures through Lincoln, okay. Now, when I asked Ms. Thayer 
about that, her answer was basically that we have to follow the 
law and a strategy that ignores the law, in her judgment, cannot 
be done or should not be done. What is your response to that, and 
did this debate go on internally? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, it went on, there were ferocious 
debates. In fact, I was involved in some. Mr. Harvey was 
involved in some with Ms. Thayer and Ms. Sakamoto was involved, 
also. The problem is there is, unsafe and unsound is a fairly 
nebulous law. What the Commissioner decides is unsafe and unsound 
that he believes is unsafe and unsound and can support, is a 
violation of the law. The guts of this order were that lying to 
the public is inherently unsafe and unsound for a publicly traded 
to do. When you get into the materiality of it, that's where you 
end up, perhaps, in a securities law argument, but we were not 
arguing materiality, we just said you have to stop lying to the 
public, in essence, and since we have instances of errors, 
omissions, that's our basis for telling you to stop. There was no 
law argument. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Are you an attorney? 
MR. NEWSOM: No. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was there an attorney involved in 
the strategy who agreed with your approach? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, two, both are northern California 
attorneys, I believe. Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey who are 
witnesses today. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We'll stipulate the value of people 
from northern California, they're going to testify in a moment, 
and they are attorneys, okay. You said that the cease and desist 
order would force ACC to more accurately tell the public what the 
condition of their company was, is that right? 
MR. NEWSOM: That was the purpose - the technical 
problem they had is that since they had prospectuses outstanding 
that included errors in them and the one that we particularly 
honed in on was the Hotel Ponchatrane, which was an appalling 
theft, really, of inside company assets, violated regulations 
involved 20 to 30 insiders. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I don't doubt that. Our first 
hearing on this subject, which I don't think you were invited to, 
so you probably weren't here, but the witnesses that we had and 
perhaps this was the experience in Washington at their hearings, 
was that the people who bought these bonds said either that they 
weren't actually given the prospectuses, or in being given them, 
they were so aggressively sold the bonds that they didn't read the 
prospectuses or read them long after the fact. Do you have reason 
to believe that this cease and desist order, if carried out in the 
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fashion that you said it should be and it was upheld by a court, 
which is problematic, would have caused a different behavior on 
the part of unsophisticated bond purchasers? 
MR. NEWSOM: What I think it would have created was not 
in terms of unsophisticated bond purchasers who were going to be 
looking at the tape down at Merrill Lynch to see the latest public 
disclosure, but a court battle with Lincoln-fu~erican Continental 
against its primary regulator, if they took the position of saying 
you guys didn't tell the truth to the public and you guys told the 
public that on a $20 million transaction, that you guys 
essentially stole money without recovery or repayment, that the 
same terms and conditions you'd afford the general public, that 
would be news. The news itself would get to a lot of those 
people. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: It was a legal and press strategy, 
is that fair to say? 
MR. NEWSOM: Well, what we hoped was that if we laid 
something like that on the Department of Corporations, as well as 
the SEC, it might have gotten them off their decision-making 
process to figure, gees, what do we do now. If the primary 
regulator issues an order to an institution saying that they are 
misleading the public in their public disclosures, how is the 
primary securities regulator going to react when they open their 
mail and see that order? We felt that by going to all these 
different people, we would find somebody who would turn the button 
off, who would do something. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. Let me ask you about 
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something else. In your testimony on page 15, if you could turn 
to that. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You recount reasons that you say Ms. 
Thayer gave to yourself and the other people, that she got from 
Mr. Rehm of the Department of Justice, his concerns the C&D, 
right? 
MR. NEWSOM: Well, what this recounts is that it was our 
understanding at the time that when she said this, she said she 
had talked to Mr. Rehm like the day before, and that's what he 
remembered. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, here's my question. You list 
four matters, and some of them are consistent with Ms. Thayer's 
testimony today and also with Mr. Rehm's testimony today, 
particularly the issue of alleged potential violations, and the 
need for specific violations, okay. Now, when your testimony goes 
on, the only one that you seem to focus on was No. 3, the personal 
background in securities law. Would you care to comment on the 
other ones? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, the other ones are addressed elsewhere 
in the body, here, just the fact that we had, I think, 25 
• footnoted pieces of documentation supporting this thing, the fact 
that it had been gone through the complete review process by CDSL 
management, an all day meeting. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Which management? 
MR. NEWSOM: Our management, the Department of Savings 
and Loan. From the top down, I spent a whole day in L.A. with 
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Ms. Thayer and everybody up through -Mr. Crawford didn't attend, 
Mr. Davis dropped in and out, but the whole chain of command, the 
documentation we were led to believe at that point was totally 
satisfactory, and in fact the issue of inadequate documentation 
kind of surfaced at this point. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You, in your, I found it when you 
referred to it when you were speaking, but I'm not sure I can at 
the moment, you refer to a memo from, I think, Ms. Thayer that you 
provided us with, that in your judgment seems to indicate that 
everything was in order except that it had to be checked with the 
A.G. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, it indicated that subject to Mr. Mare 
who left part way through it, that's the memo. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, and you just suggested that 
Mr. Mare, in your view, was resistant to the kind of aggressive 
strategy that you were proposing. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. You've heard before, 
obviously, and it's in your testimony and you've heard the 
testimony of the Department's lawyer and the lawyer from the 
Department of Justice, the problem with ''potential" violations of 
law. How seriously do you weigh that? 
MR. NEWSOM: Since the order was not based on potential 
violations of law, what it was based on was factual errors ln 
disclosure, I think that in here we address, that's the 
underscored section that we invite anybody to look at and decide 
for themselves. We were, I think Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto and 
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I felt that if that was going to kill the deal, we could just take 
those three words out and the order could be issued just exactly 
the way it_ wao;. 'I'he potential sPcurit:ies laws issuE~ i:..; really a 
red herring and I think that's the phrase I used in discussing it, 
because if you took that little section out, the order would have 
still stood on facts, details, Section 8200 of unsafe and unsound, 
we would just be arguing do we have the facts to support the 
order, I mean, the answer is yes, we had the facts. We even 
referenced them in the order, the public disclosure statements 
that these particular errors were in, so we had already discussed 
that. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Thayer said that the SEC has 
still not made a determination as to whether there was a violation 
of law. You've previously criticized the SEC, at least 
implicitly, in saying that they needed a fire to be lit under 
them, I think were your words, what's your reaction to . 
MR. NEWSOM: Let's see, I talked to the SEC a couple 
days ago also. In fact, they called me up because one other thing 
that I called them about in July, they didn't want at the time, 
now they want it. My understanding from the Congressional 
testimony is that they have redoubled their efforts at this point 
I 
and probably wish they had done more earlier. At the time last 
year, from conversations with SEC people, I understood they only 
had about two or three people working on this thing, and when I 
talked to the SEC person myself a couple days ago, I asked have 
you guys figured out on the Ponchartrain yet and they hadn't 
figured it out yet, either, but in terms of whether it was a 
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securities law violation or not is irrelevant to the order, 
really. In terms of that potential securities law was not 
fundamental to that order, it was a phrase in there and I believe 
we inserted it to put a little pressure on ACC, but the facts 
didn't require that we prove a securities law violation in that 
order. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Then you don't quarrel with the 
judgment by the attorneys who are expert in the legal matters, 
presumably, Ms. Thayer and Mr. Rehm, to remove the language 
relative to potential violations? 
MR. NEWSOM: I have actually discussed that with our 
northern California attorneys and I believe at the time we 
discussed it also, that if somebody, if that was a deal breaker to 
somebody in getting the order out, then just wipe that little 
section out, but that those three words, but that section still 
stands on its own without it. The order says that the findings 
are you've got $10 million errors, their own attorney admitted it, 
they've got other errors in there that we pinned down that weren't 
argued, and the order says tell the truth, it doesn't say, we 
don't need to tell them to not violate laws, so the problem is the 
whole section coming out. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Newsom, a lot of your testimony 
is devoted to events and impressions since our last hearing. Have 
you been limited in any way in presenting the testimony, is it 
full and complete as you want this Committee to have it today? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, it's not hardly likely that people 
would try to tamper with my testimony at this point. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And you've submitted to the 
Committee all the documents, at least at this point, that you feel 
we should have and pursue. 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes, at this point. One of the problems of 
the Lincoln story is, you get something out in public and two 
months from now, we'll probably be asking more questions about it 
because it's a puzzle and if somebody disputes what we think is a 
fact today, you may want more documentation later, but 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you very much. Ms. Wright? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Just two questions. Could you 
have gone forward with a cease and desist order based strictly on 
the fact of false advertising in relationship to these bonds? 
MR. NEWSOM: You mean, these errors? Yes, that was my 
opinion, that was the opinion of our northern California attorneys 
at the time also, that the potential securities law was not, it 
was a red herring, it didn't matter that much. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: But your counsel in her 
presentation before you, at least to my interpretation, is stating 
that basically the whole reason for throwing it out was based on 
this SEC violation. 
MR. NEWSOM: I heard that, too. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: This doesn't make sense to me. 
MR. NEWSOM: Me neither. You'll have opportunity to 
talk to our northern California attorneys who were working on this 
also and get their opinions, but it seems - I was angry at the 
time because the cows were long since out of the gate, but 




ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: What is the relationship, is 
Ms. Thayer a higher employee than the other two, Mr. Harvey and 
Ms. Sakamoto, or are they on the same level as far as their 
positions are concerned? Would Ms. Thayer, in other words, if 
Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey said, yes, we should still go forward 
with the cease and desist order, would Ms. Thayer have the ability 
to cancel out their request, is she above them in pecking order? 
MR. NEWSOM: As far as their structure, it would be 
better to ask, there's a chief attorney and I don't know exactly 
how their lines work over there. In effect, that's what happened 
this time, I think, but I don't know you'd better ask them because 
I'm not an expert on their reporting, or perhaps 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Ms. Thayer also stated that the 
cease and desist order wouldn't have meant anything in regards to 
eliminating the sales of bonds because most of them were already 
sold. Do you have any idea as to what would have been the 
difference if the cease and desist order had taken place in 
December, its relationship to how many bonds would not have been 
sold? 
MR. NEWSOM: Yes. They were selling, at the time, we 
were told about $700,000 a day in subordinated debt. Remember we 
got, in January, from federal examiners was that it was about 
$10 million sold in January. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: So we could have saved about at 
least that $10 million? 
MR. NEWSOM: That was my opinion. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I don't know whether it's 
appropriate to make a statement with you there, but I tell you 
what I get the feeling, is that a lot of people dropped the balls 
with this whole issue, and not whether Lincoln is all of a sudden 
become a big headline issue, sure it's in the headlines now, and 
everybody is sensitive, and I think what's happening now is a lot 
of people are trying to cover up for the simple reason that it is 
such a big item in the newspapers today and so sensitive, but I 
think the past - I guess what I would like to see from these 
agencies and departments, including the Attorney General, is the 
simple statement that we goofed and we should have done things 
differently, instead of this constant trying to change what took 
place, or giving the reason for why we didn't do it. Just say you 
didn't do it and you were wrong. Thank you, Mr. Newsom." 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Any votes you wish you didn't make? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: So far, no. 
MR. NEWSOM: There's some things I wish I had done, too. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you very much, 
Mr. Newsom, we reciate your testimony. I'd like to ask 
Sheila Sakamoto, H. R. Harvey and Eugene Stelzer and Osamu Mori if 
are all here, if would please come up to the table and 
we'll ask Mr. Miller to swear them in and I assume their testimony 
is the purpose of shedding additional light on the discussions 
that Mr. Newsom had with others in the Department relative to the 
cease and desist or r. 
MR MILLER: morning, I believe each of you were 
present in the room earlier this morning when I read to you the 
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statement regarding your rights as a witness before a legislative 
Committee. Would each of you indicate whether or not you 
understand that statement. 
MS. SHEILA SAKAMOTO: Yes. 
MR. H. R. HARVEY: Yes. 
MR. EUGENE STELZER: Yes. 
MR. OSAMU MORI: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: All the witnesses have indicated they 
understood the statement. Do each of you agree to testify 
voluntarily under the conditions stated? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Yes. 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. 
MR. STELZER: Yes. 
MR. MORI: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Let the record reflect that all the 
witnesses have indicated yes. Would you raise your right hands, 
please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to 
give before this Committee with be the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Yes. 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. 
MR. STELZER: Yes. 
MR. MORI: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Thank you. Will each of you state your 
name for the record, please. Would you speak into the microphone 
at the podium there and state your name. 




Department of Savings and Loan. 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Sheila Sakamoto, Staff Counsel. 
MR. STELZER: I am Gene Stelzer, Specialist 4 for the 
rtment of Savings and Loan. 
MR. MORI: My name is Sam Mori. I'm the Assistant 
Savings and Loan Commissioner for San Francisco. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Stelzer, you have a statement 
you'd like to read to the Committee. 
MR. STELZER: Yes. Mr. Chairman and members of the 
Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this 
Committee. My name is Gene Stelzer. I am currently a supervising 
examiner with the California Department of Savings and Loan. I 
was the examiner in charge of the July 1988 examination of Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Association and was also in overall charge of the 
examination of both Lincoln and its holding company, American 
Continental Corporation. 
the examination of ACC. 
surrounding the cease and 
Mr. Newsom was the examiner in charge of 
My statement is concerned with the issues 
ist order that was issued by the 
Department of Savings and Loan in December 1988 against Lincoln. 
I will begin by briefly outlining the financial situation at 
Lincoln and its rent company, American Continental Corporation, 
as I rstood it in November 1988. My understanding of what we 
knew about the financial condition of these firms in November 
1988, the significance of the decision to delete the clause 
related to disclosures being made in the public documents of ACC, 
should be clarified. In writing this, I have had time to only 
consult sever documents essential to this topic. My 
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recollection concerning the knowledge that I had about the 
financial condition of Lincoln and American Continental 
Corporation in November 1988 is as follows. It was evident to me 
that ACC was engaged in a vast Ponzi scheme. A major source of 
its cash flow, the tax-sharing payments from Lincoln, had been 
halted by the Office of Regulatory Affairs of the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board. The only other significant outside source of 
cash flow was coming from additional debenture sales. Funds from 
the debenture sales were being used to pay corporate expenses, pay 
for the repurchase of ACC stock from the Keating family and 
others, and pay off its sharing debt. The financial condition of 
the major subsidiary of ACC, Lincoln, was also known by me to be 
very bad. Mr. Newsom had determined that there was $50 million in 
losses on just two commercial loans. The interim Department 
examination report on Lincoln dated October 3, 1988, reported that 
as a result of DSL review appraisals, there were potential 
appraisal losses amounting to $33.5 million. The report also 
indicated that many of the major real estate for development 
projects of Lincoln will be classified which indicates that they 
were not functioning properly. My opinion at the time was that 
the results of the examination clearly showed that the debenture 
holders had little chance of ever getting their money back and 
that a massive fraud was being perpetrated on the public. This 
was a situation as I understood it in November 1988, when I 
received instructions from Commissioner Crawford to prepare a 
cease and desist order. I assigned the person that I felt was 
best qualified to develop an effective cease and desist order, 
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Dick Newsom, to be in charge of doing this job and assigned other 
examiners to help him on this project. My recollection is that 
Mr. Newsom worked very hard on this assignment, and was even able 
to obtain the assistance of both the Department attorneys in 
San Francisco, H. R. Harvey and Sheila Sakamoto. Mr. Newsom also 
did something for which I believe he deserves the highest praise 
he put a clause in the proposed cease and desist order that was 
intended to stop any additional debenture sales. The clause as it 
was stated in Draft No. 6 of the proposed cease and desist order 
is as follows: The Commissioner orders Lincoln, or any other 
subsidiaries, cease and desist from the following: 
3) Permitting erroneous, incomplete, misleading or inaccurate 
information of any kind to be included in public reports, 
including lO(Q), offering circulars, proxy materials, or any other 
public information. This order includes, but is not limited to, 
material omissions regarding related or affiliated party 
transactions. That's the end of the clause in the draft. As I 
understand the strategy of Mr. Newsom on this clause, his plan was 
as lows. l) If Lincoln and ACC challenge this order in court, 
this would provide an opportunity to bring the financial condition 
of hese firms to the attention of the public during the legal 
ings. 2) If the order was not challenged, it might provide 
a of exerting pressure on other agencies, in particular, the 
fice of Regulatory Affairs of the Federal Horne Loan Bank and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, to take some action to stop 
the debenture sales. 3) It might provide the Department of 
Savings and Loan with a valid reason to put Lincoln in a 
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conservatorship. A section of the savings and loan law, 
8225(a)(5) provides us a reason for putting an association into 
conservatorship the following: 11 The Association is in violation 
of an order or Injunction as authorized by this Division. If the 
prospectus for the debentures was not corrected after this order 
became effective, Lincoln would be in violation of the cease and 
desist order. Whether this plan by Mr. Newsom to put a stop to 
the debenture sales would have worked is now problematical. What 
is clear is that his plan was never given a chance to work because 
the clause was removed from the final version of the cease and 
desist order. The decision to remove this clause was a fateful 
one for those citizens of California who continued to purchase ACC 
debentures. As far as I know, this was the only actual plan 
developed by anyone in state government to stop the debenture 
sales of ACC. It was never clear to me what significant damage 
could occur to the Department and the State of California if the 
clause had been put in the order and Lincoln had prevailed on this 
particular issue in court. This question seems particularly 
relevant given the information that we had about the financial 
condition of Lincoln and ACC at the time this clause was deleted. 
I'd like to make one other point and that's that we had no idea 
how much additional debenture sales were going to occur. It's 
just after the fact that we happened to be able to get a figure, 
but I think there was an enormous reluctance on the federal people 
to put Lincoln into conservatorship, and they did this, I think, 
just when they were finally sort of forced to. We didn't know 
that they were going to do this. It wasn't at all clear. We had 
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no information that would show whenever this would happen. We 
didn't even have any information showing that the Department of 
Corporations wouldn't issue a permit for more bond sales. They 
were permitting the one to go on, if that was okay, there's no 
reason they couldn't have issued another one, so that the 
potential debenture sales could have been enormous. This is the 
information we were acting on in November of 1988. So as a matter 
of fact, there was maybe a minor amount compared to what might 
have happened if the examining results hadn't been so devastating 
and finally forced the federal people to put it into 
conservatorship. So we had an almost unlimited potential here for 
losses and we knew about it. There's no excuse for not acting in 
terms of us not knowing the financial condition. We had basically 
finished our examination work. We had what we call management 
meetings with Lincoln personnel where we present our findings and 
there were two of these, they were both in November, and this 
means that basically what I put in the draft of my board letter to 
Lincoln, we really mostly knew all of that in November. There may 
have been some ts we didn't have, we had ongoing appraisals, so 
I may not have had some appraisal results, but if you look at that 
draft of the board letter, you'll see enormous losses, bad assets 
t t were classified. Basically, we had most of that knowledge. 
I don't think all of it, that's why, and I didn't cite that, but 
we had most of that knowledge in November and it just showed a 
financial disaster. That's the points I wanted to make here. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Stelzer, how long have you been 
with the Department of Savings and Loan? 
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MR. STELZER: Approximately five years. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How long did you work on the Lincoln 
matter? 
MR. STELZER: I was assigned as an assistant on a 
special examination in 1987, I was assigned to work on loans. 
That examination was interrupted for quite a long period of time 
and then the exam was resumed and I went back by myself as 
examiner in charge. I was not examiner in charge and didn't 
design the exam, but I was sent back to finish it, and that was 
very valuable because I was aware of a lot of things I needed to 
do on this exam. I was aware that Lincoln, for instance, didn't 
have records of their loans. They'd give you a schedule, they 
would give you the loan number, the name of the borrower, and the 
amount of the loan, and that was it. And you didn't know if those 
were commercial loans, real estate loans, purchase loans, you 
didn't know where the loans, where the property was located that 
was securing the loans. There was practically no information. It 
was just astonishing. These were all over a million dollar loans, 
and so one of our exam objectives was to develop schedules, which 
we did, with a data base on these loans and that was just a first 
basic step. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What period of time are you speaking 
about, now? 
MR. STELZER: For the schedules. I did this 1987 exam 
and finished it in late 1987, and turned the report in. Then I 
was reassigned in June of 1988 and began working on the Lincoln 
exam and then in August it ... 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: June of 1988? 
MR. STELZER: Yes, as examiner in charge. I was working 
in the office initially just getting prepared for it. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Your testimony, Mr. Stelzer, is a 
strong critique of your own Department's handling of the matter of 
Lincoln Savings, isn't it? 
MR. STELZER: Well, I'll let other people decide that, 
but I do want 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, because your testimony really 
relates to the entire period that Lincoln was a troubled 
institution, and that goes back prior to your direct involvement 
in June of 1988. In fact, the bonds were sold in 1986 and then 
earlier in 1988. Mr. Crawford of your Department testified that 
they had been aware of the problems and had pursued them with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board at earlier stages and had made the 
Department of Corporations aware of these difficulties prior to 
the Department of Corporations' approval of the second $150 
million bond fering, and the Department of Savings and Loan had 
rescinded the ability of Lincoln to sell those bonds in the 
lobbies. All those actions you view as insufficient? 
MR. STELZER: Well, they didn't stop the debenture 
sa es. There were efforts, but nothing, nobody stopped the 
nture sales. Lincoln-ACC just stopped them themselves. So 
hat's why statement is that . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The responsibility for the sale of 
the res was the Department of Corporations. 
MR. STELZER: Right. But I think what Dick Newsom did 
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was to see if we couldn't do something about it with his clause. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I understand you are in support of 
Mr. Newsom's recommendation and his strategy, but you're his 
supervisor, are you not? And you've been with the Department as 
long as he has and, in fact, you were working on Lincoln matters 
prior to the time he was involved with them. Were you privy to 
discussions about Lincoln and how it could be brought under 
control? 
MR. STELZER: No, not really, because I was a field 
examiner, which means I'm out in the field. So, for instance, in 
the 1987 exam, I simply was out in the field and I write up my 
report and send it in. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Looking at Lincoln? 
MR. STELZER: Yes. I send it in and I don't 
necessarily ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What was your judgment at that time? 
MR. STELZER: In 1987? We only looked at the 
underwriting, the documentation of underwriting. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What did you find? 
MR. STELZER: No underwriting, it was terrible, I mean 
it was just totally obvious that there was no underwriting. We 
did their real estate for investment, loans and securities, and 
for instance, on the securities files, there were no prospectuses, 
no memoranda, there wasn't even the basic documents to do an 
underwriting, so- and that's in my 1987 report. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you recommend any enforcement 
action to your superiors? 
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MR. STELZER: I wrote a, and this is standard practice, 
is you write a proposed Board letter which I did and there were 
certain constraints they wanted, so I didn't put in the REI, the 
real estate for investment, but for the securities, I recommended 
that they not be permitted to buy anything but investment grade 
securities. For loans, I put in a clause saying they couldn't 
make any loans over a million dollars, and they only make loans 
over a million dollars. Basically, they have a few under that, 
but almost all their lendings are over a million, so that would 
have stopped a lot of things. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Where did that recommendation go? 
MR. STELZER: It went to my supervisor, which was 
Tommy Mare, who was the supervising examiner for Lincoln. The way 
the Department is structured is that associations are assigned to 
a supervising examiner then their examinations are done and 
are t rarily assigned to do the exam, so I was 
t rarily assi to the Lincoln special exam, so once I 
turned that in, I have no, unless they want me to do something, I 
have no formal contact or . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You're here in support of Mr. Newsom 
whom you cr it with coming up with the only strategy, you say 
it's problematical whether it would have worked, but the only 
strategy to try and shut down Lincoln's sale of the bonds, right? 
Does that mean that you didn't come up with a strategy? Or could 
have? 
MR. STELZER: I didn't think of it, I think that it 
showed real nsi on his part to, you know, everybody is going 
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to tell you we didn't have the authority, we couldn't do anything. 
Well, Dick's the sort of guy that wants to do something and tries 
to figure out some way to do it, and doesn't make excuses about, 
well, we can't do it, and that's why I wanted him on the exam 
overall, and why I gave him certain assignments because I thought 
he would come up with things, and get things done, and as far as 
I'm concerned he did do that and I . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Is this a strategy that you would 
consider employing in some other circumstance which was to force 
the issue with a court test, even if the attorneys ... are you 
an attorney, by the way? 
MR. STELZER: No, I don't want to deal with the attorney 
issues, I'm just pointing out that the consequences of not doing 
this that we could know about, that were there. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What are those consequences? 
MR. STELZER: The debenture sales continued unchecked 
and they could have gone on for another year, we have hindsight 
now that they didn't, but that's pure hindsight. At that point, I 
had no reason to think there was going to be a conservatorship. 
Mr. Keating is very durable as far as preventing conservatorships. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Would it have not been a more direct 
approach to focus your views and Mr. Newsom's views on the 
Department of Corporations, since they were the ones permitting 
the bond sales and it's somewhat indirect to have a cease and 
desist order going to representations in a prospectus which might 
trigger a court sale or a public reaction which might in turn 




purchasers of the 
MR. STELZER: Commissioner Crawford and Bill Davis 
arr a meeting th Corporations which I was invited to, as 
well as Dick Newsom. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You were invited to it? 
MR. STELZER: Yes, I went. We had a meeting. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What happened there? 
MR. STELZER: One of the items that Dick Newsom gave is 
his three memos on the Ponchatrane informed me of this, and he 
handed them over with Commissioner Crawford's approval, to the 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When would this have been? 
MR. STELZER: In November. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Of 1988? 
MR. STELZER: Yes. A lot of things were happening in 
November. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What reaction was there by the 
rtment of Corpo ations? 
MR. STELZER: Well, I was assigned to be the liaison 
th them and I had several subsequent phone conversations and I'm 




CHAIR14AN JOHNSTON: You didn't keep notes? 
MR. STELZER: No. Because I was directing an exam that 
ti just the volume of transactions, I was 
JOHNSTON: Who did you speak with? 
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MR. STELZER: I think it was Ken Endo, but I'm not sure. 
I'm really not sure, and whoever I spoke with asked me for some 
specific data which I more or less provided them facts that didn't 
seem to be very significant. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you provide them in writing? 
MR. STELZER: No, just over the phone, they were just a 
couple of facts and the fellow, whoever I was speaking with, 
didn't think they were going to do much and I wanted, I had to 
deal with people who were going to get things done, and I ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you have any record of this 
effort on your part to get the Department of Corporations to do 
something? 
MR. STELZER: No. Well, we had the meeting, otherwise I 
just phoned a couple times and they . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But you were the one appointed to be 
the liaison between the two Departments. 
MR. STELZER: Yes, and whoever I spoke with said, well, 
we can't really do anything. Well, I didn't have time to wait for 
somebody that couldn't do something, I mean, it's nice now to, we 
would of sort of, it's more a matter that you could sort of show 
they weren't doing their work, now, but that wasn't my concern. 
My concern was a positive concern of getting the exam work done 
and insuring it with somebody I thought that would use it at the 
time, and so 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How important was it to get some 
action if you didn't keep records and you didn't send anything in 
writing and you're not sure who you spoke to. I understand 
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Mr. Newsom's commitment to the issue, he's got voluminous 
documentation, where's yours? 
MR. STELZER: I simply did not have time, I did keep 
some notes on some things, I didn't have time to keep notes, I was 
revi ng massive amounts of 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Then it wasn't as important as some 
other matters that you were attending to, I suppose. 
MR. STELZER: I had to get the exam done. I had to get 
the basic exam work done, that was my basic responsibility. And 
when people wanted information and you can check with the 
federal ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, you see, the reason why this 
is tant is that part of Ms. Bender, the Corporations 
Commiss r's defense for her agency's approval of these bonds, 
is that there were vague representations of problems with Lincoln, 
but nothing ific, and you're about as vague as Ms. Bender 
indicated the representations were. 
MR. STELZER: And Mr. Newsom's three memos were, I 
think, quite icit if you read them. I phoned and asked if 
want i didn't request anything, except just a 
s. So there is nothing for me to send if they didn't 
t ific findings. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: It wasn't your job. 
MR STELZER: It was my job if they wanted something, 
t - I dn't know what they needed to make their decisions. 
i ion-maki process. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you ask them? 
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MR. STELZER: Yes, I did. I asked do you want anything, 
and they asked for several specific little ts. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The rtment Savings Loan 
and the examiners are the ones who a e deve t s body 
oblems th L nco n rtment of information about the 
Corporations has an rtant, but somewhat limit which 
is on the bonds being sold, so presumably you wou d have to tell 
them what's important in evaluat 
those bonds. 
he s i y of the i sues of 
MR. STELZER: As I say, I talk with someone hey 
indicated there was just nothi could real , so I . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Let me ask one other thing, in 
the documentation or itional test t December 5 
that Mr. Newsom prov to this ttee, rhaps 've seen 
his memo, on the to las pa ag 'd like t to 
you, as discussed with Mr. Suchil of your ttee his is 
addressed to me)please make you br r i ing 
records ners, meetings w manageme t 1 I think 
will find the product worthwhile relative to Mr. Tom's and Mr. 
Samuelian's attendance at meeti s with examiners Mr. 
Stelzer at which I was esent. Mr. Stelzer would, I am sure, be 
happy to elaborate. Could shed some 1 t on that? 
MR. STELZER: in, one 
present our fi ings to the 
t we're examining. 
30th, I'm not 




rd practice is we 
associa ion that 
, I i it wa 
te so I can the 
th Lincoln rsonnel, two of 
the people present at that meeting were Franklin Tom and 
Samuelian, and they both signed the . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The 30th of 
MR. STELZER: November of 1988, that's approximate. I 
can give you the date, I don't . They signed in so we got 
their signatures on the sign-in sheet. Mr. Samuelian, I had, we 
were doing asset classification, and I had my examiners write up 
the Crescent and the Phoenician hotels as problem assets, and at 
the same time there was an agreement being developed to have a CPA 
firm review these assets to see if there was any loss in them, and 
Mr. Samuelian objected to my reviewing them, since this other 
agreement was going on. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The other agreement ... 
MR. STELZER: With the Department Commissioner Crawford 
was developing this with Lincoln to arbitrate, if there should be 
losses recognized on these two properties and, in fact, that 
agreement was signed and an accounting firm did arbitrate. But I 
rejected and I said that my assignment was to evaluate the 
financial condition of Lincoln and that's what I was going to do, 
and these were critical properties in which we had come across 
large losses and so they were staying in my report, and that was 
it. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Samuelian asked you to remove 
those? 
MR. STELZER: He questioned that, as I remember, I think 
that's the issue. 




MR. STELZER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And you did so? 
MR. STELZER: Yes, they are in there. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Anything else on that issue that's 
alluded to by Mr. Newsom. 
MR. STELZER: I think that's what he was referring to is 
the presence of Mr. Tom and Mr. Samuelian at that management 
meeting. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, well, thank you very much for 
your testimony. Yes, Mr. Seastrand has joined us, he had to fly 
somewhere else to get here, I understand. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ERIC SEASTRAND: Cameron Park is so nice, 
1280 feet elevation. Who was the auditor for Lincoln Savings and 
Loan? 
MR. STELZER: Arthur Young. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Arthur Young? 
MR. STELZER: Yes, at that time it was Arthur Young. 
There was a change, in fact, Arthur Young was replaced by I think 
it was Touche-Ross at a certain point, they couldn't agree on 
certain transactions, so they were replaced, so there was actually 
a series of auditors during the time that Keating controlled it. 
It was first Arthur Anderson, Arthur Young, and I think it was 
Touche-Ross was the final one. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: During this period when you were 
looking at the, during the examination, did you ever look at the 
reports in your normal course of business with all the red flags 
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that were flying on this, did Arthur Young give a passing grade in 
their audit. 
opinions. 
MR. STELZER: Yes, they always gave clean audit 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: A clean audit report? 
MR. STELZER: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: In your knowledge of acceptable 
accounting standards and procedures, would you say that that 
report was justified? 
MR. STELZER: Well, I was the one that decided that ten 
transactions in a place called Hidden Valley were not valid sales, 
there were ten land sales in a place called Hidden Valley that I 
carne across and I thought, there's no way that those make any 
economic sense and I did some more work on four of them to 
document it further. One of them that I worked on was the 
Southrnark transaction and National Realty is a subsidiary of 
Southmark. It had t two parcels in Hidden Valley and I had 
done a schedule of all the Southrnark transactions back and forth, 
because these were very suspicious, and on my schedule I saw that 
the same day that 
MR. STELZER: ... three real estate loans, and 
purchased a participation in a rth. We reviewed those loans 
those loans made no sense. The interest rate on the loans was 
barely above Lincoln's cost of funds. The property securing the 
loans were apartment houses that were not cash-flowing adequately 
and that had other loans on them, so that although they were 
esent as secured real estate loans, they real were dependent 
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on the cashflow of Southmark itself, they were really unsecured in 
any real sense, so we had these really noneconomic real estate at 
the same time that we had this sale to a company that was hard-up 
for cash, they were buying land in an area that made no sense, so 
I wrote that up and I eventually got three other examples. At the 
end of January, I sent it back to the Office of Regulatory Affairs 
and they went to the SEC and they launched an immediate 
investigation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Well, I guess the question I 
have is . 
MR. STELZER: So, with this information, no I didn't 
believe, this would indicate that these were sham sales and I came 
up with $70 million of profits as not being valid, but this was 
developed, it was sort of my last project that I worked on by 
myself, it didn't even get into the exam report. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: And in your opinion, an auditing 
firm that did their job correctly would have come to the same 
determination that you did and should it have been in their final 
report? 
MR. STELZER: Well, the firm of Kenneth Leventhal has 
reviewed these transactions and issued a public statement and 
called them a sham sale. So I'm dependent, I simply am not a CPA, 
but I did present the evidence to the people I thought could 
evaluate it properly, and as I say, it had a tremendous impact, I 
think, in leading to the conservatorship. The conservatorship 
document, there were 15 items in it, this is the federal 




transactions that they went back and they agreed and said that 
the8e were phony sales and said the profits should be reversed and 
to understand maybe, further, the structure of what was going on 
at Lincoln is they had a tax-sharing agreement, and Lincoln and 
ACC was sending out money to pay the taxes on a combined basis. 
The thing was that ACC, because of losses, didn't have to pay 
taxes, so the money went up and just stayed with ACC, it was in 
effect a loan, which got up to almost $100 million or somewhat 
under $100 million. To do this, to get this cash up there, they 
had to have profits. Well, the land wasn't selling, it was just 
pie in the sky sorts of places that they were buying land, it 
wasn't selling, so they arranged these transactions that, in my 
own personal opinion, were phony. This sent cash up to ACC. Dick 
Newsom mentioned that the tax-sharing agreement was stopped. Well 
that stopped all this cash from going up, that's the significance 
of that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Well, I'm still trying to figure 
out somewhere along the road I get the idea that an accounting 
firm has certain responsibilities to abide by acceptable 
accounting procedures, and that if they don't do this, there could 
be liability involved, is that not correct? 
MR. STELZER: Well, I think there will be lawsuits about 
this and the SEC is going to have to, the SEC is investigating 
this and they are going to have to make, I suppose, the final 
definitive call on this, and I know I was sent back to the SEC to 
discuss these findings with them and explain why the land sales in 
Hidden Valley didn't make any sense given the location of the 
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place. This is in the RICO lawsuit against ACC and Mr. Keating, 
they cite these as one of the major things. I found ten and we 
have a couple others, and they keep finding more and more of them 
that they consider to be fraudulent land sales. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Well, at this point, are the 
auditors involved in any of these lawsuits? 
MR. STELZER: I don't know if Arthur Young has been sued 
or not, they may have been, but I don't want to say for a fact. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you. I'd like to ask 
Mr. Mori, Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto if they have testimony that 
they want to offer, or are they just here in response to the 
invitation in case the Committee has questions? 
MR. MORI: I'm just here to answer any questions that 
this Committee may have. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I don't have any, do any of the 
members? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, I'm going to ask the 
question that I asked before that Mr. Newsom couldn't answer, and 
I guess it's addressed to the attorneys. Are you on an equal 
basis in pecking order as far as the Department is concecned with 
Ms. Thayer, or is Ms. Thayer over you, because I'm really 
concerned about who made this final decision of the cease and 
desist order. In other words, could you have forced the issue for 
the cease and desist order? 
MR. HARVEY: Would you like me to answer that, Sheila? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Yes. 
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MR. HARVEY: Before I answer it, if I may, I do have 
some prepared testimony. I'm not avoiding your question, I'm 
going to get to your question as quickly as possible, but before I 
get to my prepared testimony, I have a problem which may not be so 
meaningful to the nonlawyers here, but we've had two lawyers 
testify so far, neither one of them has made any reference to the 
attorney-client privilege of confidentiality. Now I'm an attorney 
for the Department of Savings and Loan, and I'm not an expert on 
the privilege. I don't know whether the privilege has been waived 
by implication here, by Commissioner Crawford allowing these 
attorneys to testify. The privilege belongs to the client. To 
the extent that I do have a client here, which I'm somewhat 
uncertain of, I feel that it's my duty when in doubt to assert 
that privilege. So at this time, before I go on, and when I go on 
my testimony will have to be extremely stilted and limited, I 
would ask the Chairman if he would address the Commissioner and 
solicit a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 
CHAIR~AN JOHNSTON: Mr. Crawford, could you come forward 
and respond to the issue raised by Mr. Harvey? 
MR. WILLIAM CRAWFORD: Apparently Mr. Harvey wasn't 
available at the time that we checked on this. We didn't know 
what to do, we asked Janice Brown at the agency and she said we 
could waive it as to this specific item, of this specific cease 
and desist order, and this specific testimony relative to that, 
and we communicated that to Sheila and to Shirley Thayer, but he 
wasn't there at the time, so it's now communicated to him. Thank 
you. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
MR. HARVEY: Mr. Chairman, I think your counsel will 
advise you of this, the privilege cannot be waived piecemeal. The 
holder of the privilege cannot say to his attorney, you can answer 
this question and that question and not others, so 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I heard Mr. Crawford indicate that 
the subject matter before this Committee at this hearing does not 
cause the Commissioner a problem for you to testify . . 
MR. HARVEY: If the subject matter is Lincoln Savings 
and Loan, all of the ramifications in regard to that, and the 
Attorney General's office and their representation of this 
Department, and things that Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis have said 
to me relative to those things, I think that encompasses enough 
that I can deal with it. 
MR. CRAWFORD: It covers whatever is covered by the 
subpoena, period, I think. 
MR. HARVEY: But that's not adequate, your subpoena is 
extremely narrow, refers primarily to the conflict over the cease 
and desist order, and so then my testimony will have to be 
extremely limited and I will not be able to submit the written 
material that I have prepared. I will now attempt to answer . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, we obviously can't read 
anybody's minds as to what they would like to give to the 
Committee, but we'll think about it so that we can have the 
benefit of whatever documentation you'd like to give us. 
MR. HARVEY: Well, of course, what I would frankly 
prefer is that you hold me in contempt and get a court order, of 
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course that can't be done under the rules that you've laid down. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, I think given our time frame, 
I'd like to focus on those issues that we can deal with today 
which is primarily the cease and desist order and if you could 
deal with Ms. Wright's question and other matters, we'll think 
about, we're not at all hesitant to try and obtain from you any 
useful information. 
MR. HARVEY: Thank you. I'll answer Ms. Wright's 
question, then, as succinctly as I can. Shirley Thayer is a 
Senior Staff Counsel Specialist. Her specialty, I believe, is 
legislation and legislative liaison. She is not a supervisor. 
She is in ~ higher paying civil service position than either 
Sheila Sakamoto or I, but she does not supervise us. Actually, 
in name, our Chief Counsel, Alex Stein, who's a grand old 
man, he's 76 years old, he doesn't give us much supervision and I 
don't, in the ordinary course of events, I don't have any contact 
ith him, sometimes once in two months. My contact is generally 
directly with Commissioner Crawford and Bill Davis, the Chief 
Deputy Commissioner, and with the people in our office that we 
rk with. So, I think to sum up my answer to your question, 
for the fact that her office is a few doors down from the 
vVl<UHkssioner's in Los Angeles and she has more frequent contact 
ith him, and except for whatever his personal opinion is of her 
el ility as a lawyer compared to ours, she really has no 
thority beyond our authority. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Okay, then if I'm hearing 
rect 1 then you and Ms. Sakamoto could very easily have gone 
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forward with the cease and desist order over her advice? 
MR. HARVEY: No, I'm not saying quite that, Madam, 
because the Legal Division does not issue a cease and desist 
order. We make recommendations to the Commissioner. We couldn't 
have gone ahead, Ms. Thayer couldn't go ahead under our 
Department's rules, though she is a Deputy Commissioner as we are, 
and in theory she could sign a C&D Order, but under Mr. Crawford 
and Mr. Davis' rules, we are clearly not authorized to do that, 
none of the attorneys are. A cease and desist order is signed 
only by Mr. Davis or Mr. Crawford, and so going ahead with it is 
not up to one of the attorneys, except as an adviser. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I'm not a lawyer, thank God, I'll 
tell you right now because it gets more confusing. Both you and 
Ms. Sakamoto felt that a cease and desist order was in order. 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Yes. 
MR. HARVEY: Yes, Madam. 
ASSEMBLYWOt~N WRIGHT: You did. 
MR. HARVEY: I don't know if you heard her answer. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yes, I did. You also made that 
known to Mr. Crawford. 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Yes, we did on a number of occasions. 
MR. HARVEY: Vehemently, yes, on a number of occasions. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, it seems very strange to me 
that if you two attorneys advising Mr. Crawford felt very sure 
that the cease and desist order should go forward that the advice 
from what you're telling me is the legislative liaison and a 
Deputy Attorney General that he took their advice over yours. 
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MS. SAKAMOTO: Well, I think part of this also is the 
fact that Lincoln is a southern California association. It is 
located in southern California, and it: is my perception, anyway, 
t~at Ms. Thayer being from the south was the primary attorney on 
the case and that's why it was being handled primarily down in 
that office. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: It just seems to me that it would 
be even more so to accept your recommendations over hers because 
of her probable relationship with southern California, and maybe 
thinking things are done a little different in southern California 
than northern California, but I really feel that you are almost 
two people who had, well, you are absolutely removed, and 
therefore what you were looking at was documentation and facts 
before you in making your determination, would you say I was 
correct in that ? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Well, the documentation I think that we 
had before us at the time the C&D was drafted, was limited I 
think. The bulk of the work papers and what the examiners were 
working on were in the Los Angeles office. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Go ahead, because it boggles my 
mind. It really does. 
• MR. HARVEY: If I may, Madam, just a partial additional 
answer to your question. I think if you go out and hire three 
attorneys on any complicated question, you're going to get three 
different pieces of advice, and you're going to have to decide. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You're going to get four, you're 
going to get the three and then what the summation of the three 
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are becomes the fourth. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Lancaster. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I'm trying to understand the 
geographical differences here, I don't quite fathom the reason if, 
you happen to be from northern California, I take it, right? 
MR. HARVEY: Yes,sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And southern California is where 
Lincoln was based? 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: But I can't understand why that 
should even make any difference whatsoever. It's it's all the 
same state. 
MR. HARVEY: Well, it's very common in state government 
to draw a line across the state, often at the Tehachapi. 
You have an office down south that handles the 
associations that are headquartered . . . 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, then how did you get 
involved in it in the first place? 
MR. HARVEY: Because Dick Newsom is headquartered in our 
office, he's headquartered in San Francisco, and he wrote the 
Order in San Francisco and we helped him. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, I understand that I know, 
that's what he testified too. So, but suddenly you were excluded 
from the final decision process, is that what you're saying Mr. 
Harvey? 
MR. HARVEY: I really can't answer that because I can't 
say what took place in our absence. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, you weren't in the top 
management counsel, then? 
MR. HARVEY: The last thing that I recall prior to 
seeing the order was a telephone conversation with Shirley Thayer, 
I think Sheila was present, but I'm not sure, in which Shirley 
Thayer told us, well, I won't say told us because I can't come 
close to quoting it. I believed after talking to Shirley Thayer 
that she had physically taken the order and its supporting 
documents to the Attorney General and obtained his advice. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And that's very difficult for us 
to ascertain just exactly who gave advice to who around here. 
MR. HARVEY: She returned and told us that the Attorney 
General had advised, and I'm not quoting, it could have been 
suggested, it could have been any of the words that you've heard 
used here, but somehow the Attorney General thought that it would 
be best to remove that paragraph. That is the last influence that 
I had. I didn't have another chance that I had had many times 
before to say, why not just delete the phrase potential securities 
violation, if that's what worries you, and that's the red herring 
here today is the word "potential" and the words "securities 
violation" and the word SEC has been stuck in when it's not even 
there, why not just delete that phrase because the allegations 
stand as they are without that phrase and support the order, the 
order saying just tell the truth. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, you are in northern 
California and it's a southern California decision, is that what 
you're sayi ? Mr. Harvey, let me ask you this? 
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MR. HARVEY: I don't like to look at it that way. It's 
a decision of the Commissioner who happens to be headquartered in 
southern California. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Mr. Newsom, and unfortunately I 
had to leave and missed part of his testimony, but I believe he 
was using you and I believe you, is that correct? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And perhaps everybody sitting at 
these tables as corroborating witnesses do and what the strategy 
was and how good it was and you all reco~~ended, I presume, that 
this strategy should proceed, is that correct? 
MR. MORI: Excuse me, I'm the Assistant Commissioner in 
northern California. I have no direct knowledge of Lincoln, 
involvement in Lincoln. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Okay. The other three 
recommended very strongly that Mr. Newsom's strategy was to 
proceed, is that correct? 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Is that true of the other two? 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. I'd like to comment on that at some 
length since things became a little truncated. I did have some 
prepared remarks that I wanted to make and one of them . . . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why don't we get to that, how long 
are your remarks? 
MR. HARVEY: Not long. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, why don't we have you present 
those remarks at this time. 
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MR. HARVEY: Well, my answer to the gentleman's question 
was yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I 
understood he wasn't going to present the remarks. 
MR. HARVEY: Well, they will be very limited. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: Well, why don't you say that and if 
we have any additional questions that aren't answered by your 
testimony, we'll ask them at that time. 
MR. HARVEY: First, I wanted to give the Committee just 
a little background. Who am I? I'm an old retired lawyer with 
well over 20 years experience, a good part of it was litigation. 
I retired from private practice, got bored, and five years ago, 
September 1984, took a job with this Department. It's been fun. 
That's who I am. I'm not a friend of Dick Newsom. I want to put 
that on the record. I've never had a drink with Dick Newsom. 
I've never gone to lunch with Dick Newsom. I've never gone to 
Dick Newsom's horne, though I did invite him to my horne once to use 
my computer, he declined. But I have worked with Dick Newsom 
quite a bit in the last few years. I have found Dick Newsom to be 
an unusual person. He has a dedication to work and a dedication 
to the truth which is absolutely unusual in what I have seen of 
• the civil service. I have carefully studied Dick Newsom's first 
written testimony that I believe was on the 29th. I have obtained 
through the Committee and through Dick Newsom a written copy of 
his oral testimony. I have reviewed additional testimony that he 
submitted on the 5th of December. Particularly on the issues 
involving Mr. Rehm and Shirley Thayer, everything Dick Newsom said 
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is precisely accurate. In general, I support all of his 
testimony, plus what I heard here today. I don't know all of the 
facts, so I can't corroborate every little thing he said and 
sometimes I would use different words to express things than Dick 
does. In general, I would corroborate everything he says. Now, 
as to this controversy which I'm sure the Committee is very tired 
of hearing about, who said what, I do want to point this out. If 
one was a lawyer, one might see it as multiple stage hearsay. I 
don't want to confuse you with lawyers' stuff. 
ASEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Please don't. 
MR. HARVEY: I don't believe in it. Apparently, 
C.H. Rehm told Shirley Thayer some things. I wasn't there, Newsom 
wasn't there, nobody was there so we don't know what he told 
Shirley Thayer. There's a small exception to that which I'll cite 
in a moment. Then, Shirley Thayer told me and Sheila Sakamoto 
some things. My memory of the things that Shirley Thayer told us 
concerning the removal of that paragraph, now, that's what I'm 
talking about. My memory is a little vague about all the things 
she may have said except one thing that happened to hit me 
peculiarly and so it stuck in my mind, and that was that C.H. Rehm 
had suggested, recommended or thought the paragraph should be 
removed because he lacked sufficient securities law expertise to 
defend it. That stuck in my mind. I can't remember the other 
things she said, to be very honest with you. Now, on November 27, 
two days before Newsom testified here, we had that telephone 
conversation that Newsom has referred to with C.H. Rehm and, 
indeed, as part of that conversation, we brought up that old 
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question and Newsom's testimony was essentially accurate, I would 
phrase it somewhat differently. In the beginning, Mr. Rehm had no 
memory of the event and that was very peculiar for reasons that 
I'm going to mention a little later. I don't mean peculiar as to 
Mr. Rehm. It's not intended as criticism of him. As our 
conversation went on on the 27th, C.H., as we call him, he likes 
to go by his initials, he said, well, I vaguely begin to remember 
it and one of us quoted that securities expertise thing to him, 
and he said something like, well, I could have said that, because 
• I don't have any securities law expertise. Now, I took that as 
corroboration, that he had told Shirley Thayer what she had told 
us, that's the little exception to the multiple hearsay. Now, let 
me briefly explain why I thought it was peculiar that Mr. Rehm 
didn't have any memory. This cease and desist order was probably 
the hottest cease and desist order that had been undertaken in the 
five years since I've been with the Department. We all discussed 
it and discussed it in telephone conference calls with 
Commissioner Crawford and Chief Deputy Davis, and it was clearly 
planned. It may have been on my recommendation, because this is a 
standard recommendation of mine, bring the Attorney General in 
early when there's a problem expected so that we'll have his 
advice early, and so that he, the individual deputy that's 
assigned, will sign onto the matter, so to speak, so that he will 
enthusiastically defend us in court, because he's passed on it 
previously. He's had input. Normally, we engage the Attorney 
General's services by what I call an engagement memo. It's a 
memorandum to the supervising attorney general, it's Mr. Marner 
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down in Los Angeles. I've written a number of them. We ask for 
their services, we tell them what we want, and normally the 
Attorney General sends us a bill for his time, they bill us by the 
hour, it's roughly $80 an hour. I have checked, I find no 
evidence that there was ever an engagement memo in this matter. I 
can't say there was none, it's hard to prove a negative. We have 
checked the billing records, we find no billing from Mr. Rehm in 
this matter, and Ms. Thayer has told us that Mr. Rehm wrote no 
memo in this hot matter. I would have expected that she would 
have insisted that he write a memo giving his advice. But she 
says he wrote no memo, and she wrote no memo with her advice. So, 
apparently, this matter that I thought, and I believe Ms. Sakamoto 
thought, was going to be handled very formally, a real hot issue 
matter, turned into something that was handled very casually and 
frankly, I think Mr. Rehm was sandbagged, but that's a guess 
because I wasn't there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Mr. Rehm testified earlier that 
this was treated as a mundane matter. 
MR. HARVEY: He shouldn't have if the Department had 
communicated with him properly. Yes, I heard that testimony and 
I was sitting there rather amazed because Lincoln had been all 
over the newspapers, but C.H. is not obligated to read the 
newspapers, and I accept his testimony that to him, it was, I 
don't if that was his words, but a mundane matter, yes, I heard 
that testimony. But it should not have been. It should have been 
a hot, highlighted matter, and that's why I say it's peculiar that 
he doesn't remember it because he would have remembered it had it 
128 
been that highlighted matter. Okay, I think that's about all I 
can tell the Committee in regard to . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What conclusions to you draw, if 
any, in your own mind about the process of review of this proposed 
cease and desist order in your Department? 
MR. HARVEY: Well, my conclusion is, after being in on 
numerous rather bitter and sometimes vitriolic telephone 
conferences with Tommy Marr saying over and over, there's no 
grounds, there's no grounds, with Commissioner Crawford sitting 
• there and listening, with Shirley Thayer saying well, I don't 
know, I don't think there's any grounds, and I'm talking about the 
whole order now, I'm not just talking about the clause, I'm 
talking about the whole thing. And then at one point having 
Harvey Shames, and don't confuse him with me, we have two Harvey's 
an H.R. Harvey and a first-name Harvey Shames. Harvey Shames, who 
is an examiner 5, assistant supervising examiner in the L.A. 
office, with Harvey saying in one particular telephone conference, 
well, maybe we shouldn't issue an order. Maybe we should just 
send them a warning or a directive, maybe we shouldn't issue an 
order, and Commissioner Crawford, and my sympathy kind of went out 
to him, you wouldn't believe the yelling and screaming that went 
on in this particular conversation, Commissioner Crawford must 
have been very tired of hearing it, and he said, well, maybe 
that's what we should do, maybe we should just issue a warning or 
a directive. Send them a letter. My conclusion in the overall is 
that the ball was drastically dropped. It was dropped and allow 
to run under the table, it was dropped years before in connection 
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with Lincoln, that's my conclusion. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Who dropped the ball? 
MR. HARVEY: Well, I hope I'm not getting beyond where I 
think the privilege has been allowed, but I've told Mr. Crawford 
over and over, the buck stops with him, he's the Commissioner, so 
he dropped the ball. Probably all of the rest of us dropped it a 
little bit. Ms. Wright was asking Mr. Stelzer if he couldn't have 
done something a little more with the Department of Corporations. 
Sure, he probably could have. Could I have done something? Sure, 
I probably could have, I could have broken the law and gone to the 
press and made it all public. We could have done things that we 
didn't do, we all could have. But ultimately, Mr. Crawford and 
I'm sure he will concede that, has to take the responsibility, 
he's the Commissioner. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Lancaster. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: You know, the purpose of all 
this in reality is the development of legislation to try that 
something like this not occur again, and I frankly was somewhat 
dismayed that the Department did not, nor did the Attorney 
General's office, feel that the question of potential problem is 
sufficient for the purpose of issuing a cease and desist order. 
Have you ever been involved in cease and desist orders where they 
are issued on the basis of a cease of a potential problem? 
MR. HARVEY: I don't recall one. I doubt that I was 
ever involved in one. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: How about your colleague? 
MR. SAKAMOTO: Well, I think in this case, though, we 
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weren't saying the cease and desist order should be issued on a 
potential violation. What we were saying, I think, in the order 
was that all of these misstatements in public documents created an 
unsafe and unsound risk to Lincoln. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, this word potential is a 
scare word as far as justice is concerned. 
MR. HARVEY: It's a red herring. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: And so just the elimination of 
that, basically utilizing the rest of the existing order, it could 
have been effective in your judgment, is that correct? Am I 
assuming your testimony correct? 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. 
MS. SAKAMOTO: I think there was a basis for the 
Commissioner to find that there was an unsafe and unsound risk ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: To eliminate the cease and 
desist order based upon a legal concern about that single word 
really in effect destroyed the whole 
MR. HARVEY: Well, actually it was just a paragraph. 
The order was actually ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, that paragraph removal in 
effect created this circumstance. 
MR. HARVEY: If you limited your question to the 
paragraph, my answer would have been yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: I see. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was it your testimony, Mr. Harvey, 
that you did not raise the recommendation that the potential 
violation of securities law be eliminated? 
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MR. HARVEY: I don't think that was my testimony. What 
I would tell you in regard to that is that that subject was 
discussed in these conference calls and may I remind the Chairman 
that this went on for seven weeks. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I'm not trying to. We only have two 
drafts of the cease and desist order . . . 
MR. HARVEY: There were more. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I'm sure there were many, but the 
ones that we have, one of them on page 3 refers to potential 
securities law violations may result in liability to ACC. The one 
that was issued doesn't have that phrase, that finding, which then 
leads to the order, that portion of the order. What I'm asking 
you is, so it's clear, did you as attorneys suggest that the way 
around the difficulty of that language was to strip is out? 
MR. HARVEY: It was discussed repeatedly. I'm sure that 
we both did. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you have a recollection of ~hat? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: I don't remember. You see, the cease and 
desist order that went to the Attorney General's office had that 
in it, and so it was my conclusion from that that we were all in 
agreement, that we were satisfied with the way that the order was 
drafted and that it was now then prepared to be reviewed by the 
Attorney General's office. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Have you previously been involved in 
the draft of an order using language similar to this where there 
may be potential violations of law? 





CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So it was unusual? 
MR. HARVEY: Yes. 
MS. SAKAMOTO: It was unusual, but yes, 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And you've not been involved and 
Mr. Harvey's not been involved. 
MR. HARVEY: I don't recall one, I don't recall that the 
word potential was ever used. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Does anybody at the table recall 
one? 
MR. MORI: In the Universal case, this is what I hear. 
The C&D was to prevent something from, I think, from the way it's 
supposed to happen, but I understood that that action had already 
taken place and therefore was thrown out, or so no it was a 
potential thing that was going to happen, a loan that was going to 
go through, but the fact is, even though it was thrown out, I 
think we accomplished what we were supposed to. 
MR. HARVEY: I should point out that in the Universal 
case, it was a conservatorship, a state conservatorship, and it 
was taken to court and frankly, I'd like to publicly compliment 
Commissioner Crawford for the way he handled it because he was 
given an opportunity to get out the back door by the judge and 
save what some people may have thought was embarrassment. Somehow 
in the state service, losing in litigation seems to be a total 
disaster. That means that you don't file a lot of litigation 
e you are scared. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That's the point that Mr. Lancaster 
appropriately raises. What I want to be sure about 
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MR. HARVEY: That's where the word "potential" was - it 
had to do with that conservatorship. I just wanted to make the 
point, we really won, even though the court terminated the 
conservatorship, we won, we stopped $10 million from going out the 
back door of that little association. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And that's the same example that 
Ms. Thayer used. 
MR. HARVEY: Yes, that's the example she used. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: She has a different conclusion, you 
agree that it was a success. 
MR. HARVEY: I don't think it's applicable, that was not 
a cease and desist order, but I have no debate over the word 
"potential" -if you don't like it, put an "X" through it. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What I want to know is, after Ms. 
Thayer had whatever conversation she had with the Deputy Attorney 
General, was there an occasion on which any of you recall raising 
the possibility of deleting the potential language? 
MR. HARVEY: Not after, but repeatedly before. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Repeatedly before. 
MR. HARVEY: Before the A.G. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I don't want to put words in your 
mouths, so tell me if this isn't correct, but just it then, was it 
your assumption that if there were changes made, of if that 
language might be offensive or deemed to be too risky from a legal 
point of view, that the drop-back position would then be to take 
out the potential violation of law and that ultimately when the 
order was issued by the Department of Savings and Loan, it didn't 
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delete that more narrow language that you had said could have been 
done, but instead stripped out the entire paragraph? 
MR. HARVEY: For me, the answer is yes, I was quite 
surprised. 
MS. SAKAMO'l'O: Well, by the time we found out that the 
paragraph had been removed, the decision had already been made by 
the Commissioner. 
MR. HARVEY: The order had been signed and released. 
MR. JOHNSTON: I see . 
• MS. SAKAMOTO: And we were informed of the decision that 
he was going to file. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'rON: But you recall in the weeks 
preceding the ultimate decision raising the issue that it could be 
written in a different fashion to eliminate the potential conflict 
language, is that right? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: I think we did discuss that at length. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You think or you're certain? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: No, I'm not certain, but it's familiar to 
me, discussions regarding that, and you know, after the C&D was 
issued in the form, you know, I don't remember discussing it too 
until recently. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, do you feel today, then, that 
that language, potential conflict, should have been in the order? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: I do not perceive a problem with it. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You do not perceive a problem with 
it. 




differently. It makes no difference. It would have been fine in 
or fine out. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
MR. HARVEY: I don't think a court ruling on that 
paragraph, just on that paragraph, I don't think a court would 
have considered that phrase as pivotal. The point is, there were 
a lot of specifics mentioned in that paragraph, a lot of 
specifics. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That's fine, I just want to 
understand your testimony. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Do you seriously feel that if the 
cease and desist order had been issued in December of 1988 there 
would have been prevention of much of the sale of these junk 
bonds? 
MR. HARVEY: To whom is the question directed, Madam? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Whoever wants to answer it. 
MR. HARVEY: Would you care to go first? 
MS. SAKAMOTO: Go ahead. 
MR. HARVEY: The answer is yes. In order to fully 
explain that answer and enlarge on what Mr. Newsom said, which I 
think said was quite accurate, we would have sent a copy of that 
order to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. That hasn't been 
mentioned here, to put the heat on them. I think Mr. Newsom said 
something about their posterior. We would have sent a copy and I 
think he mentioned this to the SEC, and if they did not file an 
8(k), this is- I'm sorry for the jargon- this is a notice of 
significant events that a reporting corporation is required to 
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file, if they didn't file it, we would have been all over the 
Securities and Exchange Commission saying, tell them they'd better 
file it, this is a significant event. We would have given copies 
of that order to everybody you can think of. I frankly am very 
surprised, having learned recently that no copy was sent to the 
Department of Corporations, even though the order is secret, when 
you read the secrecy section, 8009, there are exceptions and we 
could have sent it to the Department of Corporations, they 
supervise financial institutions. We could have sent it to the 
FBI because it implied criminal activity and this is one of the 
things I don't understand about the Attorney General's review. I 
don't understand their internal workings. Maybe Mr. Rehm could 
explain this, but it seems to me, even though in a civil 
regulatory matter, if a Deputy Attorney General becomes aware of 
something that could be a crime, just a potential crime, he might 
refer it to somebody else in the office for evaluation. 
Apparently that wasn't done, but we would have sent that order to 
all kinds of people and I think the sales would have stopped. It 
would have stopped both because Keating would have been afraid not 
to stop them, or they would have been stopped by public clamor 
because one way or another, that order would have become public. 
So, it was only $10 million, maybe, that's what Mr. Newsom 
testified. Gee, we might have saved all of $10 million, and 
that's small compared to $200 million, but if it was part of your 
money or mine, it would have been pretty significant. 




CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: All right. Thank you for your 
testimony, I appreciate it. I'd like to ask Mr. Davis and 
Mr. Crawford to come up, please. Mr. Miller. 
MR. MILLER: Both you gentlemen were present in the room 
when I read to you the statement regarding your rights as a 
witness before a legislative Committee and do both of you 
understand that statement? Let the record reflect that both 
gentlemen indicated yes. Do you both wish to testify voluntarily 
under the conditions stated? Let the record again reflect that 
the witnesses stated yes. Would you both raise your right hands, 
please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to 
give before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth? 
MR. DAVIS: I do. 
MR. CRAWFORD: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Please be seated and state your name and 
your present position for the record, please. 
MR. WILLIAM DAVIS: My name is William Davis. I am the 
Chief Deputy Commissioner for the Department of Savings and Loan. 
MR. CRAWFORD: William J. Crawford, Commissioner of the 
Department of Savings and Loan. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What's going on in your Department? 
MR. CRAWFORD: I'm finding out a lot, but you have to 
admit that I have 124 individuals. 
MR. DAVIS: Could I make a suggestion, Chairman 
Johnston, it sounds to me from what I've heard here this morning 
that you've been presented with one side of a debate and I 
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understand that Mr. Newsom petitioned your Committee and suggested 
that the witnesses that were here be subpoenaed, which you 
accommodated. We have sent you and in your office when you get 
back you'll find three boxes of documents and exhibits that we put 
ether concerning this issue. Perhaps for you to get a fair 
assessment and perspective on this matter, you should consider 
subpoenaing other people that were in Los Angeles, the Chief 
Examiner, the Assistant Examiner who supervised all of those 
folks, and others who worked on this case, not for two months, but 
for a long, long time. I just offer that so that we present this 
fairly for both sides. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We will look at that documentation 
and other that Mr. Newsom supplied today, and perhaps make that 
the subject of a future hearing. What I'd like to do today 
because we've been at this for four hours, is focus directly on 
the issue of the cease and desist order and what lead up to that 
ision, and other matters that may be important to the 
investigation of Lincoln, we'll reserve for another time when we 
can look at your documentation. 
MR. DAVIS: I understand. As to the cease and desist 
or r, the ssioner and myself heard discussions, debates, 
rguments. We considered information from our lawyers in 
San Francisco, from Mr. Newsom, from Mr. Stelzer, from ten other 
ners that worked on this case, from Ms. Thayer and from the 
Attorney General. We considered all these things, we evaluated 
information and the Commissioner and myself came to a 
conclusion, we made a decision. That's our job. It's not 
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anybody elses job in this case to make tha decision. We 
evaluated all the information. We decided to ake that portion 
out of the cease and desist order We felt that i t a 
stronger order, and I think the oof of that is that it was not 
challenged by a company that's very lit Nor 
in any way. The order stood, and we felt tha we made t 
nded 
t 
decision. So, in terms of who's re i le for the eas 
desist, it's the Commissioner and myself in terms of the 
decision-making. All of the things that have n sa d today, 
there's a lot of implications of things that we didn' ri t 
and we'd certainly like to respond to those a the opriate 
time. But we made the decision and I think that we p obably were 
appointed to our jobs as a result of our rience and our 
judgment, and the experience is, r myself, I start the 
industry in 1962. I've worked in the sav s and loan business 
for 28 years. I have a respected record. 
started in the industry in 1948 as an 
ss r Crawford 
r 




CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, I'd like to focus our inquiry 
here. Ms. Wright. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGH'I': I'm just curious with all your 
experience why you seem to be so concerned about whe her or not 
this particular paragraph or sentence was in the cease and st 
order as to whether or not this company was going to take to 
court because you issued it. It seemed to me that your first 




citizens here in the State. It seemed that you were more 
concerned about a sentence as to whether you were going to be 
litigat or not. 
MR CRAWFORD: We've never said we were concerned about 
a rticular sentence. The cease and desist order is one 
instrument that we have and the thing that we were trying to 
a ish is to go after them on three loans that they put on the 
books or a series of loans, that were oper to have been put on 
the books and we told them they were improper, we told them not to 
make any more like them, and we've told them to get them off the 
books, and when t got them off the books, they'd have to incur 
a s. When they incurred the loss, they'd be writing off their 
net worth, and that's what we told them. We told them to get 
those loans off the books within, I think, six months, and we told 
them to start sending us reports within 60 days of your progress 
in tti e off the books. Now that was not the 
strategy of, is was someone elses strategy, to try to bring in 
SEC thing, and we might thought it was a good strategy, 
t we lines communication open with the SEC and with 
rat s, who had jurisdiction over American rtment of Co 
tinen 1. is was in a high corporation domiciled in Phoenix, 
zona, and we were ing to try to govern it from California 
di securities laws that we had no jurisdiction over. the 
rtment 
were t responsibility of the Corporation 
t SEC and Mr. Stelzer, the examiner in charge 
communications, he was put as the liaison with the 
rporations. He was actually sent back to the SEC 
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one month before we issued this order, we gave all our work papers 
to the SEC. So, they had all the story. So some little story 
here put into a cease and desist or r t would rna e hem 
to file an 8(k), they fi an 8(k t neve 
included this. So they i rge securi ies 
firms that told them they didn't even make disclosure 
about it. And they didn't take us to cour . If t d have taken 
us to court on some potential vi tion, le order 
would have been held up until the court was i We 
the decision to take it out, it s our 0 I hink it was a 
strong order. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: , when 're i that 
just in your statements now, that you we e lli 11 
things they had to do. What was or e 1 if l It it, 
what would happen to them? 
MR. CRAWFORD: What do mea or else? You mean 
if they didn't do it? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You're tal i t what 
had to do with their loans, reporting their ns. 
MR. CRAWFORD: They to . 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: t if didn't do 
it? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well I can tell you what would happen, we 
probably would have done what we recomme back in May of 1987, 
that we would seize the institution. We had, we concurred in the 
recommendations of Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco in 1987 
for conservatorship or receivership, we wrote letters, I have a 
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letter ri here that we wrote to Mr. Cirona on March 1, 1988, 
concurri n • 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: is Mr Cirona? 
MR. CRAWFORD: He is the es of Federal Home Loan 
in San Francisco and princi l super sory agent for Lincoln, 
and we concurred in their recommendation that the Washington from 
receivership or conservatorship, so now we're talking about a 
cease and desist order and that we're going to go over to court 
and get them on that, when were concurring in the grounds that 
were in the federal law that we didn't have in our law for unsafe 
a unsound and dissipation of assets. We could not prove with 
this insolve or threatened insolvency because they had 
an independent certified public accountant who had certified that 
ir records were accurate and every time we tried to get the 
assets written down, they had experts that said that we were 
So this order, t to communicate to the people 
juri i i lik t rtment of Cor rations or the 
SEC is to t 1 r work papers, give them the whole 
s y. Stelzer was t iaison, if he wanted to have five 
ti s , he cou five meetings with them. 
Newsom was the one t t did t holding company examination of 
• can Continental. He cou 't have communicate it through 
nister the law for other 
rtments we our own to nister and that's what 
e i 
WRIGHT: I have anot r tion for you. 




on the 29th? 
MR. CRAWFORD: I was sent over a tions that 
they thought I might be ask just so I could 
homework. And I went over there t t i answer those 
questions at all, I went over the e cold, as me 
questions for four hours, and I answer all the stions, a 
when I came here I answer tever es ions sk me, 
and lawyers do this in private practice all the time with t ir 
client if they think they're going to re a test fy. 
Nobody told me what to say. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: d you testify in Wa i ton, 
D.C.? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes I did. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: 
General before that? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Nope. 
ASSEMBLYMAN WRIGHT 
MR. CRAWFORD: I mi t 
con er i At tor 
not? 
t come over, 
I think they did, I think they came over a we jus a brief 
little discussion. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: after ri on 
29th, did you then have another renee or discussion th t 
Attorney General before t press release was issued? 
MR. CRAWFORD: I lieve did, I think that Shirley 
Thayer had a discussion wi We used their wire service for 
the press release, I believe. I can tell you that we've been 
using the wire service for the Federal Home Loan Bank in 
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San Francisco for quite awhile use when you put out a news 
release like we se ze a financial institution, if we went in and 
eiz l , a we \va to t somethi ou , we 't have the 
ity to t i out to wher it ove all the wire 
services, but the Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco have 
people with expertise and we have to rticular not to create a 
run on an institution and if we do create a run, they're the ones 
that have to cover it with advances. It's much better that we let 
them issue the release, because then if they got a run, they had 
their two cents worth in, you see. And frankly, here is a news 
release right re that I t out on February 10, 1989, that 
Keating had put out a 1 in the paper that the sale of this 
institution was nent and we put out a press release and we 
them issue a press release that the sale was not imminent, so 
if we're afraid of arl Keating or Lincoln Savings, 
're 
IGHT No, I 't think you are, but I 
thi it s strange because this became such a high 
v e is n t f months, that •.• 
MR CRAWFORD: want to tell , in government 
ce rs a v1an t to ri t, they never want to lose 
rt a that's normal. , if listen to that all the 
never th You ve to step up sometime and 
w n lose or draw. We it and we try to be as 
as we can t we 't wait to 100% right before we 
t 
Well, I just don't understand why 
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to use a press release from 
your own. 
in this particular instance you 
the Attorney General and didn't 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well, ess release went out v1as 
from the Attorney General's fice. I ieve t lict 
was with them and we thought we ought t the thi as ri t as 
we could get it. I think a lot of e 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Do cal i Mr. Newsom 
liar or . 
MR. CRAWFORD: No, lutely no , 
excellent examiner, he's an excel t 
job, he's got his battery 
man. 
r pre 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Well, 
don't you think? 
MR. CRAWFORD: , I l e 
Mr. Stelzer and Mr. Newsom, a we encou 
junk yard dogs, that's our siness. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I just wi 
listened to them sooner in this i sue. 
MR. CRAWFORD: We liste to 
Maybe once in a while we 't listen to 
Mr. Newsom is a 
, he a great 







i t or not 
all the t 
Believe me, Mr. Newsom is not a st a ist r this rtrnent. 
I'm the strategist and Mr. Davis are strategists. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Would you have done anything 
differently. 
ke 
MR. CRAWFORD: Frankly, on Lincoln I like what we've 
done in relat n to the law we have, and, yes if I was going to do 
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something, I'd go back and get the law changed back in 1985 when I 
came to work and 'd con rm it to the federal law. It took me a 
l t to learn t t I had to do that, but I did. We didn't 
get it done until April of this year, but it should have been done 
fore. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: That's SB 391, right? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Who carried that? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We have some other provisions that 
we've tried to take your advice on in a bill that I would hope 
will become a ttee bill, and when you have an opportunity, 
Ms. Wr t, I'm sure '11 want to join me in co-sponsoring that. 
Mr. Lancaster. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: To see if I fully understand, 
Mr. C rd r test today, you in the C&D order, you felt 
Linco n to divest r o divest of the Southmark, the 
rtrain and tever else. 
MR CRAWFORD: t wou punish them more than anything 
know, tti r d those assets off the books because they'd 
to e losses a write the net worth down. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Would that have been helpful in 
i , let's if had to wait another six months, you 
s x mon to do t according to the order, and if 
i in five mon , you would have had more 
rmat n ive to maybe do something re tive to .•• 
MR This company, the biggest problem with it 
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was capitalized interest, they capitalized almost $300 llion in 
interest and backed it out of nse whi overstat 
and overstated earnings. That was the biggest thi 




The third thing they did, they all se ofits on 
Valley and those were write downs that were $100 million, you 
know, so we're talking about something re that could have 
n 
affected maybe $10 million worth of subdebt, so we had, you know, 
we have to go after them for the major thi s, a 
were doing. 
that's what we 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, Mr. Crawford one thing 
puzzles me and perhaps you can give me the answer. In the 
whereas's and that's really what we've en talki t is the 
whereas's, not the therefore it be resolved, in 
part of the deleted language mentioned t se 
Ponchartrain, $35 million held 






original order and that was line you were deleti , a 
sts 
in the resolved, I call it that, they are going to call t 
in, 
further be directed that they divest of this proper y. Wou 't 
it have made sense to put that in, you want to remove the word 
potential, that's one thing, but wouldn't it 
leave the rest of that language in there so t 
sense to 
poor buyer 
would know that that's reason they have to divest of this 
property because it cost $35 million . 
MR. CRAWFORD: Let me just say, if you remove the word 
potential, then you have to prove it and that was our problem. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, you told them to get rid 
of it, didn't you have to prove that anyway? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Now you're talking about the SEC 
elations, t t's re the word potential carne Erorn. If we had 
r word ential, then would have to prove those 
things. That's where we had a problem, was that . 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Let's say you just removed that 
le parag , couldn't you have left in about the fact that 
rtrain was being covered by $35 million mortgage and all 
that ki 
of t 
stuff, cause at the end, you say, you know, get rid 
e r 
s, t 
MR CRAWFORD: Well, when they got rid of it, they'd of 
to that mortgage off, it would have been off the 
were getting rid of a $20 million loan that was 
s rdinate to that, and when they would have gotten rid of the, 
tri to deed the title to that, I'm sure that San Azento Savings 
wou called their $35 million loan and they would also call, 
t 
lieve there was a $5 million guarantee out, so this company 





LANCASTER: So you figure that the first 
with the potential in effect tainted the whole 
what you're saying, Mr. Davis? That section you 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah, we didn't like the word potential. 
LANCASTER: But the whole thing, then, the 
tainted, in effect, of the whereas's and the 
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whereas's is why you issue the order to divest. 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well, we issued the order to divest 
because of the conflict of interest that t had not disclosed 
and the fact that the loan was a s. The $20 mill on was 
advanced to fund the shortfall on this e , the hotel was 
wasn't disburs , but Mr. Newsom out e, $18 lion of t 
money had already been di rs a lo . 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: Well, r t o sum 
up so in my own mind, you clearly felt t t r to divest 
was very, very important for t C&D? Do not c the est of 
it. 
MR. CRAWFORD: I think it atten on. I 
think it got their attention. 
attention of the people buyi these i t nts fr n. 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well, t the work the 
discussion, Mr. Stelzer went back k the e at 
SEC, you know, if we can't convince how a e we i to 
convince the little old lady, know? 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: lie awareness is sometimes a 
difficult thing to accomplish, but in this case, lie awareness 
was vital to people that were unsu ti rs, in judgment. 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well, t pr tus was so confusi 
page 13, 47, 59, it's 
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER: That was referenced to somethi 
else at all times. 
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MR. CRAWFORD: That's right. When you try to read that 
stuff, it's rnumbo-jumbo. 
Mr. Cr 
LANCASTER: 
for utu e l islati 
that is something, 
a eas to try to, you know, 
it's tough it's like an insurance poli but by the same token, 
you should try to clarify it as much as ssible. 
MR. CRAWFORD: I agree. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you very much for your 
testimony, we appreciate it. I note in the Committee room the 
Attorney General, who s not been asked to appear before this 
Committee, but since he is here, I might ask Mr. Van de Kamp, is 
ther anything as t head of the Department of Justice, you would 
like to in r rd to this matter? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Is he bei 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yes, sure. 
sworn in? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: He wasn't here before. 
MR. JOHN VAN DE KAMP: 'd to be sworn in. 




We would be happy to swear in all 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise r right hand, 
. Van 
to give 
tru , and 
Do emnly swear that the testimony you are 
is Committee will be the truth, the whole 
t truth? 
DE KAMP: I do. Thank you. 
MR. MILLER: State your name. 
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MR. VAN DE RAMP: John Van Mr. irman and 
members of the Committee. I've heard some of the testimony this 
morning and of course I follow this very closely in the press, 
particularly since your November 29th hear , a came ove 
here because I wanted to do a MR. VAN DE RAMP 
(inaudible) indicate what is goi on in some other areas as well, 
so I hope I can be informative. First of all, I feel duty-bound 
to defend the integrity of the Attar General's office in this 
matter. The lawyer in this case, Deputy Attorney General C.H. 
Rehm, who you've met, and you've heard this morning, and it seems 
to me that the testimony you've rd from him a from Mrs. 
Thayer meshes pretty well pretty well settles I think some 
secondhand information that Hr. Newsom t was not too far 
off, but off to a certain extent crea some sl i 
impressions. Mr. Rehm, I ht th s goes to a stion 
think Mr. Lancaster had ask t wit ss a few mi 
had been at the London l Econom s r a a come 
back in September, 1988, so he wou not r n the 
I 
newspapers about the Lincoln Savings a Loan be re 
I don't know how much he real knew before the tel 
t time and 
call 
came in from Ms. Thayer. Seven years in the Attorney General's 
office, as he testified, he carne to me in our office from the 
District Attorneys office in Los les re he worked very 
closely with Bob Philabotian. And as you heard in testimony 
before, he had worked in 
when he came to the office. 
lican igns. I interviewed him 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: What's that got to do with it. 
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MR. VAN DE KAMP: He has a high reputation for 
professionalism and 
a to knowl 
tence and he was reinstated by my office 
has been an outst ing Deputy Attorney 
General, a 
t 
certain since I have 
rd about today, a lot 
n working with him there. 
s been made about this, 
was a routine tel call, at east it certainly appeared to 
him to be t t, from irley Thayer t focused, and we've talked 
about it ad nauseam today about the language of potential 
violations. Mi you, he was not brought into the strategy, 
Mr. Newsom didn't call h , Ms. Thayer didn t talk to him about 
strategy with r ct to this o r, or about all or what now 
appears to be the in-fighting within the Department. He was 
merely ask about t 
did, and he said, 
order, whether he saw a problem here as she 
, I see a problem and I'll lay you odds that 
lawyer 'd ed at this wou say, yeah, you've got to be 
ific, you've ndicate what violations there are, not 
just potent l violations, so he said he concurred. At the 
same t , I i the testimony is clear, we are not the 
r lators. We not e the law. We provide legal advice and 
rtments in liti tion and a pretty darn good job 
a t. Now, a lot of blame is being cast around here today and 
I've heard some the stions being raised. You talk about, 
know, one rson I ree that and I think that the first 
on this, if really want to get serious, Mrs. Wright, 
comes r t to this Legislature. In 1982, how many of you 
vot o re 
n? How 
nvestment situation with respect to savings 
you voted "yes" on the Nolan bill? How 
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many of you. Good, good for 
But the majority certainly of this Legislature did, and 
I think we are all ruing that day and I would hope if something 
comes out of this, that you follow some of the leade ship that's 
been taken to make sure that that mistake is undone as well as 
providing to the Department of Savings and Loan the kind of 
personnel that's necessary to enforce the law. As you heard in 
your opening statement today, it was r to nearly an all-t 
low, at least in recent memory, what in 1983, they are the 
enforcing arm of the state with respect to the savings and loan 
industry, it's not the Attorney General's office. If you want to 
grant us that authority and change the law, let's proceed in that 
direction. But in my view, they are t chief enforcer for the 
state in this particular area. So I think, you know, 
Mr. Newsom's statement today used the word red herring, I think 
that's accurate with respect to trying to make us the fall guy in 
this particular situation. The Department ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: On this point . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: No, let h finish his sentence, 
Ms. Wright. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: The Department got good advice from 
Mr. Rehm. As one of their own witnesses indicated, there was 
never any request made of us for anything in writing. It was not 
elevated in our Department to a high state of interest. No calls 
ever carne through to me, to Dick Martland, or to the section heads 
involved here with respect to this particular case. It was a one 
shot proposition. Now, Ms. Wright, you had a question. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yes, the one thing I was 
cancer t is what you just said. Are you contradicting also 
n Har said this morning in the testimony? 
DE KAMP: Please refer to me as to what 
are referring? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: The attorney for the Savings and 
. Har , said that the information that passed between 
Ms. Thayer gave the impression that Mr. Rehm said you 
t t rtise as far as the SEC ruling was concerned. 
DE KAMP: What was said has been taken ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And that's the part that has been 
l r rring. 
. VAN DE KAMP: Can I point you to both the statements 
Mr Ms. Thayer today, who were parties to that 
t was said was yes, I don't have any great 
se at SEC t I think as a lawyer I have problems with 
was never any implication that we would 
ings and Loan if they went ahead with the 
sent to us, he merely pointed out a problem and I 
r Mr. Rehm were absolutely clear on that. 
I 
WRIGHT: But it seems to me what you are 
t contradicting what Mr. Harvey said. 
DE KAMP: I am contradicting, because I'm basing 
on the basis of the first-hand testimony 
were party to that conversation. What 
ng to and I don't doubt his veracity, is 
what I think he put together, and I think 
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that's happened and I think today we can come to closure on that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: What he testified to was that 
Ms. Thayer told Mr. Harvey of the conversation between Mr. Rehm 
and Ms. Thayer. May I just say one more thing and then I'm going 
to shut up and I may even leave the room, you may bank on that. 
I think the point here is I don't understand, Mr. Van de Kamp, why 
you felt that you yourself, it was necessary to come here and make 
any statements before this Committee, number one, and number two, 
I would really appreciate it if you would consider on behalf of 
your department, since you feel you want to defend it, that you 
would contradict or at least apologize to Mr. Newsom for calling 
him a liar when he already had three people come up and verify 
what he said. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Mrs. Wright, first of all, you have 
been impugning my integrity from the time that Mr. Newsom was here 
on November 29. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: The Department. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: No, it was more personal than that, 
let's be honest. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Okay. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: We're on opposite political parties 
and I know what's going on here. And you know what is going on. 
We have a professional obligation to maintain here and I'm just 
telling you what the facts are in this particular case. What was 
said in the newspapers in response to what Mr. Newsom said which, 
by the way, he has said today and he has said before, although it 
was somewhat cushioned at that point, was that he had indirect 
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information about this conversation. There was a conversation, 
that's right. And I think what was said is now out there for all 
to see. As I say, a routine request, we did not tell the 
Department what it should do, we did not make the decision. 
Everyone, I think, who is directly involved agrees on that. What 
was said in response, I think, before is that he's either wrong, 
mistaken or is a liar. I don't like to use, frankly, the latter 
kind of word. I think he was wrong. And I'm not going to use the 
word liar because I doubt, I have no reason really to think ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I think your press secretary was out 
of line. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Well, let's let that go. The fact of 
the matter is 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, Ms. Wright, Mr. Van de Kamp 
didn't make that statement. He's here voluntarily to comment on 
this issue as the head of the Department, as Mr. Crawford has been 
cooperative, I think we ought to let them complete that, and 
advise the Committee of other actions that he and his Department 
is taking and then we will be done with this. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Okay. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think, by the way, that Mr. Newsom 
is well-intentioned. That he obviously has seen some problems, 
he's argued inside his own Department on this. Obviously he feels 
very strongly about it and is trying to do the right thing. And 
God bless people who try to do that. You've got to be careful, 
though, when you're in a public forum that you don't tar other 
people unfairly, that's an obligation that we all have who are in 
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public life and I think those of us who are lawyers feel strongly 
about that. Enough said about I think the issue that brought you 
here today. I would just like to briefly indicate what we are 
doing. First, at the request - that's not quite right, I should 
say it was our request that joined in by the two departments that 
we'd open an investigation some while ago about the sale of these 
bonds, as whether or not it might violate state law. We did that 
because there was no other public entity engaged in that and as 
you know, I think there was testimony in Congress and elsewhere 
that there were laws that might be violated and I opened that on 
our own after reading about it in the newspaper with the 
concurrence of the two Departments. It became clear to me, 
however, that there was a lot more that had to be done in this 
situation. One, we had defended and are defending the two 
departments in the civil lawsuits that have been filed against 
them and the State of California. Our Tort section came into the 
cases, I believe, in early September. And by the way, just to 
pick up on this, we did not prepare or talk to any witnesses 
before the Congressional testimony because the lawsuits had not 
been filed at that point. It was only afterwards. And so there 
had been, as you know, discussions that our lawyers had had in a 
sense letting them know what they are apt to be questioned about 
before their testimony here, I think, on November 29, but it was 
not for Congress. Now, one, no public official, no agency, no 
public agency anywhere, has taken any concrete action to try to 
get the money back for the 23,000 people who are out in this 
particular case. Yesterday I announced that we were opening a 
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civil investigation under our own authority, this is exclusive of 
the two departments, and it's not in conflict with the situation 
that we're in with them, to pursue recovery for those who have 
lost money in this fraud. And I think that is absolutely critical 
for the state to do. How are we going to do that? We will 
conduct a regular investigation, using the powers that we have, 
using the unfair practices law in California, ultimately if we 
find adequate facts to bring an investigation, as well as a 
prosecution that will lie against those who are responsible for 
this. Second, I think it is absolutely incumbent that the State 
concurrently, with federal authorities, run a full criminal 
investigation to determine whether anyone in California, public 
servant ot private party, had any kind of criminal culpability in 
this matter. There are allegations that have been raised hither 
and yon about that. Because we have represented the Department, 
starting in September, we are precluded under the case of 
Deukmejian versus Ralph in doing that ourselves. And so I have 
put together a task force involving two of the three primary 
counties of where Lincoln Savings and Loan is involved, Sacramento 
County, Steve White the D.A. here, Ira Reiner in Los Angeles, who 
is dedicating a small unit to open this up, we've asked Orange 
County to join in this, but Orange County for its own reasons 
declined to join. They will be looking at this case from the 
criminal standpoint, bottom up, and are into this as of now. So 
that was announced yesterday and I only bring that to you to 
assure that I think we're moving ahead on two fronts, one what we 
can do to get civil recovery for the bond holders today, and there 
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may be some parties out there from whom recovery can be obtained 
in whole or in part, as well as a full, no-holds-barred 
investigation as to whether or not there's any criminal conduct by 
anyone in this state in this matter. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I appreciate your reporting to the 
Committee, Mr. Van de Kamp, and I applaud your action to appoint a 
special prosecutorial unit to examine any criminal wrong-doing in 
this matter, and I think that your investigation of sources of 
recovery for the 23,000 Californians who hold those worthless 
bonds is certainly appropriate. We are pleased with your report 
of that action. Ms. Wright on that issue. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I'm going to break my promise and 
ask one more question. Is it not possible for you to seize the 
assets of Lincoln in order, because what I'm thinking of, is when 
there was a situation with a thrift and loan in northern 
California that Mr. Boatwright and Mr. Baker carried legislation 
on and which the state loaned money in order to pay back these 
people who had lost in those investments, they turned around and 
the assets were seized and at that point, and I understand as of 
today, with the sale of those assets, that the total loan was paid 
back to the State of California. Is there a possibility of 
seizing the assets of Lincoln? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Mrs. Wright, as I understand it, what 
Lincoln Savings and Loan was, what, taken over, was it April of 
last year, April 14 of last year, so the assets in a sense are 
today under state control through the Department of Savings and 
Loan. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And are they going to sell those 
assets? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: I don't know what they are going to 
do, I'd have to refer you to the Department of Savings and Loan 
for that. 
CHAIRMAN JOHN&TON: Okay, I think this draws this 
portion of the hearing to a close. Mr. Seastrand. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: In your investigation for the 
bond holders, will you be looking at possibly any wrongdoings by 
the auditors? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Arthur Young. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: The answer is yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, thank you very much. 
Mr. Taggart, our next witness, has just arrived from southern 
California by way of the bay area because of the fog. We're going 
to take a brief recess of about five minutes and then we'll take 
his testimony. 
[FIVE MINUTE BREA~] 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We have one remaining witness, 
Mr. Larry Taggart, former Savings and Loan Commissioner. 
Mr. Taggart, I'm going to ask Mr. Miller of the Legislative 
Counsel's office, to swear you in as we do typically with all the 
witnesses. 
MR. MILLER: Mr. Taggart, under the provisions in the 
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Government Code that describe your rights as a witness before the 
Committee and I provided you with a copy of those rights. Did you 
understand those statements as set forth in that Government Code 
provision? 
MR. LARRY TAGGART: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Do you wish to testify voluntarily under 
the conditions stated in that provision of the Government Code? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Okay, would you raise your right hand, 
please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to 
give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth? 
MR. TAGGART: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Okay, would you be seated and state your 
name for the record, or stand. 
MR. TAGGART: Thank you. Yes, my name is Lawrence W. 
Taggart. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Taggart, you're the unrepentant 
chief proponent of deregulation, is that a fair characterization? 
MR. TAGGART: I would say, yes, I was saddled with that 
when I took the position, a bit unawares of what was really 
occurring, but I would say I'm a proponent of deregulation, yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I don't know if you have any 
introductory comments, I would like to cover some of the ground of 
when you carne on board as Savings and Loan Commissioner for the 
State of California, and what occurred during your tenure as to 
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resources of the Department and enforcing the law which had 
recently changed, the approval of savings and loan applications, 
and a couple of specific questions relative to Lincoln. Do you 
have any opening remarks? 
MR. TAGGAR'l': I have no prepared opening remarks, but: 
I'll be happy to address what you've asked. I am going to give 
you a little brief history of my background, maybe that will 
explain how I came into the office. I was previously with Great 
American First Savings Bank, formerly San Diego Federal, for 
twelve years and held positions as commercial loan officer, and a 
branch manager, and legal counsel, and loan servicing manager, and 
had directed a number of mergers and acquisitions, and so forth, 
for the company. My father and my sister and brothers were also 
with savings and loans, so I felt somewhat familiar with savings 
and loans at the time I came in. I'm also a graduate of the 
savings and loan graduate school in Bloomington, Indiana, it's a 
three year program, and was appointed by the Governor and took 
office March 9, 1983. That was about two months after the Nolan 
bill had hit in California. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How did you come to be selected, are 
you familiar with the process? 
MR. TAGGART: I'm still not familiar with it, to tell 
you the truth. I went through the interviewing process, had 
understood that they were taking candidates, and that the 
candidates names would come in from anywhere in the state, if 
somebody sponsored them or sent a letter, and a letter was sent by 
another organization, not Great American, from Horne Federal to the 
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Governor, rather unbeknownst to me . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Home Federal of San Diego? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. And my father had been employed 
there, I didn't really realize what happened but the Chairman of 
Home Federal I think had sent a letter to the Governor and I was 
then called later on to ask if I wanted to participate in the 
interviewing process. And I said, I'll be happy to get 
interviewed, so I went up to Orange County once, and I was up here 
again being interviewed, up her and it's a three or four month 
process. In a list, I don't know, some list of candidates, it's 
not clearly known exactly how this happens. I came from a federal 
association at that time, it's now state-chartered, but it was a 
federal association. I was familiar with the disparities in the 
laws between the two associations and somewhat of the jealousy 
that the federal associations had for state-chartered associations 
at the time. I was not that familiar with the Nolan bill when I 
came into office because I had come from a federal association, I 
was really much more familiar with the federal regulations, so I 
came onboard March 9, 1983. It was a very interesting period of 
time. Trying to get our staff together, I think the Department of 
Savings and Loan had been decimated at that time and they had 
something like 42 employees, down from about 165 employees several 
years previously. There were 105 associations and there were 
considerably more than double that in previous years. There was 
kind of a lackluster spirit within the Department, I think they 
needed some direction at that time. A number of associations had 
converted from state to federal chartered associations because of 
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the more favorable federal climate they felt, regulatory climate. 
So a number of things had happened in the Department and this new 
spirit of deregulation was coming on the seen, the Garn St. 
Germain Act was passed in 1982, Congress had kind of signaled that 
it wanted deregulation within the industry. The industry was 
suffering dramatically from 1980 to 1983. Most associations were 
losing money in California. It was necessary to get them back on 
their feet and they had not found a way of doing it through strict 
home finance. Even though I am for home finance, they had to have 
other means of raising profits. So it was a difficult period 
coming into 1983 for associations in California. They had 
difficult times making money. And then deregulation again hit 
from the federal side with the Garn St. Germain and then the Nolan 
bill in California effective January 1, 1983. It was about a 
month after I was in office, and we have a split office, one in 
Los Angeles and one in San Francisco, and I came into my office in 
San Francisco and pretty soon I saw applications starting to pile 
up on my desk and I asked the staff, what are these? And they 
said these are applications for new savings and loans and I said, 
my goodness, and there were more and more each week, and I guess· 
probably for a year prior to that time, there was a tremendous, I 
think, amount of promotion out in the industry and at the 
conferences and conventions, to obtain new S&L's. I think that a 
number of entrepreneurs in the late 1970's made a considerable 
amount of money in real estate and other related activities. They 
found that, I think, in the early 1980's that the S&L represented 
some diversification, and it was another asset they could possibly 
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acquire at that time, it only took $2 million, and seemed like a 
relatively secure safe horizon for them. By June of 1983, we 
started tightening up the criteria. When I came into office, we 
were probably, and I'm just guessing, 60 to 70 applications 
already in process within the Department in various stages. 
Throughout the course of the two years I was there, there were 
probably a total of 200 or 210 that had come through the system. 
The exact amount we had approved was less than that, I don't know 
the exact number. I think in the two-year period, there were 
probably another 50 that came in, I think there were 155 
associations by the time I left. What we did . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How many did you approve? 
MR. TAGGART: The Counsel from the Department of Savings 
and Loan, I would guess 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The number 200 is sometimes cited. 
MR. TAGGART: I don't believe we approved 200 at all, 
there were 200 somewhere in the system. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I understand, well, many did not get 
federal insurance. The process that you went through to approve 
MR. TAGGART: Well, many didn't get through our 
Department, either. About halfway through 1984, it was very clear 
that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had issued, they hadn't 
issued anything, it was an informal moratorium that they were 
putting on associations. I met with them continually about new 
associations and nobody ever told me to turn off the spicket. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Who was supposed to tell you to turn 
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off the spicket? 
MR. TAGGART: It would be the FSLIC who issues insurance 
of accounts. Somebody, nobody ever told us we're not going to 
issue any more insurance of accounts . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You said you carne from a federal 
institution before you carne on as a California regulator. How did 
you view the dual system, what was the point of having a state 
chartering system in the state regulatory apparatus? 
MR. TAGGART: That's a very good question. It's one of 
the first times people have really brought up the issue of the 
dual system. I feel it was very important to have a good balance 
within the financial industry and at the time I came in, probably 
a little prior to that, I believe it was probably weighed more 
heavily to the federal side. The state chartered associations 
were becoming decimated in many of the states. The fed's were 
pretty strong. I was, because I was representing the state and 
the state chartered associations wanting to bring back a sense of 
strength within the California savings and loan industry, and I 
believe through the Nolan act, that was my charge. That is 
signaled from the Legislature and from the Senate in California. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you favor the Garn St. Germain 
deregulation act and what you refer to as the Nolan bill in 1982? 
MR. TAGGART: When Garn St. Germain came through, I had 
felt, because associations had been struggling for about two years 
prior to that time, I had felt that it was almost too little too 
late. It was a piecemeal type regulation. It was giving savings 
and loans really commercial lending powers, they wanted to look 
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like banks, they wanted to call themselves banks. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Now they do call themselves banks. 
MR. TAGGART: Now they do call themselves banks, but 
they had suffered tremendously up until about 1982, 1983. They 
were all losing money. And they didn't see any way out except 
through direct investments. State rtered associations really 
had an enviable position for 15 rs prior to that in that 
they could invest five percent of ir assets in the typical 
direct investment type of activity. Federal charter savings and 
loans only had one percent they could invest and they were very 
envious of that for years and rs. It gave them additional 
profits centers and additional income. Rather than increasing 
fed's five percent or increasing everybody ten percent, through 
the Nolan bill, it effectively took them to 100%, so rather than 
throw a little balance or movi the pendulum a little bit to the 
right, it went totally to the right, and totally lifted the lid 
off ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Now that happened in 1982, which was 
prior to your tenure. 
MR. TAGGART: January l, 1983, through the Nolan act. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, when it became effective. 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But we ssed it in 1982, that's why 
Mr. Seastrand didn't have the privilege of voting on the bill. 
And you were with the Federal Savings and Loan association, so 




MR. TAGGART: No, not in any way. I had understood that 
maybe California Savings and Loan League was, I'm not clear about 
that right now, but the industry needed something, and they didn't 
know where to turn. Probably the most dramatic regulation I think 
that occurred was in the early 1980's. If you wanted a stock 
association prior to that time, you had to have 400 shareholders, 
which typically made you a mutual association, you had to get them 
typically from the community involved and so forth. They changed 
that law from 400 to one and all of a sudden you say, people that 
had made a considerable amount of money in the late 1970's said, 
you know, I can come in as an individual and I can acquire a 
financial institution, it only requires one share. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Let me go to, we were talking about 
the dual system, so California prior to the 1980's, had some 
advantage by having some direct investment authority, even though 
it was only five percent, it was still more than you had with the 
federal charter. Then, Garn St. Germain in 1980 gave federally 
chartered institutions some additional powers, and we had an 
exodus from California, that is the charter moved from state to 
federal in the case of Home Savings, Great Western and some of the 
major institutions, and with that went their assessments that 
funded the Department of Savings and Loan, and paid for all that 
staff that was supposed to keep an eye on everybody, right? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So into this environment, then . . . 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Well may I make one point, 
there? I don't think that there was lack of money during that 
169 
period of time in the Savings and Loan account that paid for 
auditors. In other words, you weren't prevented during that 
period of time 83-84 from hiring more people because the money 
wasn't there, as I recall at some point along in there, I was told 
there was like $15-$16 million of special fund money that was 
available for salaries to hire auditors, and yet they weren't 
hired because of a policy not wanting to put on any more PY's 
because we didn't want to see government grow. 
MR. TAGGART: It's actually a combination of both of 
those. At the time I came in, there weren't very many 
associations paying assessments and the large shops were 
converting to fed's, so it really hurt from that standpoint. 
During my two-year tenure, I didn't feel like I was really 
constrained on the money side of it because we were getting new 
associations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: You had 200 associations that 
had paid money in that wanted to be chartered in the State and, I 
mean, it wasn't inexpensive to file for a charter. 
MR. TAGGART: It's kind of a ratcheting thing, you 
probably, if you were here, saw me a lot here. Rather than 
waiting each year for the budgetary process, I came up here about 
every three or four months and worked with the Legislative Analyst 
Budget, Analyst continually trying to get more people and I would 
ask for 20 people and I would get 10. I'd ask for 25 people and 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The Governor on January 10 makes a 
proposed budget public, sends it to the Legislature. What did 
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those proposed budgets for years 1984-85, which would have been 
the ones you were involved in making recommendations to Department 
of Finance, what increases did they have MR. TAGGART: As I 
can best recall on that, I had the higher figures in there for 
more examiners and auditors and so forth, and I'd get typically 
half of what I'd asked for, and I would come back 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: From the Department of Finance or 
from the Legislature or 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, from the Department of Finance, and 
we met with them continually and it was a problem to me because I 
knew what I needed and I couldn't go increase my staff and then go 
a year and increase my staff and go for a year, because all of a 
sudden I had this influx of activity. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Plus, you were only staying two 
years. 
MR. TAGGART: Me. I didn't know it at that time. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Oh. 
MR. TAGGART: And the other thing was, we had worked out 
a formula with the Federal Home Loan Bank because, and we had a 
number of meetings, Ed Gray was involved in a meeting, of these 
new associations coming in. Nobody said turn it off, they said 
this will be the constraint, and we spent a number of meetings 
designing a formula, if we have so many examiners for so many 
associations, we can continue to add as we go along, and so it was 
a pretty straightforward process at that point. And it was 
readjusting to all of this new interest in savings and loans in 
California. Putting a legal hat on, I had a difficult time 
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discriminating against people, saying who could come in in the 
industry and who couldn't, and there were advocates that said, 
well, gee, there shouldn't be any more associations, but typically 
they were worried about more competition. I think the only 
complaint we really got in the Department for the two year period 
was the fact that we were too slow in approving applications. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: You've got that right. I was 
involved at that period of time with some constituents of mine 
that had applied which typically before that, as I understood it, 
it was like a six month process, you made your application, went 
through all the hoops, and six months later you got an 
application, and two years later and a half a million dollars 
later, you got the application but, of course, by that time they 
had cut off the FSLIC. FSLIC had cut off issuing more insurance 
to California. But that's what really bothered me during that 
period of time and I think I probably had a conversation or two 
with you over the telephone on why we couldn't put on more 
auditors. Here was an industry that was begging to be regulated, 
paying up big bucks to do it, and yet here we were with 45 or 50 
auditors trying to cover everything in the state, it was stupid. 
MR. TAGGART: We would have joint examinations, I think 
for instance, we went in to audit American Savings and I think the 
fed's, the Federal Home Loan Bank, put on something like 25 
examiners, I think we put on two or three. It was a joint 
examination, but we had to rely very heavily on our federal 
brother, our counterpart. 





federal testimony before Congress, weren't you critical of the 
examination and the process by which the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board engaged in what you called seizure mania? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. I happened to have been in 
Washington about a week and a half before they made a move on 
American, and I was told by certain individuals at the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, they were directors of departments, they'd 
asked me, they said, Larry, do you know Charlie Nabb. I said, 
well I've met with him I think four times over the two year 
period, on very formal occasions, you know, in his office, I said, 
but I'm not that familiar with him. I said, why? He said, well, 
we're going to go out to California and take him over our knees 
and teach him a lesson. I said what are you talking about? They 
said, well, it's been growing too fast and very prolific and all 
this stuff, and losing control, we think, so we're just going to 
go out there. I said, have you ever sat down and had a meeting 
with him and asked him about their business plan, because I knew 
they were on a plan, they had presented it to us several times. 
And sure enough . . . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Wasn't that plan based on broker 
deposits and direct real estate investment? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, it was a difficult situation. 
American was growing by leaps and bounds and it was difficult for 
me to capture where they were going, they were growing so fast. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you find that risky strategy at 
all that they were doing jumbo certificates of deposits with 
boiler room phone operations and brokering, attracting brokered 
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its in hundred thou r b s? 
MR. TAGGART: My phi at tha time was that it 
wasn't necessarily the sources of funds that were critical, it was 
the uses of the funds that were critical. That associations were 
going to make money . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: It depends on what you pay for your 
money, doesn't it? 
MR. TAGGART: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Weren't they paying above market 
rates? 
MR. TAGGART: They were in and out of the market, like 
all associations are, if you want to garner in funds, you're going 
to raise a little higher rate than everybody else, you get your 
funds and then you pull out of the market. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Weren't they mostly in during that 
period because they were growing so rap ly they had become the 
largest savings and loan in the country. 
MR. TAGGART: They had a money desk that was incredible. 
I . . . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why would people put money, and I 
know it's headquartered in Stockton which is a very attractive 
reason, but why else would they put all their money in a 
Stockton-based institution from all over the country, if it didn't 
offer a higher rate . . . 
MR. TAGGART: It would be yield, most people would 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Plus the insurance was the 
guarantee. Well, let's look at how they spent the money. How did 
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they invest their money? 
MR. TAGGART: American was kind of a potpourri of 
everything you do in an S&L, including the fact that they were a 
conduit. In other words, they would be buying a lot of product 
from other S&L's and passing it on thr , or securitizing it, 
which is common. I think came out with the first euro dollar 
offering. They came out with first mortgage-backed bond t 
was issued. At that time they were pretty innovative in doing 
things that hadn't been done 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: 
lots of real estate with the 
n industry before. 
Well, they're still selling lots and 
nk now, that the fed's have 
divided them into, American Savi s Bank, with new management, new 
ownership, and the bad bank, whi is New West, right? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So must have been engaged in an 
awful lot of real estate ventures in California and other states. 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. They being $34 billion in size at 
that time, they were involved all over. 
CHAIR~~N JOHNSTON: Well, isn't Charles Nabb your 
business partner currently? 
MR. TAGGART: No. I resigned from there last April. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Oh, but anyway, subsequent to your 
tenure here . 
MR. TAGGART: I was an offer in the company, I wouldn't 
phrase it as a business partner, semantically. 
ASSEMBLYMAN didn't have any equity in 
the operation, you were just a hir employee? 
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MR. TAGGART: No, I was a hired employee, it's was just 
trying to build up a mortgage operation, and I was driving too 
much, it was too stressful, so I resigned. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: May I ask a question about what 
we were talking about earlier, about chartering these, the growth 
in the ones that want to be chartered in that period of time. 
Would you have had the power at that time to, in other words, you 
had 200 applications, some applications were people that wanted to 
start an S&L in the historic sense, broad-based ownership, do 
nothing but home mortgages, not get into the land speculation 
business and all the other things that were involved. Could you 
at that time have pushed these type of charter applications to the 
front of the line, say, versus an application where there was one 
person that was basically going to be the stockholder and maybe 
was a developer or something? 
MR. TAGGART: If I valued my life, I would not let 
any ... it was a very critical order when the applications came 
in. I detected about four months after I was in office that 
people were even selling positions in line. I'll sell you my 
position in line for $100,000 and you can take over my 
application, and so forth. I was continually trying to outplay 
this game that was going on with new charters. And basically I 
think the Federal Home Loan Bank took them in the order in which 
they were received, also. It's amazing if you put out the 
criteria, they'll qualify for the criteria, they'll tell you that 
they want to be a home lender. They'll tell you exactly what you 




new shops, is we raised the capital requirement from $2 million to 
$3 million, I didn't think $2 million was enough to start a new 
shop with, you burned through that probably the first year. We 
required a certain mix on the board of directors, they had to be 
people that were experienced in banking or savings and loans, or 
thrifts or some related experiences. I required business plans -
that was the first time it had ever been required anywhere in the 
country, and that they actually had to tell us what they were 
going to do, and you know, what next they were going to follow. I 
was kind of a proponent of niche financial institutions. I didn't 
say they all had to be the same, then they would become very 
saturated in the State, but you had to tell me what your niche was 
going to be and if there was a need for it, how are you going to 
do it. And so we required the business plans and pretty soon they 
carne out of the word processors and they started all looking alike 
within six months, and whatever criteria I used to change, they 
started corning out of the word processor that way. The only other 
check you have is you run an FBI check and you run a State 
Attorney General's check on the people, and if they're clean, how 
do you discriminate and keep them out, legally. And that's where 
sometimes there would be complaints or this and that. California, 
being a pro-business state and pro-employment, says, hey, this is 
the law, this is the criteria, if they meet the criteria, they get 
a little company called a savings and loan, and I wrestled with 
that tremendously. I wasn't/ I would had one of my chief deputy 
commissioners was almost solely committed to that. I typically 
spent 90% of my time flying around California working with problem 
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shops. You didn't see it in the press, but that's typically what 
I was doing at the Federal Home Loan Bank, or probably 80% of my 
time. But we tried to get a handle on it, and I think we had a 
pretty good handle on it. I don't think the new shops necessarily 
were the bulk of the problems that came about in 1985 and 1986. 
It was the shops that were in place in 1979 and 1980, because when 
the deregulation in 1982 and the Nolan bill hit in 1983, they were 
in place with $100 million in assets, and they just grew a half a 
billion to a billion dollars within a year or a year and a half. 
They knew the system. The new shops really didn't get a chance, 
they got cut off I think as soon as they got in. That's my own 
feeling. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Speaking of business plans, Lincoln 
Savings was purchased by Charles Keating and ACC in February of 
1984? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, Sir. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: According to the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board's examination from 1986-87, which was participated in 
by your Department, you were gone then, but it was stated that 
Mr. Keating had committed to the operation of a traditional 
savings and loan institution, making home loans, and that he had 
committed to retaining present management which, in the view of 
the San Francisco office of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was 
important since there was no evidence that anyone in ACC was 
qualified to manage a financial institution. Do you have any 
recollection of representations made by ACC or Mr. Keating when 
they took over that California institution? 
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MR. TAGGART: I really don't. I remember the 
application coming through. I remember the amount of capital, I 
think it was $51 million or $50 million to pay for Lincoln. I 
knew Lincoln, I had a lot of respect for the manager of Lincoln or 
the owner prior to that time, but Lincoln was an association that 
was having difficulty for the prior four years. And it appeared 
that it needed a little fresh blood, I think, or an infusion of 
capital or something. It came through in the normal application 
process, passed through staff, I don't know if it was there for a 
• year or six months. I'm typically the culmination, it comes on my 
desk and everything theoretically is supposed to be complete and 
make a final pass on it. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, just using that as an example, 
if a savings and loan committed to a business plan and then failed 
to live up to it as Lincoln moved completely, virtually 
completely, out of home lending, made eleven loans in a year 
period, 1985-86, fired all the top management, installed new 
people from Arizona, what recourse would you have? 
MR. TAGGART: That's a very good question. I think it 
was in September or October of 1983 that Federal Home Loan Bank 
started using business plans also. And it was a question on my 
part and their part, how do you put them in check and balance when 
they deviate from their business plan. And you have various 
rights. You can issue a supervisory letter, I would probably put 
out something not quite as formal the first time around, and say, 
hey, we've got to have a meeting, and sit down and have a hearing 
about this. You can send out a supervisory agreement if they 
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continue to . . . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You mean a meeting, not a hearing, a 
hearing sounds like it's a public event. 
MR. TAGGART: A meeting. Tell them your concerns, if 
they don't comply with it, you send out a supervisory agreement, 
and if they don't comply with that, you hit them with a cease and 
desist order. And get them into compliance. Now, what I would 
have typically done is say fine, either get into compliance or 
tell me why you can't get into compliance and what you're going to 
do. You can typically ask. If you have a deviation or a 
modification from your plan, it's okay, but tell me what it is 
when you're doing it, don't just ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, this has obviously been 
testified to you and covered in the federal testimony, but from 
our perspective I'm curious about that period at the beginning of 
December of 1984, just prior to your leaving state service, when 
you approved direct investment of some $900 million by Lincoln 
Savings and Loan in non-real estate ventures, or they were direct 
raw land sales or junk bonds, and other things, that were 
prohibited a few days later by the imposition of a new federal 
regulation. In your approval of that $900 million of direct 
investment, what factors did you consider with respect to Lincoln. 
They had a business plan that they had to show in February of that 
year, by the end of the year did you review that business plan and 
see if they had complied with it? 
MR. TAGGART: I'll need to give you a little historical 
sketch for about six months prior to that time. Lincoln, it 
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became obvious to me probably about Jt1ne of 1984, that Lincoln was 
going to be a direct-investment niche institution. I was 
impressed with them with probably the first contact I really had 
with them, they submitted a request to the Department to move 
their record storage, or center over to Phoenix. This was a 
California association, this is supposed to stay in California, 
and I said I'm not going to do that, and they said, no, if you 
could just come down here, if you'd just come down here, you'd 
understand why, our whole accounting staff is here, and the legal 
staff is here and so forth. So I went down there and took the 
Chief Deputy at the time, I think it was Sam Mori, and was 
impressed with their operation. At that particular time, they had 
what I would consider to be a model operation. They hadn't been 
in business through that management more than maybe five or six 
months, but their accounting records were, I think, impeccable, 
and the legal staff and the way they ran their securities 
investments and everything else, I was impressed. I had been in a 
lot of associations, and he was impressed too. I thought this is 
a model association. They, during that period, had filed one or 
more applications, I can't recall exactly how many, for direct 
investment authority in certain areas. Typically, we would spar, 
we'd go back and forth a little bit on their application. I think 
one time they asked for a hundred million in a hotel subsidiary, 
and I said, no, I'm not going to give you a hundred million, 
that's too much, I'll give you fifty, and we'll see how you do, 
and we'll see how the project comes out and then you can come in 
and request an additional amount after it comes out, so during the 
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year they would do that, and then I think, I don't know if it hurt 
their feelings or what, but they would pull their application or 
they wouldn't go ahead with it because they thought I didn't like 
direct investments. I said no, that's not it, I'd like to see how 
things are going. During that same period, I believe it was June 
of 1984, there was a real concerted effort by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank, the fed's, to preempt state law in California. At that 
time, I was on the board of directors of the National Association 
of Savings and Loan Supervisors, the commissioners in this 
country, and that particular group met continually and was alarmed 
by the fact that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was now going to 
run in and preempt and cut back those states that had excessive 
direct investment powers, namely California and Texas were the 
most affected. We had, I think, 100% authority. I think they had 
the same authority in Texas. And what alarmed me is nobody 
coordinated it with us. All of a sudden they said, we're just 
going to cut you back arbitrarily to 10%, and I said why not 8% or 
12% -why 10%, and they said California associations now, and I'm 
just using it as an example, but Lincoln, I think it predicated a 
lot of their growth and everything on direct investment, they 
probably had a five-year growth plan within their association, 
what they were going to do, and here the federal government was 
going to come in and cut it off, shortly after these bills had 
been passed in California. Myself and most of the other 
commissioners and this commissioner group in the country, fought 
this new imposition coming down on the states. Okay, when you 




works. We assert our rights, the fed's assert their rights and 
hopefully it maintains some balance in the system. There were 
meetings back in Washington on that, a number of them. Finally, a 
regulation 1 bf~lieve was proposed dnd came out limiting direct 
investment authority back to 10% in California, all over the 
country, and I think it was supposed to be effective in August 19, 
1984 or some time around then. There was so much flack on it and 
so much criticism to it, it didn't have grandfathering provisions, 
they didn't know how to deal with associations that were over 10% 
already, Lincoln and other associations, and so forth. They 
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withdrew that regulation, but it was re-introduced back in the 
fall, again. Here comes this regulation limiting direct 
investment. And it not only limited it back to 10%, it was 10% in 
the aggregate, investment in securities, direct investment in 
service corporations. So if you equally spread those out, you 
really only had 3% direct investment authority, so you're coming 
off with 100% in 1983 down to 3% and I said that's not fair, they 
haven't examined those particular associations that are going to 
be affected. I wasn't lobbying on behalf of anybody other than 
the State of California. I felt that they were preempting 
state's laws without any consideration for our laws. Again, I 
think I participated in a hearing back there. I think Allen 
Greenspan and everybody else was in the thing, and finally, the 
regulation came out with a very short comment period, I think it 
was 30 days or 45 days, it was ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was Allen Greenspan working for the 
government or for Lincoln Savings and that time? 
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MR. TAGGART: At that time, he wasn't working for the 
government, he may have been a consultant for Lincoln at the time, 
I don't recall. So, during this period, I called back to the 
Federal Home Loan Bank and said I want to issue a comment letter 
on behalf of the State of California, because it just needed more 
consideration. And some of the associations were feeling pressure 
in California because all of a sudden they were taking away this 
tremendous authority that they had, and it was happening all 
within about 30 days. So I asked, what do you do with the 
comments? They said, oh, we don't really read them. We've got 
about 700 or BOO comments here, we don't even read them. That 
kind of infuriated me. And I thought, you know, people take the 
time to write you, to have other proposals and everything else, 
they were still going to cram this down states' throats, and 
pree~pt state law. Then it came down, I think it was probably in 
the regulation that was going to be effective on December 10, so 
yes, Lincoln did come in, they had applications on file for direct 
investment authority, I can't remember if there was $800 or $900 
million, now, in a number of different service corporations, so 
they were diversifying their activities, it wasn't all bunched in 
one area, they probably had more concern than other associations, 
even though they didn't really have the most direct investment in 
California on a percentage basis. During that same six-month 
period, when associations came in and asked for authority for 
things, the law gave them 100%, okay. I could have been 
challenged on the Lincoln approval. They could have come, I 
think, and legally challenged me - I'm cutting them back to $800 
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million, when the law provided that they could go up to 100% of 
their assets which would have been about a billion and a half at 
that time. That's what the law said. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Your testimony is that you trimmed 
them back to $800 million? 
MR. TAGGART: The way that we were looking at it for 
that year period, as I did it on basically a percentage of their 
assets basis, I wanted to know whether they were 20% or 25 or ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How much did they ask for? 
MR. TAGGART: They had submitted approval for, I think, 
I don't recall exactly, the papers say $800 million, if that's 
what it is, that's what it is, there was so much in different 
service corporations. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I thought you said that you reduced 
what they had asked for to $800 million. 
MR. TAGGART: There was a provision in the regulations 
that said it was subject to the commissioners's approval. It had 
never been challenged. It hadn't been challenged at that time. 
Had they challenged this and said that the law gives us this, and 
you're turning us off on this, you know, we're going to take you 
to court. There was no difficulty here because they were only 
about 50% or 52% of their assets. It wasn't alarming to me on a 
percentage basis, they were about half-way there. Other 
associations were in excess of half-way there. And then what we 
did because the associations were growing so fast, is we put 
through a policy within the Department, is I'd figured out an 
approximate percentage basis, and we'd convert that to a dollar 
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amount, and then freeze the dollar amount rather than say I'll 
give you 50% direct investment in the hotel industry, as it they 
kept growing, that would keep going up. We'd say fine, that 50% 
represents "X" number of dollars and we'll freeze it there. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You mentioned that you considered 
Lincoln Savings in mid-1988 as a direct investment niche. 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. They were probably much more 
developers and builders 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I thought the rationale for expanded 
investment powers was to diversify, give institutions an 
opportunity to make money, so that they could better support their 
main business which is in the public interest, which is presumably 
why we have the taxpayers backing up the deposits and that is home 
loans. 
MR. TAGGART: I agree with you 100%, that was my 
philosophy also. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, then, what does it mean to be 
in the direct investment niche, that sounds to me like an 
institution that is not focused on home lending. 
MR. TAGGART: Prior to the time they acquired Lincoln, 
they were probably the leading home builder in the Phoenix area, 
if you ever look at their subdivisions, they always have . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You're talking about ACC . 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. The same group, and they'd have the 
American flag in all their subdivisions and they were basically 
impeccable subdivisions. My philosophy was, you didn't 
necessarily have to be involved directly in lending as long as you 
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were involved in the home building or lending process. Then you 
were fulfilling your commitment to the country, if you built homes 
and sold them, if you financed them, and I think they had the 
first builder bond, they actually got involved in financing before 
they acquired the association. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Where were they doing this 
investment in homes or real estate? 
MR. TAGGART: Prior to that time, it was in the Phoenix 
area. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: After they bought Lincoln Savings? 
MR. TAGGART: To my knowledge, they didn't get involved 
in the home building business anymore. For some reason, they got 
out of it. I thought they were still committed to it during that 
time. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Wasn't most of their raw land and 
other real estate related ventures in Arizona? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, I believe they probably at some time 
had a conversion of philosophy that rather than be a home builder 
and put up the sticks and the mortar, they were going to become 
land developers, sell off to various developers, and be 
involved ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, certainly that's their 
business and not ours, except that they owned a California 
chartered savings and loan institution. 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. 




MR. TAGGART: The benefit of? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Of having an institution that took 
deposits and invested them in Arizona? 
MR. TAGGART: There is not a lot of benefit there. It's 
a very good question. It's a very good philosophical question. 
Back in the 1970's, the industry, the thrift industry, became very 
heavily involved in nationwide lending. In other words, they 
deviated and got away from this formula that you took in money 
within a 100-mile radius, or whatever it was going to be within 
your state, and you had to reinvest it back in there. We have the 
California Reinvestment Act which, and I know they were concerned 
about that some time in, I don't know, 1986 or 1987, or some time 
along there, they were concerned about the California reinvestment 
act, that a portion of those funds have to go back into the 
community in which you derive the funds. But getting involved in 
secondary market activities where portfolios of loans are sold 
across the country and developments are made across country, the 
only way the financial institutions in this country have survived 
is the fact that they aren't confined to one specific geographic 
location. And that was really borne out in the Garn St. Germain 
act also, and just before that, they just took all the lid off 
geographic lending. You weren't confined to your state or your 
particular locale. So that was through the course of 
deregulation, that happened. So when you say was it a bad thing 
or a good thing, no, I feel the association should be committed to 
lend back in the area where they take their money, and I wouldn't 
argue with that at all. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yet in December of 1984, about ten 
months after Keating bought Lincoln Savings, you approved $900 
million in direct investments. During that time, they had 
terminated the staff that knew the savings and loan business, put 
in a management team that had been in real estate in Arizona, 
moved the books to Arizona, decreased to the point of eliminating 
home loans in California, and expanded their investments in raw 
land, junk bonds, and other higher risk investments such as 
hotels. Why, given that history which I would think was known to 
you in your Department at that time, would you have approved the 
$900 million? 
MR. TAGGART: I looked at Lincoln to be synonymous with 
American Continental at the time and from all that I could 
ascertain, and all that we knew in the Department, they were a 
very successful company. That meant that those skills could 
probably be transferred to a financial institution or to direct 
investments or to building. I had nothing to the contrary to tell 
me any differently. And I think it proved out, accounting 
standards, you know, if you take them on their face, I believe 
Lincoln made, I don't know, was it $50 million the third year, or 
$75 million profit the second year, and $125 or whatever it was, 
they were for all appearances at that time, a very successful 
company. The management had been successful in building American 
Continental, which was a company that was totally under water in 
the 70's. They had what I considered to be very good credentials. 
They had an accounting staff, it was bar-none, and a legal staff, 
and they had experience in developing 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Except they were using the taxpayers 
money, weren't they? They were taking deposits that they wouldn't 
have gotten except for the federal insurance, and then investing 
them in business opportunities that they thought would be useful, 
but they weren't going out and borrowing the money where they were 
at risk, they were borrowing the money with the taxpayers at risk? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. In getting up to where we were in 
December, to find out why, when you say fine, the law gives you 
100% and we're going to take you to 50% or 52%, give you that 
authority, I would presume that somebody would monitor the 
activities. It's not a blank check. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That was your job, right? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, had I been there for another five 
years, that would have been my job. But there is continuity in 
the Department. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Let me ask you, December 1 you 
approved the $900 million in direct investments through 
subsidiaries by Lincoln. You indicated that it was common 
knowledge among regulators and probably the industry, that there 
was an impending regulation that would have restricted Lincoln's 
aoility to make that investment, you felt rebuffed in your 
attempts to influence that regulation as a representative of 
California, so you proceeded to approve the investment authority 
for Lincoln and ACC, which you viewed as a successful company with 
a S&L unit in California. The regulation did, then, go into 
effect, and shortly after that, you resigned from the State of 
California and went into private business, and that private 
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business, as has been reported elsewhere, was TCS Financial, in 
San Diego. Shortly thereafter, this business which arguably was 
not doing particularly well, had a massive stock purchase by 
Lincoln and therefore a substantial investment that presumably was 
to the benefit of the business that you had just associated with. 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. I might mention that 
MR. TAGGART: I can't recall the exact date, I believe 
when Lincoln had applied for that direct investment authority, I 
recall having a meeting in my office with two representatives from 
Lincoln, two representatives from the Federal Home Loan Bank in 
San Francisco, and another member from my staff, and we went over 
the direct investments. I said there's an application in, this is 
what's coming down, I said, do you have any objections, we went 
through the whole thing, and do you have any objections? There 
were no objections from the Federal Home Loan Bank. This is 
really a two-pronged thing when things like this happen. It was a 
substantial investment and at that time, nobody raised a hue and 
cry, nobody said anything, and I said, fine, I really can't find 
any reason not to. I told Lincoln at the time, I said, in view of 
the impending regulation, you may have a difficult time, a real 
difficult time, grandfathering that in, I said. That's not going 
to be my battle. I said, if you have a tough time with the fed's 
on this thing, because they haven't said anything here, you know, 
you're going to have to tough it out with them. That's where the 
problems, I think, started, you know, with the Federal Home Loan 
Bank and Lincoln and the feud. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Were you a member of the board of 
TCS prior to your resignation as Savings and Loan Commissioner? 
MR. TAGGART: No, sir. I have here the proxy statement 
that's going out this year, okay. I'll just read you from one 
page on the proxy statement if it hasn't been mailed out to 
everybody already and I'll explain why that discrepancy was there. 
On page 4 here, and it says, I need my glasses, excuse me, page 5, 
Mr. Taggart joined the company as a director in January of 1985 
and was the President of TCS Financial, Inc., a subsidiary of the 
company, from January 1, 1985 to October 31, 1985. I have been 
involved in mortgage banking and consulting activities and so 
forth. What happened during that period, one, I was not exactly 
sure when I was going to leave office, I wasn't certain where I 
was going. Mr. Stickle was trying to get a commitment from me. 
They were considering going public. At that time they sent in a 
preliminary prospectus which has to go to the SEC, which is 
subject to modification and approval, in December of 1984. I 
presumed I was coming on board with them, and they thought I was 
coming on board and I did come on board with them, and it wasn't 
approved until January of 1985. But that preliminary prospectus 
had to go in because it takes one to two months to get approval on 
them, and by the time the approval or disapproval would come back, 
and it could have been disapproved, it may not have gone public, I 
was on board at that time. And that was not a document for public 
circulation or anything, it was sent directly to the SEC and I 
think they approved it on January 11 or something, so there wasn't 




CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you tell anyone associated with 
ACC or Lincoln that you were going to work for TCS? 
MR. TAGGART: No. Not to my knowledge. They were 
totally unrelated transactions. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You indicated a few moments ago that 
it was common knowledge that you were leaving the Department. 
MR. TAGGART: I don't believe it was ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Perhaps not common knowledge - let 
me rephrase that. You said that it would be Lincoln's problem to 
defend the grandfathering of their investments that you were 
approving because you wouldn't be there. 
MR. TAGGART: No, I didn't say that, it wasn't that I 
wasn't going to be there, I just said any grandfathering that you 
have with the Federal Home Loan Bank on getting those provisions 
in, because of the impending legislation, is not my problem, it's 
your problem. And it wasn't a matter of whether I was going to 
defend them or not defend them, it was - legally, it was a 
difficult issue. In other words, when you start talking about 
preempting state laws . . . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You did not tell anyone and to your 
knowledge no one at Lincoln knew that you were leaving the state 
to go to work for TCS? 
MR. TAGGART: No. I don't think they even had ever 
heard the term TCS. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, did you talk to Lincoln or 
Mr. Keating or anyone from ACC after your leaving the state 
service to interest them in an investment opportunity with the 
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company that you were becoming the president of? 
MR. TAGGART: I was invited over to Phoenix in January. 
I asked Mr. Stickle, I said, Tom, would you like to meet these 
folks, I think they're a model association and at that time, a 
clean association, they're very entrepreneurial, I'm not very 
entreprenueurial, Tom Stickle is, and he said, yeah, I'd love to 
meet them, and so I said well, if you want to fly over for the day 
with me, that's fine and I went over there and introduced him to 
Mr. Keating. The two of them started discussing about the stock. 
I wasn't there for any purpose at all to mention about stock at 
all. Actually, at that time, I was almost trying to discourage 
Tom Stickle from going public with the company and I thought it 
was a little premature at the time. And we used to go around on 
it and that was his plan. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Then you and Mr. Stickle went to 
Phoenix for lunch? 
MR. TAGGART: I don't know if it was for lunch. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, what was the purpose for the 
visit? 
MR. TAGGART: At that time, Lincoln obviously knew I had 
left the state, and wanted to talk to me about a consulting 
arrangement. My whole purpose for them was on an internal 
consulting basis, not to mention anything about stock. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When did you become a consultant to 
Lincoln? 
MR. TAGGART: The exact day, I don't know, some time in 
January of 1985. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you contact your Department in 
that capacity? 
MR. TAGGART: No. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How did the interest of Lincoln 
occur to invest in TCS? Did it occur at that first meeting? 
MR. TAGGART: Tom is an energetic fellow and loves his 
company, and I believe at that meeting he made mention, again, I 
wasn't privy to a lot of the conversations on the stock. I 
• believe he made conversation, I think Mr. Keating said, well, 
gosh, if you've got a little public company going, send me a 
prospectus, and it was worked out between Mr. Stickle and 
Mr. Keating and the attorneys on what was going to be purchased. 
I think there were two other companies, one other financial 
institution that was very interested in getting TCS stock at the 
time. 
CHAIRl~N JOHNSTON: Why, why was TCS a desirable 
opportunity? 
MR. TAGGART: It was, he had been very successful, I 
think, in building up a savings and loan. He converted to a bank. 
Tom is a very innovative, energetic entrepreneur and the company 
is doing extremely well now. Over the years, it's returned ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Better than Lincoln? 
MR. TAGGART: Right now? It probably has a better 
return on capital, yes, I think so. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You said Lincoln was a model 
institution, what happened? 
MR. TAGGART: What happened with the institution? I 
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think as Keating went on and found out that he was having 
difficulty with respect to direct investments, and got into a feud 
-- a tremendous feud -- with the Federal Home Loan Bank and he and 
Chairman Gray for probably three and one-half years were going 
back and forth at each other, shooting at each other, and it has 
pulled the whole association down. There's just been an awful lot 
of turmoil involved. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: This is the Danny Wall, U.S. Senate, 
perspective on this issue, that it was a personality conflict 
between Ed Gray and Charles Keating, that's your explanation for 
what happened? 
MR. TAGGART: Yeah, when I was in office, from a 
professional standpoint, if I had asked them to do anything or 
submit anything, it was there. There wasn't much room for 
argument. But for some reason, he didn't have that same dialogue 
with ..• 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Maybe you didn't ask for much. 
MR. TAGGART: No, I did. I sparred with them throughout 
the year on direct investment authority and so forth, and ••. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You, in your federal testimony, have 
said, not specifically with respect to Lincoln, have said the 
majority of the substantial losses that have been sustained had 
been due to regulatory intervention, write-down of assets, 
write-down of supervisors and premature liquidation. And then you 
refer to seizure mania. 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. I probably should explain that. I 
think it's important. It became somewhat clear to me in the last 
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part of 1984 that there was a gaining distrust for the 
entrepreneurs in the industry, whether in California, Florida or 
wherever. And I was also on the Federal Home Loan Bank advisory 
council. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was this distrust that you shared? 
MR. TAGGART: No, but for some reason I had a feeling 
that Chairman Gray was getting very concerned and didn't know what 
to do on his cutback regulations here and re-regulate there, and 
swing the pendulum totally to the other side, rather than bringing 
it back to center and bringing some balance, it was going totally 
to the other side, cut everybody off. And during that period, 
there were a number of associations that were very concerned 
they'd be affected. The first association that came under, well, 
we were monitoring a number of associations in California. 
Lincoln was not on that list. Nobody had ever brought to my 
attention that Lincoln was a problem shop, they'd really only been 
in business for ten months anyway, but there were a number of 
other associations that were monitored, a number of other 
associations I visited frequently with the Federal Home Loan Bank 
in California. When we made a more definitive move on San Marino 
Savings, for a number of reasons, it became clear and apparent 
that the Federal Home Loan Bank was very loath and very reluctant 
to take the lead in state chartered takeovers, unless they could 
clearly define that the association was insolvent, so it became a 
pattern during the end of my tenure that the Federal Home Loan 
Bank would have to find some justification for making the 
association insolvent before they felt comfortable in seizing 
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associations. So rather than go in and remove officers, and I've 
used the cliche before, what they would do is sink the ship to get 
at the captain, rather than use removal powers that they clearly 
had, and remove management from organizations, they would go in, 
write down the assets, try to get it to a point of insolvency, and 
thereby give them the justification for seizing and removing all 
the management they didn't like. That has caused a tremendous 
need for liquidation in this country. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you think a more effective 
approach by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board would have been to 
remove Mr. Keating, Mr. Keating's son, Mr. Keating's family 
members, Mr. Keating's associates, instead of closing Lincoln 
Savings? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. Associations in and of themselves 
are not bad, they're not problems. But the problem assets have to 
be dealt with. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Then, did you view the management as 
incompetent or fraudulent in its conduct of its business. 
MR. TAGGART: At what period of time? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: At the period of time when their 
problems became apparent to you, when might that have been? 
MR. TAGGART: That probably was about 1986, half-way 
through 1986. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
MR. TAGGART: And I was becoming further and further 
away from Lincoln at that time. And the storm was brewing more 
and more in Washington, so I really, truthfully didn't keep that 
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close a watch on what was going on, I knew there was trouble 
brewing, and it wasn't until this last year, I realized really how 
serious it was. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I know you've been a private citizen 
for that period of time, but have you had opportunity to look at 
any of the examination materials that the Federal Horne Loan Bank 
Board prepared in looking at Lincoln and the high risk investments 
and the lack of reliable appraisals and many of the other things 
that suggest very risky investments, at best. 
MR. TAGGART: I'm not really familiar 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So you're only not familiar with 
newspaper accounts or what the management told you? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, and actually management didn't tell 
very much. It seemed to me they were taking on their own battle 
at about 1986 and they were going to take this battle on with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and it was a win or lose situation 
for them. Come head nor high water, they were going to win or 
lose. And I thought, whoa, that's dangerous guys. That's really 
dangerous and I really didn't see them that much any more, 
sporadically off and on, but it just seemed to be a battle that 
they were taking on in Washington. I don't know really the extent 
of the involvement of the battle, if there was one, in California. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, you've alluded to a powerful 
enemy of Mr. Keatings, namely Mr. Gray, he also had powerful 
friends and I guess you were one of them. 
MR. TAGGART: Well, thank you, I don't know if that's 
flattering or what. but I really if you take a look at practically 
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my whole record, I was not a strenous, I'm not a lobbyist. I was 
concerned more with internal consulting in associations and trying 
to help them, and prior to 1984-1983, it was very rare for 
supervisory agreements and cease and desist orders to be sent out. 
All of a sudden there was a proliferation of them at the end of 
1984 and 1985, and it was hitting management, it was hitting 
directors, they didn't know how to cope with them, they didn't 
know how to comply with them, there really wasn't anybody out 
there that really knew ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Or contest them? 
MR. TAGGART: Or contest them ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was that part of your 
responsibility? 
MR. TAGGART: I think if you talk to the regulators, 
you'll find out that I wasn't, I rarely ever tested them, I think 
there's one association that I'd helped represent. It was a 
little association in the valley, here, that was all. It was more 
working with management in trying to get them back on track, 
trying to make home loans, trying to beat them over the head and 
say, hey, if you guys don't do this and don't set this up, you're 
going to be in trouble. You try to convince them as much as you 
can, and sometimes you can't. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Just a couple more questions. 
Shelter Island was a thrift in San Diego that you were involved 
in, were you not? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes, I was, unfortunately. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why do you say that? 
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MR. TAGGART: Because it was a financial, let's say, a 
tremendous financial loss for me. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, what was your relationship 
Hith Shelter Island as commissioner and afterwards? 
MR. TAGGART: When I was working with TCS, I believe it 
was about March of 1985, Tom Stickle had been consulting prior to 
that time, I think maybe in 1983 or 1984, to that association and 
getting their papers in, or whatever, and he said, they're having 
a little difficulty up there, I don't know what it is, Larry, you 
know, because you're the consultant, you know the industry, why 
don't you go up there and see if you can give them some help. I 
happened to know the chairman, he was a friend, not a real close • friend, but he was a friend in San Diego, so I went up there a 
couple of times and was working with them, and I said, what's the 
problem, and they said, well, we have conditional approval. I 
said you do, that's rare. It was difficult for associations to 
get conditional approval. I said how long have you had it? They 
said we got conditional approval for insurance of accounts two 
months ago. I said, woe, you've got six months to comply with 
everything, what's the problem. They said we can't get our 
capital up. And I said, well, where are you now. And they said 
well, we're about $300,000, and I said, whoa, you're really short, 
and you're running out of time. So I tried to work with them, I 
tried to help them and so forth. I had met an individual who at 
one time said, hey, if you ever want to get involved in an S&L in 
California Larry, give me a call. I gave him a call. I, again, 
my whole life has been in the savings and loan industry and some 
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day I kind of wanted to get back into it, so he came out and we 
had met several times. I said, this is the situation at the de 
novo Association. It's going to be tough and it has to be run as 
clean as any association in California. There's a very short t 
fuse on this thing. And I said, do you want to get involved or 
not? So finally we elected to get involved to see if we could 
help it through. Unfortunately, I think because of a personal 
vendetta, it never came up for a vote back in Washington, and so 
all of the organizational expenses and everything else, went 
straight down the drain along with 100 other associations in 
California. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, in November of 1983, as 
Commissioner, you approved Shelter Island, is that right? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. I have to say, I don't recall it 
coming through, but I would imagine my signature is on 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay, so in 1985, within a few 
months after you left the State, you were involved in tryi to 
effect its launching, right? 
MR. TAGGART: Trying to see that it complied with its 
conditions. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So you represented it before the 
State and federal agencies? 
MR. TAGGART: The representation was very brief. I had 
made a contact with Bill Crawford, and I said Bill, I said, 
there's a situation with the Shelter Island savings down here, and 
I said, I'm not even asking for preliminary approval or anything 
because I wouldn't do that, I'm just saying if you have any 
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objection with this, let me know right now and I won't be involved 
with it. Because if there's going to be objections along the way, 
there's too short a time fuse on it. And after discussing it with 
him, he said, no, it sounds fine to me, Larry. And I said, fine, 
and I think it was Jim Cole had contacted and I had contacted an 
individual at the Federal Home Loan Bank and I said, I'm not even 
looking for any kind of approval, I know it has to go through the 
whole process. If you have any objections of the fact the way 
it's set up, and he said no, he talked to the Chairman back at the 
Savings and Loan, and I wasn't the Chairman, he called the 
Chairman and said this seems fine with me. So with that, we 
assumed the organizational expenses, continued to fill out the 
final paperwork. Three weeks after that happened, I got a call 
from the State and they said, we've looked at it again, we're 
sorry to inform you, we'd like all the original shareholders back 
in, there's not enough shareholders here. I said, boy, I wish you 
kind of told me that in the beginning, but that's fine. We 
brought in all the original shareholders, over 26 shareholders in 
the association. And filed, and got down to about the last two or 
three days, and all of a sudden all these organizational expenses 
were assumed or paid off, and they were considerable. And I 
thought, I don't know where this is going to go, and he said, I 
think I talked to Bill Crawford, he said, I don't know where it's 
going to go either, I said, I'm just going to file with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank and see what happens. When it went to the 
Federal Home Loan Bank, it came back about a month and a half 
later from Washington, and they said, we're going to deny it 
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because there's a substantial change in the shareholder mix. 
Because there wasn't any condition there was any particular 
shareholder mix at all, that was not one of the conditions, so 
once our attorney had told their attorney, the dialogue went 
between the attorneys, they said, oh, you're right, they were just 
trying to kill it. They gave three automatic extensions beyond 
that into 1986, without even telling us what was wrong with it. 
Finally, I was back at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and met 
with a high official back there, I happened to be back in 
Washington in about April of 1986, I believe, and I said, I'm just 
curious, I said, what's going on, I said, I thought you had this 
30-day thing, you're either going to deny things or approve 
things, I said now I know how the public feels out there, I can't 
find out anything on this. And he said, well, it's a very 
problematic file. I satd, that's great, you're the first person 
that ever told me there's a problem with it, what is it? And he 
said, well, it's the adequacy of capitalization. I said, well, 
that's interesting. I said, the money is sitting in escrow, and 
it's a little bit more than the amount required. He says, oh, 
you're right, Larry, actually it's the qualifications of 
management. I said there isn't any management, there's only one 
gal that works there. I said you can call me president, I've 
never taken a penny out of the thing. And I said, I'll tell you 
what, I'll take my credentials against anybody you have back here 
at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and run circles around them. 
He said, well, you're right, Larry, because actually it's a 
problem with Ed Gray. If you could use just a little bit of 
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honey, you know, maybe that thing would come up for a vote. I 
thought, that's it, the thing's been sitting there for four years, 
and that's the federal system. And, yes, it cost me a lot of 
money. So it's a sad story, but I got hit with a thing that 
hundreds of other people in the state have got hit with. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Your career has been in savings and 
loan institutions, primarily. 
MR. TAGGART: Most of my life, yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In that career, you served two years 
as a top regulator for California? 
MR. TAGGART: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why did you take the job? 
MR. TAGGART: I think I was ready for a career change. 
I was very fortunate in Great American to have been with an 
innovative association and I had done just about everything within 
Great American, I'd been on the lending side, the savings side, 
the grants side, the legal side, the servicing side, worked on 
mergers and acquisitions, it was time for a change. And that 
opportunity came up. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why did you leave? 
MR. TAGGART: Why did I leave? I found, to me, it was 
an opportunity and an enrichment in my life and a different 
experience. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I mean left the state. Went back? 
MR. TAGGART: Oh, at that particular time, I was up in 
San Francisco, my family was down in San Diego, and after two 
years, I think the average tenure of a commissioner in California 
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prior to Bill Crawford was about a year and a half, two years. I 
had been two years, things seemed to be in a little bit of a lull 
that last quarter. I was missing my family. I wanted to 
repatriate myself with with, and so I resigned at the end of the 
year, and had I known there vlould be these challenges later on, 
people have asked me, would you have stayed in? I don't know, I 
like challenges. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, you would have more knowledge 
then probably the average business person, maybe it's just the 
nature of the business that your services were most valuable to 
people like Charles Keating, or Charles Napp, both of whom have 
been involved in the largest and most expensive S&L failures in 
the country, yet you've seemed to put the best face on it from the 
perspective of the entrepreneurs that ran those institutions and 
lay the blame on the kind of people that were once your 
colleagues, namely, government regulators. 
MR. TAGGART: I'm really careful not to place blame, and 
you'll notice in my federal testimony, I really wasn't there to 
castigate anybody or lay blame on anybody. But I have to ask 
myself, what the heck's gone on in the last five years. Five 
years have passed since I left, you know, has somebody been asleep 
at the switch? And a lot of problems come up and they aren't just 
in California and they aren't just in Texas. They're nationwide. 
So if they are nationwide, you have to kind of take a look where 
the source of the problems really come from. That there's some 
point in this country, some change in regulations, something, that 
has caused this whole industry in this whole country to have 
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extreme difficulties. It's not a California problem, it's not a 
Texas problem, it's a nationwide problem. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Seastrand. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: I just might say that obviously 
the examining and auditing of these firms have an impact on it, 
but you go back to the late 70's, early 1980's, when we saw a 21% 
prime rate, and had an inverted interest rate structure, short 
term rates being higher than long-term rates, that has a 
II 
tremendous impact on financial institutions and especially since 
we went to deregulating the savings rates. You might recall that 
prior to the mid 1970's, I think it was, you used to get paid a 
total of 5% for your savings in the bank which was very nice for 
saving institutions, not very good for the consumer. 
MR. TAGGART: I remember clearly in 1975, the fed's 
wanted variable rate notes and the state charters had them, and we 
got into 1977, and there was a tremendous fear on 
disintermediation mediation, that money was going to be sucked out 
of associations, rate control was coming off and all of a sudden 
money market funds took $240 billion out of the industry. There 
have been problems every year and then they got in the 1980's with 
those tremendous high interest rates, there were serious problems 
facing the industry. And now there are. I kind of have to ask 
myself, why is it t fol s I'm trying to help clean these 
problems up 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Now the lacest problem is that 
we see in some financial publications around is the 
collapse in real estate prices and not only in the southwest or 
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south, in Texas, where oil loans had been, t now Ar zona 
Colorado, I'm told, are taking it in the shorts and . 
MR. TAGGART: Phoenix in the mid 1980's was a str 
strong city and it is 
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND: Now, instead of having worries 
about oil loans to banks in Texas, we are worried about real 
estate loans. So there's always nice little problems around. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We appreciate your efforts to get 
here. This time of the year you have to almost come the night 
before, but nevertheless you were here in time and we appreciate 
your testimony and your willingness to candidly answer the 
questions, and maintain your reputation as a continued proponent 
of deregulation. 
MR. TAGGART: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: This hearing is adjourned. 
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OPENING STATEMENT OF CAROL H. REHM, JR. 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
December 20, 1989 
I am a Deputy Attorney General in the Civil Division,. 
Business and Tax Section, in Los Angeles. This section serves 
client agencies which include the State Board of Equalization, 
Franchise Tax Board, Employment Development Department and the 
Departments of Insurance, Real Estate and Savings and Loan. 
The Attorney General's Office provides litigation 
services to these client agencies and is called upon to defend 
them in court. The office does not •pass" on client activities 
in the sense that it approves or disapproves their regulatory 
actions. 
In December 1988, Ms. Shirley Thayer, Legal Counsel for 
the Department of Savings and Loan, and I had a telephone 
conversation to discuss a proposed cease and desist order 
concerning Lincoln Savings and Loan. She had forwarded a copy of 
the proposed order and supporting documents which I had reviewed. 
Ms. Thayer asked if I shared her concern over language 
regarding •potential securities laws violations•. I told her 




I was not asked to research any matter. I did 'not 
H 
I, or 
language in the proposed order. I did 
office, lacked the securities law 
.. 
expertise to defend a challenge to the order. I told her we 
would defend in court any action the Department took. 
0008 
was not again by the Department 
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Mt. Chairman and Members of the committee I thank you 
for the opportunlty to teati!y before this Committee. My 
name is Qene Stelzer. I am currently a supervising examiner 
with the California Depattment of Savings and Loan (OSL). l 
wa1 the examiner-in-charge of the July, 1988 examination of 
Lincoln Saving& and Loan Association (Lincoln), and was also 
in overall charge of the examination of both Lincoln and its 
holdin9 company, Ameriean Continental Corporation (ACC) Mr. 
R1cha'd H•w$om was the examiner-in-charge of the examination 
of ACC. 
My 1t1tement is cnnr.ArnAd with the ia§~e~ surrounding 
tha Cease and Desist Or~er that was issued by the Department 
of Savings and Loan in December, 1988 against Lincoln. 
I will begin by briefly outlining the financial situation at 
Lincoln and its parent company, American Continental 
Corporation (ACC), as I understood it in November~ 1988. By 
understanding whet we knew about the financial condition o£ 
these firms in November, 1988 , the significance of the 
decision to delete the clause related to disclosures being 
made in the public documents of ACC should be clarified. !n 
writin; this, I have had time to only consult several 
documents essential to this topic. 
My recollection concerning the knowledge that I had 
about the financial condition of Lincoln and American 
Continental Corporation in November, 1988 is as follows. lt 
was evident to me tbat ACC was engaged in a vast Ponzi 
scheme. A major source of its cash flow, the tax sharing 
payments from ln, had been halted by the Office of 
Regulatory Affairs (ORA) of the Federal Home Loan Sank 
Board. The on other si f1cant outside source of cemh 
flow was comi itional debenture sales. 
from sales were being ~sed to pay 
r r repurchase of ACC stock from 
rm, and pay off maturing debt. 
major subsidiary of ACC 1 
be very ba~. Mr. Newaon had 
llion in losses on juat two 
exami ion report on 
that, as e result of 
ial appraieal losses 
r also in~ioated that 
lopment projeeta o! 
recollection is that Mr.Newsom we very bar4 on 
assi even le ain the assistance 
in Francisco, H. R. 
Mr. Newsom also did &omething for which I believe he 
deserves the highest praise. He put a clause in the proposed 
cease and Desist Order that was intended to stop any 
additional debenture sales. The clause, as it is stated in 
draft no. 6 of the proposed Cease and Desist Order, is as 
fol'lOWI: 
The Commissioner orders Lincoln, ACC, or any of 
their subsidiaries, cease and desist from the 
following: 
3. Permitting erroneous, incomplete, misleading or 
inaccurate information of any kind to be included in 
public reports including 10-Q, offering circulars, 
proxy materials or any other public information. This 
or4e~ ifteludes bu~ is Be~ limi~cd ~o mo~oriol omimaions 
regarding relateo or att1l1ateo party transae~1ons. 
As I understand the strategy of Mr. Newson on this 
clause, his plan was as follows: (1) If Lincoln and ACC 
challenged this order in court, this would provide an 
opportunity to bring the financial condition of these firms 
to the attention of the public during the le;al proceedings; 
(2) If the order was not challenged, it might provide a way 
of exerting pressure on other agencies, in particular, the 
Office of Regulatory Affairs and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, to take some action to stop the debenture sales; 
and (3) It might provide the Department of Savin;s and Loan 
with a valid reason to put ncoln into conservatorship. A 
section of the Savings and Loan Law, 8225 (a) (5), provides 
as a reason for puting an association into conservatorship 
the following: "the association is in violation of an order 
or 1njuction, as authorized by this diviaion" If the 
prospectus for the debentures was not corrected after this 
or~er became effective, Lincoln would be in violation of the 
Cease and De1i1t Order. 
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• 
STATEMENT OF SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL 
AND LOAN 
LAW AND REGULATION 
My name is Shirley M. Thayer and I am testifying before this 
Subcommittee pursuant to a subpena issued on matters related 
to Richard Newsom's timony given on November 29, 1989, and 
the additional testimony provided to Steve Suchil, Consultant 
for the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee, on December 
5,1989. 
I am Senior Staff Counsel (Specialist) for the Department and 
in this capacity I am as 
comments and tions on 
to the Commissioner. I am 
authorizes me to final 
do provide 1 al and 
From prior testimony 
aware that the 
Lincoln Savings 
Corporation (ACC) 
I also do not need 
the Department 
As I underst 
testimony 
by 
to look at, review and make 
a variety of matters to staff and 
in a job classification that 
isions or policy decisions. I 
give opinions. 
by Commissioner Crawford you are 
s taken a vigorous stance with 
nco ) and American Continental 
ion and enforcement actions. 
ttee again how much effort 
sale of the bonds. 
se of today's hearing is to accept 
ist Order (Order) issued 
1988 to Lincoln and ACC 
because there 
the decision to 





remove ce language from that Order. 
rtment, gave testimony on 
certain language was removed 
General C. H. Rehm. Mr. 
nfo indirectly through 
Mr. Rehm felt he 
deal with any 
He also 
"This would 
sa es program." 
December 21, 
ruary, 1989. 
s on repeating 
did not veri 
I now that 
not accurate. 
0 
language would have 
p Obviously there 
of what over a year 
that no one had 
first time 
research had 
law was being 
Department was not ignoring rmation de from 
the Order, as all findings had al sent the 
rities Exchange Commiss ( ) n November with a cover 
letter from William Davis, Chief Deputy. Additional 
information has been forwarded throughout 1989. But, as of 
December 15, 1989, the matter is still under investigation and 
no determination has been made as to whether or not the 
findings are a securities law violation. By naming ACC in the 
Order this could trigger the requirement to file an a (k) with 
the SEC, which would make the Order available to the public, 
and alert anyone interested in finding out, that Lincoln was 
being ordered to divest the loan that was associated with the 
potential securities law violation. 
Had the language related to the "potential" securities law 
violation remained in the Order, it would have been easily 
challenged and I have grave doubts that a court would have 
enforced a "potential .. violation. ACC would most likely have 
requested the court to seal the records, thus depriving access 
by the public. If it was not challenged by ACC and had the 
Department tried to enforce the Order through a court action, 
I would surmise a similar result from the court. Had we tried 
to use it as a basis for a conservatorship I strongly doubt 
whether a court would have confirmed it. The SEC requires 
publicly traded companies to report "significant events." ACC 
did not file its annual report March 30, 1989. 
I think it might be beneficial to describe the mechanics of 
issuin~and enforcing a Order and the background leading to 
this Order. By statute adopted by this legislature the 
Commissioner is authorized to issue an Order when an 
association, holding company or subsidiary is violating or has 
violated a law or is engaging in or has engaged in an unsafe or 
unsound business practice. (The past tense language was added 
to become effective January 1, 1989.) The Order must first 
state the violation or practice and then facts must be stated 
in support of the violation or practice. The Commissioner then 
orders discontinuance of the violation or practice and then 
orders conformance with all requirements of law. The Order is 
a two-pronged document with the .. order" portion of the Order 
linked to the violation. You can not order someone to stop 






r is a 





is to be 
ifi 
and not available to the 
An Order is considered to be a 
issued only as a final resort 
v lations or practices. 
ision issue this Order during the examination of 
Lincoln ACC was, as I stand it, without precedent and 
re was a considerable amount of concern with taking this 
action re standard exami ion procedures were 
The seriousness of the situation related to certain 
a great sense of urgency to get an Order out as 
soon as possib , but it was extremely important to issue an 
Order that would be enforceable if taken to court and which 
complied completely wi the law . 
takes regulatory actions and issues Orders but 
litigate. Therefore, the Attorney 
acted when litigation is anticipated or 
know no Deputy Attorney General has 
merits of a regulatory action, but does 
give opi ons on what has a chance of being 
Since a Deputy Attorney General is 
or enforce this Department's Orders 
we go imes ask for review of drafts of an 
r to see if would be any problems defending or 





r at issue was given to me for review 
of a "potential" securities law 
li to 
o r. I expressed concern over 
ial" violation. The Department 
nvolving Universal Savings in a 
ch contained language about a 




the conservator so I thought that there would be 
s situation. Orders issued by the Department 
for violations, not "potential" violations. 
r was sent to Deputy Attorney General C.H. 
Since re was only a brief telephone 
over one year ago, I have no 
t was said but remember generally 
of defending a "potential" 
1 need to be specific. I do 
he wasn't an expert in securities 
him to do any research to 
ssions were in fact a securities law 
take time and the Commissioner was 
discussion related to specific language being 
t in; therefore, I can conclude that Mr. Rehm 
to remove language from the Order. 
3 
i 
ted the 1 
lacked securities law 
court challenge by ACC 
without merit. 
t a itig or 






At a subsequent meeting with staff linked to San 
Fransico on a conference call con for 
leaving in or taking the " language was 
discussed There was suppo sitions from staff 
members. I did communicate Mr. sa there wou be 
problems with enforcing a "potential" violation. The 
Commissioner made the final decision to remove the language 
about "potential" violations the attendant order after 
listening to and considering all input from the staff and not 
upon instructions from the Deputy Attorney General. Additional 
language was also added to the Order after Mr. Rehm reviewed it 
which would make Lincoln divest itself of the loans at issue. 
In my opinion the removal of language that could be easily 
challenged and the language added made the Order much stronger, 
not weaker. 
After the November 29th hearing, since the Deputy Attorney 
General had not made a request to remove any language from the 
Order, and since it was I who supposedly made the allegation 
that he had, I felt it was imperative that the press be 
informed that this information was not accurate. The 
Commissioner and Chief Deputy authorized me to make the 
appropriate contacts. I also contacted Steve Suchil the 
following morning. I read a statement for TV Channels 2 and 7 
on November 30th. I specifically stated that "Mr. Newsom only 
repeated what he had been told but what he had been told was 
not accurate." A press release was also drafted the same day 
which clearly said Mr. Newsom had no first-hand knowledge. 
This press release was drafted by Duane Peterson, Press 
Secretary for the Attorney General, for release to the news 
media. Our Department is small and has no press office and no 
capability to contact a central news release agency. We have 
a used other agencies out our news releases. Mr. 
Peterson faxed us a draft Mr. Davis and myself reviewed it, 
edi it to our satisfaction~ and faxed it back to be 
distributed. 
In a printed submission from Mr. Newsom to Steve Suchil and 
labelled as additional testimony dated December 5, 1989, 
allegations were made that "I have reason to believe a 
cover-up is in process". In addition to Mr. Newsom's 
references related to the Order which he alleges created a 
conflict of interest with the Attorney General, I am accused of 
having attempted to tamper with his testimony to be presented 
4 
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ressional Banking, nance and Urban Affairs 
discour 
r 31, 1989. He stated that I attempted to 
from including hundreds of pages of supporting 
ts. 
Since an attempt to tamper wi or any actual tampering with 
t before a legislat is a very serious matter, I 
relating the extent of my wish to make a sho statement 
invo with Mr. Newsom's timony. 
Brief , I had helped Gene Stelzer and the Commissioner edit 
written st thout changing content, and was 
look Newsom's statement on October 26, 
1989, in a time per re a subpena had been served and it 
was r it would be a subpena for testimony only 
duces tecum. The only conversation that I recall 
him was over the phone and was related to what 
to be a draft of his statement. I told him that it 
to be c up, after he protested I said I would 
touch it. At no time was reference made to specific 
sue 
you 
to him. ila Sakamoto worked with Mr. Newsom to 
you. 
s statement which was considerably different from 
in a discussion that same day and gave an 
ia 
a 
a v l ion of California Financial 
arily submit confidential documents 
This is the position I have 
ttee. In fact, in my 
t a 
Committee 
Mr. Newsom has submitted to 
duces tecum has violated 
subpena duces tecum was served 
and there was no longer an 
not be considered to be an 
testimony. 
to say that the Department of Savings 
in a coverup on any matters 
We have at all times tried to do 
sa of the bonds being issued by ACC 
law. 






nance and Insurance 
s Loan Law and Regulation 
r 0, 1989 
itional testimony is necessary because of 
dis arisen over my stimony relating to the 
changes ase and Desist Order (C&D) eliminating an 
rtant clause t in my opinion may very well have directly 
or i irect stopped subordinated debt sales at American 
inental rp (ACC) in December 1988. A pattern is emerging 
liberate attempts state officials to conceal or distort 
truth, t r with congressional testimony and discredit 
or sses or potential witnesses that is contrary 
to erest. As late as three weeks ago Commisioner 
Cr rd and Mr. Davis seemed to support both action and public 
disclosures relative to the Lincoln matter. Something profound 
seems to have occured since that time to change that position. 
I is 
licting, inaccurate, and I believe deliberately 
s releases and statements have been put out by 
Attorney Generals Office(AG) and the Califonia 
Loan(CDSL) to attempt to explain how 
cast doubt on the credibility of my 
r to pages A-1-A-5) Stories have 
flip flopped again. Explanations 
are inconsistant with multiple 
standard operating procedures of 
ch has a serious conflict of 
a self serving, misleading press 
t attampted to minimize the AG's 
of my credibility, only to be 
n hours contradictory admissions by the AG's 
newspapers. 
little dispute that the AG's office had 
draft order and influenced the CDSL to 
AG's ffice 
inaccurate 
was quick to 
self serving press 
se, at no time did the 
to enquire about my 
publish a 
release and assist 




me the AG's office exhibited at least 
1 
r, ·') 0 8 C) "'1 ',.,v u i 
incr ibly poor judgement, escalated problems, and acted 
improperly contrary to the client's best interests. (CDSL & 
myself). The result has been detrimental to the public 
interest and a slap in the face to the subordinated debt 
lders who ~ the public most affected by this disaster. 
My previous testimony was very clear in stating that I was 
advised indirectly by California Department of Savings and 
Loan (CDSL) counsel in San Francisco of Ms. Thayer's 
explanation to them regarding the cause of the change in the 
Cease and Desist Order. (Refer to page A-18) During that 
testimony I clearly advised Assemblywoman Wright that it would 
necessary for the committee to talk to others to find out 
dir ly their story on what happened. Mr. Harvey and Ms. 
Sakamoto are the referenced San Francisco counsel and hopefully 
are present to testify. 
A written transcript of my November 29,1989 testimony is 
a ached.(refer to page A-6-A-21) . This was provided to me by 
Mr. Johnston's office. Looking at the clarity of this testimony 
it is incredible to me that the press releases by CDSL and the 
AG • s office could be so wrong, so vicious in attacking my 
testimony and my credibility, and so far from the truth and 
deliberately misleading. 
While I was first assigned to Lincoln/ACC in September, 1988, I 
· believe that state and federal regulators would confirm to you 
t no one worked harder to try to protect the public from 
t s disaster with efforts that included working up to 20 hours 
a day. I felt that with obviously worthless subdebt being sold 
at the rate of $500,000 -$700,000 per day to people described 
in congressional testimony by federal examiners as "widows and 
orphans, mom's and pop's " any less effort would be 
inexcusable. 
The situation has changed a lot from last year when we were, 
without success, seeking assistance from FHLB personnel, SEC, 
Department of Corporations, etc. to help shut down the subdebt 
sales. A year ago Mr. Keating appeared near the peak of his 
power,a financial great white shark feeding indiscriminantly 
off misinformed senior citizens and others swimming at a 
public beach. There are many parallels to the famous movie 
"Jaws", including public officials reluctant to "close the 
beach" .. 
I believe that I have been caught in a v1c1ous squeeze between 
public policy concerns warranting full disclosure to the 
public, versus tort liability concerns and political concerns 
which require no disclosure or outright denials . My belief is 
that when 20,000 + citizens, including many senior citizens, 
lose $250,000,000 in a disaster under the conditions that 
2 
r, ·r 08")9 
l.,.~l..) uo 
L n/ACC 
. I have no 
rement 
unconsci 
lie policy concerns should override 
mind that some of these 
, in what should have been 
ause of a combination of 








political/regulatory process that 
public. 
State employees who try to do something to protect the public 
shou not be muzzled, smeared, or intimidated when they 
provi a congressional or assembly committee information that 
may be political or reacratical embarrasing. 
In conducting the ring today I hope the committee 
understands that the committees actions may be scrutinized by 
other state employees may wish to speak out about what 
, and knew. If these potential witnesses feel 
face humiliation, retaliation, or isolation 
t to the Committee that I have felt, I 
11 you that this will stifle your investigation 
information from public scrutiny that should be known. 
t ayers subordinated debt holders have paid their 
and to see all the cards, face up and uncensored. 
se Keating empire and other institutions that 
ratching" arrangements with Lincoln/ACe is 
c ci tzens beyond the 
rs and the wipe out of 
.. shark victims" referred to 
insurance company, Pacific 
Davis, li rnia only 20 miles from here, 
ate insurance regulators with what was 
r_as a substantial deficit net worth. 
New~ 18,1989 stated that" The 
will result in the single· 
ses in the state's 
r r, "Since California has no 
se losses will be borne largely by 
itors, like Lincoln, and its 
the unsafe and unsound 
atedly referenced in my 
(Refer to Page A-25) 
Desist order(page A-66 & 
rk exhibits which I 
r pages A-22-A-28) 
$50,000,000 in loans 
~·-~~-~·- i presumably may 
t paragragraph).The 
s if i as t a a by 
ent a memo and analysis to 
the expres 
to FHLB 
ne n r 
r a was a t 
in San Francisco, 
s less concerned about 
Heal thy insurance subsidiaries inconsistant with a 
looted holding company and a review of Pacific 
Standards financial statements lf showed heavy 
intercompany receivables and inves rela to its 
parent. At Lincoln near eve ng was worse than it 
. I drafted the attached warning letter with Mr. Harvey, 
August 16, 1989 (exhibit A-29 0) which I drafted for Mr. 
Davis to the Department of Insurance. Receipt was subsequently 
acknowledged. 
This is an example of why this committee needs to encourage 
witnesses to tell what they know about Lincoln. The pieces of 
the Lincoln puzzle and related "backscratching" transactions. 
need to be brought into public view and it may take years to do 
so. 
If you don't want to know the truth don't supena us. If you do 
want to know the truth, you better make it very clear that 
retaliation is unacceptable from any source. 
I wish to thank the committee for hopefully providing supenas 
to additional witnesses to add depth to testimony. Some of 
these witnesses have specific knowledge about certain areas but 
not the whole C & D. 
My testimony will focus on three main areas all that relate · 
directly and indirectly to the cease and desist order: 
1. C&D issues 
2. The self serving breakdown in professional responsibility 
by the AG's office which had clear detrimental effects on 
CDSL and myself and will likely adversely affect the 
subordinated debt holders by serving to intimidate State of 
California employees who may be called to testify. 
3. Tampering incidents involving congressional testimony. 
To insure that the witnesses , who include several attornies 




irman to ask t ior CDSL official present to 
authorize attorneys present to fully answer questions without 
concern over attorney Client privilege issues. 
I was as 
November 29,1989 test 
the severity of the response to my 
which included : 
1. A news release( r to page A-l&A-2} was apparently 
is on November 29, 1989 by the Office of the Attorney 
General that mischaracterized my testimony and then 
attacked the mi r rization.This included a number of 
false r misleading statements that indicated that I 
minimized the role of the AG's office in 
C & D. It alsc mistated events and 
on my credibility in sworn testimony 
role of the State Attorney Generals 
office in draft order and influencing the 
CDSL to remove the one section of the order that was 
intended to stop subdebt sales. 
2. A lifornia Depar of Savings and Loan news release 
(page & A-4} was reportedly prepared jointly by Shirley 
Thayer of the rtment of Savings and Loan and the 
Generals f and approved by Mr. Davis 
thst that the C & D was at the AG's 
also inaccurately characterized 
avorably on my credibility in 
material ommissions that 
misl ing news release and linked with 
release could not help but lead the 
t testimony lacked credibility. 
Even more appeared in newspapers 
inc i one indicated that Mr.Van De Ramp's press 
a , Duane Peterson said Newsom "either doesn't know 
talki about or is a liar" . It was my 
from Mr. Davis that Commisioner Crawford may 
di Mr. Van DeKamp on Wednesday 
r 29,1989. ease confirm this with Mr. 
information and seems to have 
mentioned change in attitude of 
newspaper reporter saw the 
exhibit provided to this 
A-58-A-68) supporting my November 29, 
5 
1989 testimony and the al claims by the AGs office 
t t included statements that would lead one to believe 
that they had never seen the d~aft order. The newspaper 
seems to have racted from AG's office an admission 
that they found a memo.showi had in fact seen and 
reviewed the C&D, which . they were allegedly denying 
earlier. In light of all the contradictory and false press 
releases, constantly changing stories, tampering with 
congressional testimony of myself and Mr. Stelzer, and 
what I perceived as an attempt to keep my March 5, 1989 
testimony from reaching the cornmi ttee and the public, I 
hope you will understand why I describe this to you as a 
cover up. Please review the evidence question witnesses 
freely and draw your own conclusions. While you may not 
want to believe this the evidence and I believe the other 
witnesses will speak for themselves. 
DRAFTING THE ORDER 
My congressional testimony (See page A-31-A-42 contains 
considerable information on the preparation of the C & D and 
other efforts to stop subdebt sales. 
The facts are that this order was drafted by me starting 
approximately Novemer 8, 1988 at the delegated request of 
Commisioner Crawford with the staff legal support of both Mr. 
Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto. This was the day after Mr. Keating 
advised State and federal regulators that a takeover of Lincoln 
would cause FSLIC $2,000,000 in losses. The "shark victims" had 
little chance in these waters. 
The strategy of the order was that 
1. Violation of a Cease and desist order would provide legal 
grounds for a conservatorship which we didn't have under 
sting law. 
2. Ordering Lincoln/ACC to cease and desist from making unsafe 
and unsound loans, engaging in conflict of interest 
transaction, and making misleading or inaccurate public 
disclosures would likely stop the subdebt sales indirectly, 
as accurate disclosures are fundamental to securities 
laws.Further because of Lincoln's pattern of doing 
business, reviewing new loans made after the order would 
likely find violations that would quickly reveal grounds 
for a conservatorship. Violation of an order was grounds 
r a conservatorship. 
3. A Cease and desist order would help paint the FHLB(ORA) in 
Washington into a corner. They had the power to stop 
6 
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we C&D would pressure them to 
FHLB ho ing company examiners informed 
of our ions includi the section dealing with 
disclosures~ as they were allies in attempting 
in Wa i ton stop subdebt sales.( Refer to 
pa A-46) I also felt that such an order would put 
pressure on the SEC and the Department of Corporations who 
we already advised of specific disclosure problems. ( 
Page A-47) 
4. Speed was of the essence-Subordinated debt was being sold 
at the rate of $700,000 per day and it was obviously 
worthless.(Refer to pages A-48- A-56)The supervising 
examiner for the job Q1~.Mar)_ was working at a different 
speed than Mr. Stelzer and myself and I believed it might 
be months bef_or:.a...an~_ioi!_r_§PPJt !'lent out (if at all) 
and I believed un s I fought it through the system no 
enforcement action would occur at all. At the outset of the 
examination l was advised that Mr. Mar was relieved of his 
duties as supervising examiner for the apparent reason that 
several previous Lincoln examination reports had in fact 
never ft desk or been mailed to the association. He 
as only a "consultant". He was inexplicably 
during examination which created problems for 
and Mr. Stelzer, in conducting the examination 
a se and Desist order processed. (Pages 
Mr. Stelzer and myself took exception with 
about--Mar-Ls-re.sumption of supervising 
on ncoln/ACC on several' occasions. 
5. ressional testimony (see pages A-31 
6 . 
even 
ions rting the cease and desist 
so lli I felt even an unsophisticated 
understand ncoln/ACC was out of control. 
to challenge the order the 
in court open to public view. 
llingly unsafe and unsound and 
would become public would create 
public in terms of disclosure 
army of ACC attorneys. 
7 
so innocous that I believed 
our favor. My rationale was 
block an order that merely 
to stop including inaccurate 
public rports.Even their own 
n writing to a $10 million 
page A-57)and there were 
rors on which documentation 
approved by CDSL management 






into the record 
January 1989. 
o r was to s , if possible, 
si i sure errors in the 
relevant excerpt of the fi ings( cou be described 
Did Wrong") in the draft order follows (refer to 
A-65): 
"Furthermore, public disclosure statements (Footnote #3) lacked 
comp and accurate disclosures regarding the above 
referenced Pontchartrain transaction, which in addition to 
being potential securities law violations may result in 
liability to ACC, and thereby may adversely affect the safety 
soundness of Lincoln. Material omissions and/or 
inaccuracies in these reports include: 
1. Failure to disclose that the Pontchartrain Hotel was 
heavily encumbered by a $35 million mortgage with another 
lender; 
2. Failure to disclose a $5 million rantee by ACC of the 
3. 
5 Ilion first mortgage he another lender on the 
Pontchartrain Hotel. (An additional $9 mi llioon secured 
guarantee was later provided by ACC in 1988.) 




the below market interest rate, the 
and the unsafe and unsound risk 
the above-referenced Pontchartrain 
(Footnote #3 Proxy material dated April 8,1988, a 10-K report 
dated December 31, 1987, and offering circulars for $300 
Ilion subordinated debt fi th the SEC on April 14, 
1988.) 
4. rs and potential investors were advised in one 
(footnote #4) that "Management believes that the 
terms of the transactions set forth in the preceding 
paragraphs were as favorab the company as those which 
could obtained in similar transactions with unaffiliated 
ies". This statement is misleading given the facts of 
transaction; and 
8 
r, "1. Q 8 (\ .<1 
1_. 1._) ...J ;t 
5. Due an error (described as "typographical" by ACC's 
counsel} ACC's proxy statement. dated April 8, 1988 
erroneous disc sed that ACC and a subsidiary advanced a 
total of 6 llion to a limited partnership in which 
officers and directors had an interest, when in fact the 
total amount was $16 million under the $20 million line of 
c it i ore referenced. 
(Footnote # 4 ACC's April 8, 1988 proxy statement, page 7.)" 
4. 
These findings are specific and link to multiple 
a support. Further, the serious conflict of 
interest f ings on the same transaction (refer to page 
A-63 ) survived legal review and were included in the final 
order. This added to my surprise regarding the reason for 
the the order. In essence if it is accepted that 
the shows that you can prove that insiders 
$20,000,000 contrary to Federal regulations 
in an unsa and and unsound transaction, proving 
disclosure problems given all the evidence doesn't seem 
difficult. 
that underscored section (relative-to. 
ial securities law violations .. ) was superfluous J. o 
and could have been taken out without effect. 
- ~ ~~- ---·"_"_ ---·----- .----~--. 
from the order part of the C&D(what 
.. STOP DOING") follows: 
erroneous, incomplete, misleading or inaccurate 
on any nd to be included in public reports 
Form ring circulars, proxy materials 
r publ rmation. This order includes but is 
rial ommisions regarding related or 
there is 
9 
reference to securities laws~ 
--··-·-~ 
DID WRONG") supported the 
DOING") without regard to 
ly expressed to Ms. 
, and myself prior to the 
r did not seem to like 
all known to myself, Mr. 
management in LA 
at the time, Mr. 
pressure 
t 
a previous SEC 
sus ib to 
Congress onal 
was particularly 
ing the order I t I rsonally 
revi myself involvi rain , RA Homes, 
Southmark Corpor . I documentationm on 
these transactions and in fact Mr. Stelzer) junior 
examiners xerox whole files rel transactions and 
index page, a mammoth ta in anticipation of an 
court chal ressional testimony 
s in more detail. ( A-31 - A-42) 
ised Mr. lzer on fif assigned to Lincoln 
an enforcement action was necessa based on the Hotel 
Pontchartrain transaction alone he had concurred. 
ter drafting the order and discussions/disputes with LA staff 
over documentaion I spent a whole day with Los Angeles 
management at roughly the beginning of December going through 
the order which I had footnoted with over 100 footnotes linked 
to supporting documentaion, which I produced to the group, as 
requested, that included Ms. Thayer, Mr. Sumimoto, Mr. Travis, 
Mr. Shames, Mr. Stelzer , Mr. Mar, who left early and Mr. Davis 
who came in and .out of the meeting. The footnoted draft C & D 
was included as an exhibit to congressional testimony and 
included approximately 25 footnoted pieces of documentaion 
dealing with the disclosure problems alone.(Refer to pages A-69 
- A-83) ). The level of review at this meeting was extremenly 
detailed.I was amazed that Mr. Mar wished to delete the whole 
finding relative. to the $10,000,000 disclosure problem because 
it was alleged to be a typographical error. 
The attendees represented the whole LA chain of command and the 
whole purpose of the meeting was to satisfy management that we 
the documentation to support the order and move forward. My . 
impression WaS---that_ that __ waS----S_a_tis_fied- .and __ t-1~-..made · j~~~/g{ 
~ satisfy the group. An E-mail from Thayer Ref E:::::.. 
~~ to Ms. Sakamoto followed that meeting' w ich 
1 somewhat confirms that. The documentation was indexed in 
~several files and filled a box. Every page in each file was 
actually numbered hand to totally organize the files and 
facilitate the review. I sent a follow up memorandum to Los 
taking except ted minor changes that 
to intentionally favor ACC.(Refer to page A-85). 
The issue of adequacy of documentaion was satisfied by CDSL 
management before it went to the AG which is the normal 
procedure.. It is obvious from contemporaneous memorandums 




::~1 :CJ: r·::v·if;~,';r \.j:.:-·c~ is ~~c~ ~"-·-.:~r·--.·=~:t rrc:c-:ju~e 
ir;.q t.1a:: IFT result in liU_-Jat~_::'·n(:·cr2n ti~:e 
That was ~a~ticularly truu ~n th.~s c~se b9cause of 
s nature of llCC. 
and o~al statement~ made to Congress plus exhibits 
to test (Refer to page A-87- A-·92 Letter t') ACC 
spec f cally addressing disclosure problems) which clearly 
i icates my strategy from the beginning of using disclosure 
problems ACC as a means to put pressure on Lincoln/ACC as 
well as ORA, and Department of Corporations tv whom 
th were provided. It should be noted that out of 13 
bits provided to ress 6 exhibits referenced these 
disclosure problems. The October 1988 FHLB interim report of 
examination(draft) on the holding company included these 
disc sure problems. 
It should particularly emphasized that ths "SEC Securities 
----.l.i-=_violations issue which seems to be raised as the joint 
sis for removing the ent_j,_r~ disclos~ue section 
:i;; __ ~~okesc:ree9, and v1as argued internally 
draft order even went to tha AG. Please draw your 
ion, as to \-'Jhether the deletion of t!'ls wi10 le 
section NBS justified by the "SEC SECURITIES LAW" 
a written admission by ACC's own attorney of 
error in disclosure on the Pontchartrain 
that their was an error in disclosure at 
a "slam dunk". I hope the cormnittee 
a fatal flaw in the "SEC REGULATIONS 
of the C & D preparation process was 
were reluctant to issue an order and 
r as much as possible. I recall 
erence c th Mr. Harvey and myself,in SF, 
Mr. Mar, Mr. Shames and perhaps others in LA 
on vac ion. Mr. Mar and others argued to weaken 
we prevail in convincing Mr. Crawford that the 
is ing the section on disclosure . 
differences of opinion with 
ACC/Li~soln. Refer to 
:re were other irstances of r,1r. 
se the whole C&D process.2efer 
become aware that other Thayer 
favorable to industry have 
on , including one related to 
large institution specializing 











the o er 
and would be 
s(Pag0~jl-;? ~ 
l i veretrf:o the l~ifl 
is, we will issue 
to the committee 
normal procedure ·~ 
J 
this testimony have 
vi im of a deliberate 
campaign office to mislead and 
distort en by the CDSL 
Commisioner Crawford of Califo a Department of Savings 
and Loan and s assist William Davis who have so far been 
unwilling to issue correct news re ases in spite of 
admissions by AG. rsonnel referenced i:1 newspapers that the 
AGs' earlier statements about my testimony Here in error. It 
appears t :re is some Agency involvement. It is clear to me 
that there has been a breakdown in professional responsibility 
and ethics by t At ral' s office due to the 
conflicting ir1vc. AGs office in the Lincoln 
matter involving AG's action3 may have 
adverse effects on federal litigation in 
which I have been , am called as a State or 
ral witness. Nei AG's office nor the CDSL has shown 
any inclination to cor erroneous new releases. 
Prior to this inci was gh regarded by State and 
ral regulators outstand ng track re~ord that 
included involvement in some of the most difficult 
examinations anc1 enfo actions in California. I invite 
you to ask Mr. rilori Assistant Commisioner in charge of the San 
Francisco office my tr reco . I beli1.:;ve he also feels 
I have been treat unfair this situation (refer to Page 
A-99). also at r 29,1989 hearings. 
To facilitate 
providing the followi 
• s review of this rna t ter I am 
On r 27, 1989{approx 9:00 1\.H.) I initiated a 
telephone con renee a 1 to our Los 1\nqeles Off 3.ce. 
Mr. H. R. Harvey SF S af counsel and Ns. Sheila 3ukan~tG(S.F. 
Staff Councel) were pres (San Frnncisco) with Con,misioner 
12 
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ieve Mr. legal Department als~ 
on inion that I thought :i. t was in l1A. I 
ina ropriate to s office for my prOJOSeC briefing 
office in LA relati V8 to m~r pend::.ng 
stood that r,1r. CraHford and r'Is. i3snder 11ad 




my that there was a conflict of interest 
office enting us. I advised that it would 
ly come out in testimony (words to the effect) that the 
and Desist order had been weakened at their 
tion based on concerns reportedly expressed by the 
AG, Mr. Rheem, about his expertise to handle litigation 
t ght involve complicated securities issues.(This 
rmation been provided to me indirectly by Ms. Sakamoto 
Mr.H. R. Ha who had recollection of the December 1988 
s. Ms. to had very specific recollection of the 
r 1988 conversations with lYis. Shirley Thayer, Staff 
el in LA and others. I would invite you to confirm this 
these tnesses to resolve the credi~ility issue.) 
ause the weakening of the order may have 
e sses subsequent purchasers of Subdebt, 
ial conflict of interest involving the CDSL 
lity for the change. Mr. Crawford 
because the AGs office frequently has 
1 
t I was extremely sensitive about 
of tampering testimony. I then indicated 
want go to LA in any case because my 
already well known from the congressional record. 
(Nov.27,1988 approximately 9:15+ or 
ral C.H. Rheem in Los Angeles 
to remaining present. I advised 
that the modification of the 
tion based on his lack of 
expertise might come up in testimony on 
tial i ica he didn't recall it. Later he 
have some recollection of it .I don't recall 
t I was certain that he had confirmed the 
(re: rities expertise) I advised him 
not see the purpose of traveling to LA to 
. As we ft it, if the AGs office had any 
call me the following day. Mr. Rhecm (AG) 
of of the conversation if I had any 
tions for the Corporations people(which I 
er to Department of Cornc:ations Personnel 
ay.) I advised him," Yes prny" 
13 
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When we hung up Mr. 
his response anG t 
confirmed seeing t 
1 of securities 
That l;·<as my last di 
to this matter. 
date 
elf discussed 
felt he generally had 
C&D because of his 
th Mr. Rheem relative 
On Wednesday mo I delivered, with Ms. 
Sakamoto present, to your committee and 
one copy of the (Ha attached draft of the 
C & D. Page A-58-A-68) at Mr. Johnsons office. 
On Wedne ay November 29,1989 it ve clear in my oral 
testimony that I was testi been informed by SF 
counsel relative to Ms. Thayers comments relative to the AG's 
role in influencing rtment to weaken the order. The 
counsel were in fact Ms. and Mr. H. R. Harvey both of 
'i1hom had confirmed recollections of the December 
1988 events Re: the ich they also understood 
to be at the AGs suggest 
Shortly after the 
mistated what 
Sakamoto and Mr. Ha 
and which they still recalled. I 
at directly. As a rna r of f 
Rheem Monday. I don't recall r 
Sakamoto was pres 
r advised me that I had 
, no I testified to what Ms. 
to me in December 1988 
didn't say you had told me 
we confirmed it with C.H. 
i and I left. Ms. 
On Thursday morning I read in the S. F. Chronicle 
attributed to At rney general Van De Camp that, "Newsom was 
wrong" or words to t.I have seen even more appalling 
quotes attributed Mr. Duane rson , Mr. Van De Camps 
Press Secretary, that Newsom " either doesn't knovJ what he's 
talking about or is a liar". As I recall, the reader of these 
stories would be 1 lieve no draft order or 
documentation had ever to the AGs office nor 
wou it have been to do so. Mr. Davis 
advised me on Thu was claiming that I 
perjured myself a ring. Davis agreed 
that I had not, r red that I very 
clearly advised received my information 
indi ly. is ttees own transcript 
(Page A-6-A-21) 
At 11:15 AM on Thur 
A-5 ) v1as repor-ted 
Thayer which stated in part 
r 30, a statement (Page 
to Channel 2 and 7 by 
"Mr. Richard Newsom at the hearing yesterday before the Finance 
14 
r 'I 0 ,. 0 I) l,.;u v J 
IV- urar.ce Cocul!: ::'e ::::.:a s; z:- t :.n ·~::isr: "!G i::'tdi :::::a tEld 
t he was info i irec througn myself ;hat ~he Deputy 
torney General felt t he lacked securities law ~xpertise 
o effective al with with any cou t challenge by ACC of the 
arbnent' o r, M7:. Nett1som on repeated wh ~- he NuS told 
what he was to was not a.ccurate ...... " It snould be noted 
1.\lr. Davis advised myself, Mr. Harvey, and Ms. Saka:noto of 
t s and provided us a copy of this on Dece~ber 13, 1989. This 
statement is far less misleading than the earlier AG's news 
release or the CDSL news release(Drafted by AG and CDSL) issued 
4 hours later, but still contains inaccuracies. 
Heated discussions occured all day on Thursday November 
30,1989, in which myself Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey were 
generally involved in conversations with Mr. Crawford , Mr. 
Davis and Ms. Thayer in the Los Angeles office. 
At one of these Ms. Thayer related to us the substance of 
Thayers November 29,1989 conversation with C.H. Rheem , wherein 
r rela several reasons why the order was changed. 
Thayer related to Newsom, Harvey, Sakamoto, in San Francisco 
a Crawfo , and Davis, in LA that she had spoken with C.H. 
and he had to her that he recalled his concerns at the 
time he reviewed C&D were: 
\ 
1. DSL's lack of jurisdiction/authority to issue orders based, 
on securities law. 
2. The C&D only all potential violations of securities 
laws and specific violations should be alleged. 
3. His rsonal 1 of background in Securities laws. 
lease ask r~J:r. 
testi about 
sufficient factual basis or documentation for 
ause we were back again to the initial 
1 of specific securites. expertise by the ~~ 
a · cto-r-irl modif:~ting the 
_statement read to 
.(page A-5). I believe Mr. 
surprised from their comments . 




13, 1989 two later Mr. Davis made myself, 
aware of the short statement that 
r noted above . Mr. Davis indicated also 
r call all people she had talked to on 
to correct her statements.) 
a t 2 ~ OOPr1 Thu:::-sd 
me (no one else p 
draft the at 
to me the dr,aft inc 
documentation was prov 
indicated was being ta 
assLmed that clause 
consistant with alleged 
office that they even saw 
indicator that •someone" 
documents never went 
contra which also 
89 , Mr. Davis advised 
release Nas being 
fo CDSL. As read 
i icated that, no 
ffice, Mr. Davis 
's request. I 
AGs office to be 
newspapers by the AGs 
It is a very serious 
firmative denial that 
t re was evidence to the 
was the intent to do so. 
Ms. and Mr. Harvey on 
them and continued the 
1989 Mr. Crawford , Mr. 
I put Mr. Davis on ho 
the conference call 
conversation. (On 
Travis, Ms. Thayer, , 
Thayer confirmed that 
office with editing 
Sakamoto were present 
Mr. , and Laura present Shirley 
press re se was drafted by the AGs 
rley Thayer. Mr. Mori and Ms. 
San Francisco in addition to myself). 
I objected to the fact that the press release was carefully 
crafted to avoid ment 
including the corraborating 
exhibit provided to 
indicated that a 
stated that the press re 
had in fact accurate 
information( Mr. Ha 
to testify that they 
all corraborating evidence 
memo and Draft C & D which was the 
on Wednesday that clearly 
at the AGs for review.I 
to emphasize that I 
i rect sources of 
th of whom offered 
i me to that effect). 
The press release also 
confirmation with C.H. 
failed to mention our Monday morning 
no previous and the lack of 
return calls from 's off release referenced only 
"a call " to the office and emphasized alleged inaccuracies 
in my testimony. I advised t my timony clearly stated 
that I was advised 
Sakamoto specific recol 
related to me. Thus my t 
did not dispute of 
and that Mr. Harvey and Ms. 
of what they heard and 
was not inaccurate. Mr. Davis 
said nobody in LA could 
remember taking 
inaccuracies are in 
appear to be subsequent 
's office. These alleged 
not inaccuracies in my testimony but 
Thayer , Mr. C.H. 
Subsequent events 
recollection of Ms. 
not affect the accu 
As indicated earlier, 
carefully and art 1 
di recollections between Ms. 
S and Mr. Harvey. 
inaccuracies in the 
. These disputes did 
testimony. 
in my opi on the press release was 
cra:ted by the AGs office to give the 
16 
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s in;J impressi:: , ia ccn:; :.;;.nct:i.o::1 v:i :L ,:,~~5 deni.:~ls quoted 
in the newspape::s that I "'"'as a know notning or a liar. In 
reviewing both releases I believe that !:he insertion of 
"Federal SEC regulations"in both press releases (page A-1 and 
A-3), which appears nowhere in either the draft order or the 
final order was a red herring possibly included to divert 
attention from the fact that in December 1988 a department of 
state government had provided to a Deputy Attorney General a 
document alleging unsafe and unssound actions, conflict of 
interest , disclosure problems as lvell as po..t;ent:i,al securities 
law violations that presumably might involve referal of the 
matter internallly in the Attorney Generals office to Law 
enforcement officials, not·Ni thstanding any separate c & D 
action taken by the CDSL . Since Department of Corporations 
personnel had already been advised of these specific disclosure 
concerns in November, 1988, it added to the Attorney Generals 
problem with conflict of interest, as the AG is defending the 
Department of Corporations against the "shark victims". 
The implications of this are rather negative as the Attorney 
Generals office joined the Department of Corporations, the SEC, 
and the FHLB as age~cies to which we sent specific information 
on disclosure problems while subdebt was still being sold . 
On December 1, 1989 the Los Angeles Daily News and on December 
2, 1989 the San Jose Mercury News, and the San Francisco 
Chronicle published alleged recanting statements by AG 
officials, location of a memorandum from Mr. Rheem to Ivis. 
Thayer that documented Mr. Rheems review of the draft order, 
which he earlier denied seeing and other information. 
On December 4, 1989 Mr. Davis confirmed to Mr. Harvey, Ivls. 
Sakamoto, Mr. Mori and myself his October 27,1989 statement to 
me(telephone) relative to his telling Janice Brown at Agency, 
that tampering with testimony was 11QJ;;_ ok because of the 
sensi ti vi ty of the matter. He added that agency wanted my 
t "toned down". Mr. Harvey described the brief "reign 
that had occured whan I resisted the tampering 
r 5, 1989 a series of events occured which triggered 
ssion of the December 5, 1989 clarifying testimony to the 
cumul ive effect of the tampering 
last few days led me to believe 
was being made to cover up 
ions. events include but are not limited to: 
earlier approved a press release on 
that racterized my tesU rnony and 
naccurac es in my testimouy, and 
1 li in sworn testimony, even when 
7 
t ac :e 
-v1ere t .!,. 
get to 
ion of Mr. Davis.We 
Mr. Davis) that we 
t out. 
I cal back 
day, and the 




stop the dissemination of s 
information by office. 
The press release p 
included nothing that wou 
releases adverse reflection 
newspapers broke cor i 
Mr. Crawford on December 
it" i.e.the additional 
faxed him a draft. I was 
time Crawford ever obst 
Ms. Sakamoto sounded equal 
rd and Davis on the 5th 
correct the earlier press 
credibility, even after 
about 9:30 said " don't send 
the committee after I 
because that was the first 
my testimony. Mr. Mori and 
surprised .. 
5. I later that day became aware that Davis and Crawford 
contacted Mr. Sutchel , which I took to mean that they were 
trying to shortstop my testimony going to the committee. 
(On Dec. 13 Mr. Davis advi me, Mr. Harvey, and Ms. 
Sakamoto that they did call Mr. Sutchel and Mr. Johnston of 
this committee and requested that information going to the 
committee should be channel or funnelled through 
Crawford or Davis so they could see it. Mr. Davis indicated 
he did not know that Crawford had told me not to send it, 
and I assume tQe committee was not told that in fact I sent 
a draft to Crawford that morning just for that purpose of 
_..;ny-·own-voli1:ion./Davis also indicated that he had spoken to 
r;J ( Chairman Johnston who Davis reported (EMFSHASIS INDIRECT) 
~c.a.t.ed- that that was a reasonable request. I assume 
something was lost in relating it as I can't believe the 
committee would take that position given the sensitivity of 
the information .. 
I asked Davis words to the effect "why did you go behind my 
back to the Committee when I already volunteered and faxed 
a draft to Crawford? why not call me direct and discuss 
it? Unti 1 that day and these facts occured I had never 
given you any reason to believe I would go behind your 
back" Mr. Davis advised us that if he knew the facts as I 
saw them (Knowing that Mr. Cr ord had said not to send 
it) he probably would have made the same assumption(cover 
up} as I had although he said Mr. Crawford would not cover 
anything up from his knowledge. I stated that evidence for 
the last 2 weeks has been to the contrary. 
18 
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It shou particularly emphasized that requiring 
sensitive information going to an assembly committee to be 
"funneled" th Mr. Crawford and ~r. Davis is 
inconsistant th Regulations established by Mr. Crawford 
r the Savings and Loan industry which guarantee 
confidential access by Savings and Loan staffs to the CDSL 
or the institutions outside auditors.(see page A 113-A 114) 
This is another indicator of an attitude change since 
November 29,1989. 
6. Mr. Crawford's draft memo See page A-100-102),if approved 
would have restricted access to the committee contrary to 
Government Code 19251.5 (See page A-103) and been in 
essence a gag order. I understand that Laura, Commissioner 
Crawford's secretary, advised Northern California CDSL 
personnel that the decision not to finalize the gag order 
came from Mr. Geoghegan • s office or staff on December 
5,1989 which seems very strange. 
In a meeting on the 13th Mr. Davis declined to identify who 
made the decision to Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. Harvey, and myself. 
He also confirmed that he had ordered 25 LA staff members 
to write down their recollections of everything they knew 
about the C & D. Mr. Harvey advised him that under the 
tense circumstances(Harvey referenced a "Reign of Terror" 
that ght be viewed as intimidation, i.e. pinning down 
people stories that they might be discouraged from 
changing if their recollections improved or if they 
wished to Davis stated he hadn't thought of that, 
which seemed strange to me since I understood Mr. Stelzer 
had protested that it was intimidation. At this meeting 
with Mr. D s, Mr. Harvey also discussed a conversation he 
had Mr. Stelzer which I understood addressed 
intimi tion felt by Mr. Stelzer. 
TAMPERING WITH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 
me on October 25, 1989 that he had been told 
ing congressional testimony could not have 
ts, ch he had planned to insert. Since thB 
ing my timony were so numerous and -so 
the c lity and the documentary support 
I inc a" poison pill" clause in my 
lieved would discourage attempts to remove 
from or otherwise make other than typographical 
my timony. 
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This clause stated : 
"A draft of this testimony has been provided to senior CDSL 
officials and I understand to the state attorney general's 
office, as well as our parent. agency in Sacramento however I 
have requested by inclusion in this letter that any material 
changes or requested changes other than typographical or 
clerical must include the name and initials of the requestor 
along with any reasons to avoid tampering with testimony." 
It should be emphasized that rumors of tampering with testimony 
were widespread because of the "whistle blower" nature of the 
witness panel and Chairman Gonzales had made it very clear in 
newspaper quotes that he would not tolerate tampering with 
testimony. I also understood that changes had been made to 
Commisioner Crawfords earlier testimony 'at the request or 
suggestion of Agency (This is indirect information and I invite 
you to confirm it directly with Mr. Crawford.- I have no direct 
knowledge as to whether there were changes or if so that they 
were substantive) 
On October 26, 1989 the tampering incident described in my 
testimony occured involving a bitter argument with Ms. Thayer 
who told me that I would not be permibted to include exhibits 
with my testimony. At this time I had not yet faxed my 
testimony to LA, but I believe I may have warned Mr. Mori that 
I was including the "Poison pill" clause because of Mr. 
Stelzer•s warning to me. 
I told Thayer that the exhibits were critical to my testimony 
and absolutely essential. She told me that she would decide if 
exhibits were to be permitted and ordered a copy of the 
exhibits and a draft of the testimony to be sent to LA for 
her review and also the review of Agency, which I took to mean 
editing, "Toning down" as Mr. Davis described on December 13, 
1989. Ms. Sakamoto was present in SF and on the squak box and 
argued against the tampering attempt. I advised Thayer that, 
Do you understand that what you're doing constitutes tampering 
with congressional testimony? It is me personnally supenad, not 
the department and the testimony will be mine. Gonzales has 
made it clear -no tampering with testimony- If anybody makes 
changes I will advise Chairman Gonzales of the changes and who 
changed it. 
She argued but I do not recall her citing a legal defense for 
her position. (The commisioner had been permitted to include 
exhibits with his testimony.) I advised that the testimony 
described such bizarre events that I felt that the credibility 
of the testimony was totally dependent on placing the hundreds 
of pages of contemporaneous exhibits in the congressional 
record for public scrutiny. I later faxed the testimony to LA 
with the " Poison pill" clause described in exhibit 20 which I 
20 
understood caused considerable consternation with CDSL 
management and with Agency. 
I believe Ms. Sakamoto had arguments or discussions(defending 
my position) with CDSL personnel in LA relative to altering the 
text including deleting opinions and conclusions, however you 
would need to discuss that with her. Mr. Davis and Mr. 
Crawford supported me the following day, however, if I had 
caved in it would have been too late on Friday to revise the 
testimony. Mr. Davis advised me by telephone on October 27 that 
he had called Janice Brown at Agency and advised them that the 
matter was too sensitive and that no tampering could be 
permitted. It was extraordinarily traumatic having to challenge 
Ms. Thayer,who I believe to be operating with Agency 
instructions, that neither she nor anyone else could take out 
exhibits or make substantive changes. As I mentioned to Federal 
examiners in Washington, I thought a Royal Dog House would be 
prepared for me in Sacramento. Mr. Stelzer was eventually 
permitted to include exhibits to his testimony after I took my 
stand. 
After returning from Washington, D.C. I became aware of an 
unusual letter to the Commisioner (See page A-104-A-108) from 
Corporations Commisioner Bender dated November 2, 1989, 
inquiring as to what proof the CDSL might have that the subdebt 
sales were a "scam" as I described in my congressional 
testimony on October 31, 1989. 
I was amazed. Seeing this letter at this point in time led me 
to believe that Corporations approach was to totally deny 
history. Refer to page A-9 . The date stamps (page Al08 for 
example) into the Department of Corporations were also 
suspicious as were mismatched exhibits.(See page A-47 ). I felt 
that the tampering attempt with congressional 
testimony(countenanced by Agency) was linked somehow with 
Corporations approach to denying the obvious and I decided that 
if they would try.to tamper with our testimony at CDSL , they 
almost certainly would try at Corporations. I prepared a 
memorandum briefly summarizing the event and eventually 
ted Mr. Harvey to send it to the F.B.I. (refer to page 
109-112). As I told Congress, I did not intend to be part of a 
cover up. The following is an excerpt from that memorandum. 
"Given a subsequent letter from Corporations Commisioner 
~~ .. ~~r, dated November 2, 1989, whom my testimony seems to have 
in an awkward position, I am requesting a discrete( if 
ssible) investigation by you to determine whether the actions 
of Thayer, ce Brown,and perhaps others potentially violated 
state or f ral laws or regulations." 
21 
It was my opinion that this was a serious tampering attempt and 
that the text and all the exhibits would have been gutted 
without my personal and harsh stand. State employees should not 
have to fight so hard just to tell the truth. 
With all due respect to the committee and the seriousness of 
referring to a Government coverup, I believe the facts indicate 
a probable coverup and warrant referral to whatever Government 
agencies monitor govermental and political abuses for further 
~J;t;;~~ -
Richard E. Newsom 
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Mr. Richard Rewaom at the hearing yeaterday before tbl Finance 
and !nau~ance Committ•• ~••4 1 atatement tn which he indicated 
that he waa infor.-4 indirectly through mraelf that the Deputy 
Attorntf General felt that he lacked aecuritiea law eapertiae 
to effectlvel~ deal with any court challenge br ACC of the 
Department•• Or4tr. Mr. Bewaom onlr repeated what be bad been 
told but what he had been told waa not accurate. After a 
4lacuaaion between mrae1f and the Aaaiatant Attorney General 
C.H. lebm, baae4 on a letal technicality the Department Made 
the deciaion to remove the reference to tbe potential 
aecuritiea law vlolatlona. Thia daoiaton waa made entirely by 
tha Department and not br the Attornar General • 
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State capitol, Room 4202 
CHAIIUCAJI JOJOISTONI Jb: • . BeW8011la 
• D. I.XCIWU> 1. DWSOJia 'l'~nk you. Xy .ft.U\8 ia JU.aha:rd 1. 
H•v•om and X am a aenio~ 
D. ROBIJ\'1' JIIU..ZR.I 11r. Chairman. Do you want. to swear the 
witneaaas7 Do you want th .. to ta1tify under oath? 
IR. JODI~ I 'l'el. 
D. XILLD. I Would aach Of f0\1 Z'Aiaa you.r s:ight Jumcl plaaae • 
Do you solaftlJ' swear that the taatillony you are abo'Qt. to giva 
befon thi1 coaitt.M will be the trutb, tbe vhol• t.wth and 
nothing but the tnth7 
\ 
D. DWSOH (Mar and. C:rawford?) I X do. \ 







MR. NBWSOMa Richard Hew1om •. examiner IV Special!•~ with tha 
California Department of Saving• and Lean. 
My name ia Richard E. Rewaom an4 I am a ••nior field examiner 
with the California Departm.nt of.Savinga and Loan baaed in San 
rranoiaco, California. I am here pursuant to a aubpoana which waa 
••~•d yeaterday. I underatand the committee hAl a ca.plete copy 
• 
of my teatimony and all attached exhibits provided to the Houae 
Banking Committee on OCtober 31, 1989, an4 I will attempt to 
briefly augment thia teJtimony to avoid V&ltinq thia committee'• 
valuable time. 
My firat contact with American continental corporation, the 
holding company of Lincoln Savinqe and Loan Alaociation occurred 
on September 1988 which I wa1 aaaiqned to act &I the examiner in 
charge of the holding company examination of ACC. &a moa-• 
•pacifically detailed in my Con;reaaional teatimony, % rapidly 
changed priority with the approval of Mr. ltelaar, the 
Department•• examiner in charge of Lincoln after I had identified 
a seriea of maaaive loan problema. One of th••• problem loan• vaa 
Lincoln'• Hotel Ponchartrain loan. It was readily appazent that 
was a $20 million loa• on thi1 loan and ~hat it involved 
flaqrant, unaafe and unsound landinq practice•, evan mo~ flagrant 
violations of federal conflict of interaet regulations and ACC•a 
0 Q091 ~} 
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di•••mination of inaccurate, inaompleta and erroneous information 
ancl public d.t.aclor~ure atateaanta. Baled on the docu.ntl 
available, 1 t was my opinion that the Jlonahartra1n tre1a.etion 
repreaented the willful misappropriation of 820 million in company 
••••ts, almost cu qu~er of x:c•a net wonh •• of 1/30/18 for 
the benefit of inaider• without a prarer of collection and w1~ 
·groaaly aialeadin9 diaolo•ur•s to the public. The docuaentation • 
vaa over:whel.ming and cl•u to •, to a tate aftd federal savinO• and 
loan regulators and eventually to tha PDIC who uaed thia 
transaction in part to •upport a atco lait. l ••• unable to 
determine tbe difference between the Hotel Ponchartrain 
tran•action and what a.ount•d to outright theft of $20 million, 
followed br lring to th• •hareholdera and areditore to oonaeal the 
theft which l felt to be ;rounds for aecur1t1et r•;ulatort taking 
action to stop aubord1nated debt aalea. 
lt waa mr opinion that virtually no pruden~ and info~ 
investor would invest in ACC if aclvi11ed. of tM apit.ude of the 
mi•appropriation of company aaeet1, the willful nature of t.h• 
violation of regulations and breach of fiduciary duty ~ inlidera. 
My concern• were immediatelr conveyed to Lincoln ACC aanagement in 
a letter (lxhib1t 2 to Con~llional teatiaoey), dated OCtober I, 
1188 to managaaent, l conveyed 'llfY oonc•m that invol~nt 
J 
"involve.ent of ao many officer•, directors and affiliated parties 
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in auch a blatant violation of ~onflict of Lntereat ~~Qlation 
reflect• unfavorablf on the integrity o! the whole inltitution." 
AI an 1ntereat1ft9 lide note, one of the ACC officer• involved in 
the tran•action turned up •• a propoaed 23' ac~ir. Liftcoln •• a 
pa~t of the Rouaaelot group after t had referred the P~nchartrain 
• transaction to the nx I The Hotel Ponchartrain trauaction 
involved what appeared to be clear cut er.rora and aaterial 
adm1aa1one in public diaclolurea addreaaed•in detail in lxhibita 
1, 2 and 4 to fll1 Con;rese1onal teatimony. '.l'hel& exh.ibita wen 
copiel ot the ••• docwaM~nta that I had provided to a Deput.Mnt 
of COrporation• official at the concluaion of the November 10, 
1988 meeting between Department of Corporation~~ per•onnel and 
Department of lavinq• and Loan per1onne1. The purpoae of thia 
meeting vaa to eonvey to tu Depe.t'tlllent of ccrporatiou ..-r&l. 
concern• about the viability of ACC aa well •• apecifia aoncerDa 
about the Ponchartrain traneaot1on and to aeak aseiatance in 
•=pplng the euborcU.nated C$el>enture ealea. 
I I ad.viaad the Co:r:porat1ona Pf»:tlonnel, JIOJ'ton l.ift, Robtlrt 
Rifkin and Ken Indo of the epecific diaclo•ure probl .. a on the 
Hotel Ponchartrain tr&Daaction and hoped it would 'ultlfr 
Corporation•' curtailaent of aubordlnate debt aal••· fn addition 
to the document• provided at thi• ..etinr, Corporation• offioiala 
ware 1nv1te4 to rev!ev~the box of doaumente aupparting our 
.. t"1"1 oro .. ,.~ 
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crit1ciea of tha Ponchartrain t~anaaction located in our Loa 
An9elea office•. 
The Departaaent of Saving• and Loan final cb:aft o! tu oeaae 
and deaiat order agaLnet Lincoln and ICC wae eubaitted to the 
Sta~• Atto~ey Qeneral'l office for final ~iew 1n Dec~ 1188, 
The committee hal a OOPf of thia •• an exhibit •• ~11 d:aft 
included an ~rder requiring lCC in ••••nee to atop aillaadtn; the 
public in public dilcloaure ltat .. enta baaed on the finding that 
inaccu~ate and a1eleadin; •~•t ... nta appeaztd in ACC'a pUblic 
diaclo1uza•1 docu.ente. Thaae ftndingl and the pzopo1~ order 
were deleted from the o~r finally ieeued, reportedly at the 
nque•t of the Deputy Attomar General aaai;ned to thia utter. % 
wa1 infonaed indirectly through Sh.lrl8f 'l'harar in our Loa .&.aplee 
le;al division that the Deputy Attorney General felt that he 
lacked aecuritiel expertiaa to effectively deal with ~ court 
challenge by ACC of the departaent•a o:der. 
I undez.tand the committee i1 conlidering chan;ing aavinga 
and loan law. I hope thil ·OOo~• ~oauee one o! the cataetrophie 
problem• with major expan1ion of aavinga and loan povera waa the 
virtual deletion of all aignificant confliat of interaat 
prohibition• f:r:om the savings Ae1ociation and Law. Xn ef~ect, 
~ 
there 11 no apecif!e atate prohibition a~ainat inaidera atealing 
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Mr. Crawford and M~. Bill Davie' aeaiatanca fo~ their euppo~t 
through the lalt 1everal monthe in bringing thie whole matter to 
li;ht. 
Thank rou vary much. 
XR. JOHNSTOHa xr. Hew1om. TO put your testimony in contaxt. 
In November of 1986 the D•partment of corporation• approved the 
•ale ot $200 million in eubor41nated dabenturea, aometime referred 
to 01 junk bon41 by ACC through ita principal aub1idia~, Lincoln 
Savin;•. Ia that correct? 
n. NBWSOMa I am not--mr knowledge of thia Lincoln 
particularly relate• from Sept.aber '88 on. 
MR. JOHNSTON• I understand. I believe that to ~ th• fact 
an4 aubeequent to that in May of 1988 an additional $150 aillion 
~i·•· 
in aubordinated debenture• waa approved by the Depa~nt of 
Corporations for aal• through Lincoln ~avinge an4 ita ~nt ACC. 
I 
You teatify about the period following that in late 11
1
18 where in 
.... 
your view there were ai9nificant probl.-a with Lincoln and tC. 
Department ieeued a ceaee and deaiet order~ Ie that corzeot? 
they had no right to even be there and he alao indicated that h~~ 
.fj,, 
n 1~ 
felt that the holding campanr examination waa going fa: afield of . 
looking at matter• apacificallJ related to Lincoln. &t that point 
he indicat~ aomething to the effect that he thought aarbe be 
would throw all the examLDe~a examining. the holding company out of 
the examination. X aek~ct hill 1a you threat applf to tbe state of 
California aa much aa we didn•t.ai;n tha xou. He aatd, •wall, 
yea. • So I aatcl vall I •h1elc ?Out> ••=!."MJ' .t.a f011l9 ~ be •alk1n.t 
t.o our attomar becauaa we haw tM zoight to auatDa the holding .. 
companJ. At that point he aga.in aa.id well why ue rou even 
examining it, ancl % naponclect to hia that aOMt.hiq, VOI'CII to tha 
. 
effect, that ou of ~he re&IO!ll we wera lookint at it vaa :beoau.•• 
people who va felt v.ce not accu~a~ly intozaed ~gazding tha 
cond1 tion of Lincoln, or ACC were 1nvaat1n; IIOMJ' 1rl auboJ:dinatad 
debt there, which on the other aide vaa !Haing uaed to aupport 
treaau~ atoak purcha••• fz:011 inaict..zoa. &t vbat ve perceived aa 
being ralatiYalr high pricea. that waa raaeon anoufb !oZ' ua to 
look at the vhola thing beca.uae it d.idft' t look ,right. 
10\. JOIDIS!'Olla Did you ad.Yiae the ·DaputaMtnt of Coz:porat.J.ona 
in your Bovember Meting wJ.t.h Deputment of CorpozoatJ.ona pezoaonnel 
of the impreaaiona that you had, in tha facta that you had at that. 
time, which you hav• ~uat taltifie4 to? 
D. DWSOXJ What I ncall t•lling the corpo:tation• peraonnel 
... 
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waa that we had aerioua concern• that we felt the institution waa 
• 
probabl7 bu•~•cl, lNt. lt would take aCBM tiM to p~ it. · We wen 
in proceaa of aA examination. AI an immediate effort to perhapa 
atop tba aubordinatad debt 1aln, we tel t the uae of a d.iacloaure. 
iaau• would be a vehicle that they might ua• to aaailt ua in 
stopping the aubd.ebt. Some of the dieoloaure pro!)l.U related 
back I beli.ve to Kay 'II and even earlier diaoloauree. one of 
the problem• with the ACC diacloaure is that w• felt vaa many, 
• 
nearly all their public reporta, included a large number of 
refer.ncea that were incorporatacl by reference to other documenta. 
one of the probleau they had waa that they included a mialeaCU.ng, . 
and erroneoua atat.ment, Very mialeading and erroneous 1tatement 
to the effect on the Hotel Ponchartrain that the tran.act1on vaa 
on the aame terms of conditione •• affo:ded the general public, 
which waa pure 81. 
D. 30BHS'l'O!fa 'l'hat is a technical term. 
D. NIWSOJie Yea. (laughter) We use it aoaetiMa in 
euminationa, particularly at thia place. aut it IH81d to ua 
that the facta were overwheLming on thia tranaaction and while we 
move forward and attempted to document the insolvency of the . 
inatitution, that would be aomethinq the Cor,porationa people ataff 
could aaaiat ua with because we are not espe~• in eecU%it1ea law. 
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we draftad. our c:•••• and. d.uiat order baaed upon unaafe and 
• 
unaou.nd. 1aauea that were within our coo and. our plan waa if ther 
wanted. to take ua. to court on it, we felt the 9ublic: would. benefit 
bec:auae it eftdAKI up in a pal> lie coGft., the public would knOw what 
was oo1n9 on. So a frankly fel~ ,. ooulcSn •t loee, ptt1ng it. out 
to the public. 
KR. JOHHSTOH • ftan'k you,. Queatione f~ the uabe.r.'a. b. 
sea•tZ'u.cl; 
UIIJIBL'!'UJI, DI.C 8Ciiii'JIMDI You. aaid. tbat t.htQ' wen taking 
the 110ney f~ the ealea of theae aubord·inatecl debentuea and. 
buyin; tnaau.xr atook'l. 
D. RIWIOitl Ye•,·1 th.,.· W'lllfa, tmyin; atock fJ:Oil inaiclu'a. 'fha 
tr•••·tu:Y etoolc ia ••••ntially the atock that ••• out.atand.ing in 
I 
the .a.marican continental tbat waa h•14 by 1u14ere, Jtut.in; fg!ly 
~r• and othere. 
JIR. SBI'R»>Dt '!hat ia not =•••UZ'f atock. 
MR. DW80Jh After it WAI acquired ·by AMX'iCU COntinental 1 
it i•. btarican eontine.ntal waa acqu1r1nQ that atock bact from 
JDt. ltBWSOX 1 We loolatd at that in at lea at one or two 
1netanoea. we aav ~hat the quotes didn't aake aenae1 that they 
were paid the actual cloee -price was 1li;htl7 over the ctuot.ci hiqh 
for the clay on the information we had. we wecen' t. axperta at 
aeeuritiaa aattara and eo we called up tbe IIC, app~x.t..ately 
oetober 17, ancl explained to thea what va thou;ht we vera !in4.t.n; 
and we weran' t that a kill*' aa far nuance• of aecuri tiea law and 
obvioualr we need~ help bacauaa tbeae people we~ the atata ot 
the art and ..,. vere thia waan•t our place, but % think that 
anawera rou~ ~e·~~ona &bou~ ~~•••urr •~oak ~b&·~·· Tha~ 11 
what thel' vera d.oin;. 
IIR. SBASTaARDt Well, they vera buying atocJc to be traaaury 
atock, then, and not buyinG tt:eaauxy a took •••• 
JOt. NIWSOMa It vas alaa ;anerally re1trictecl atock. t.t'ha 
inaidera atock vaa aub,ect to apac1fic ~~t~iction1 10 it val 
aublect to limitation• and open aa:ket 1alea, 10 the 1ala back to 
ACC waa a perfect way to ra1o1v. the probl .. becau1e if ACC bought 
it what they war• doinq, we aa:ac.ct the~~ wait a second, how coaae 
you're paying top dollar for re1trictad atock.. 'l'bara 1hould ~ a 
~ 
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dieeount for re•trioted 1tock relative to aarket atock and the 
reeponee wae well we are retiring it all 'eo it doeen't matter, 
whiah 1• I peaa zatioul. But it •-ttel like the treaaw:y atoc'k 
purcha••• o..r time were heavily weighted tow~d• aal•• from 
ineidere, It eeemed like when they wanted to go into the aa%ket, 
when the 1naidera wanted to aell vaa when American Continental 
•eemed to want to go into the M&'ket to buy a lot of ltook. 'l'hat 
wae addreaac in detail in federal int.e~ill. hold1ft9 Coap&nf 
eXA~Aiu.tion nport. in atd-October whiah Kevin o • Con.n.ll of OIA 
told ~· waa pzcvided ev•ntually to the s•c in Bavember. 
D. JODSTOltt b. Wright. 
ASSD.BLYWOKAH CA'!HII 111\IQJft' 1 Yea • I would lilca you to 
•laborate a little mox. on baa1cally ita your aecond full 
paravraph in which you mentioned the fact that you took your final 
draft of a ceaaa and de•i•t order to the Attorney General? 
D. Rn80Xa I didn't paraonally, but Shirl.y Thayer, our 
aouthe~ Cal1fozn1a attorney did. 
u. WRIGH'l't Had the Attorney General vent forward on the 
e•aaa and deaiet order th1e whole thin; could ha¥8 been at lea•t 




JUt. ltBWSOMa It vaa my f•ling and I think ahazoec:l br CNZ' 
internal northe:n California attorney• that thil would have 
dropped an atomic bomb on their eubdebt ealea pro~a. It would 
hav• been very, very diffic~lt in terms of a pot•ntial criminal 
exposure to •ecuritiel fraud to continue to sell lubo~nated 
debt after an ord•r vaa outatanding againet th.. telling them they 
wer• misleading the pul>lic ancl o"cla"ift.O t.h• to atop. We felt 
that. ve ve%'41ft't ••curitiee expert.e, but. v• felt that it would. 
cextainly cauae them aa~or delay and ha•e to ~.diaaloa~ and 
frankly, we d14n' t te•l that the7 could tell. the tzouth and really 
;•t anybody to buy thie 1tuff if 1t came out. 
MS. WRIGH'la And you' r• telling thil committee that the, 
Attorney General vu de Kup, 
u. HIWSOMt No not ••• but a deputy attorney general. 
xs. WRIQHTa He i1 re1poneible for the O.pa&'taent, correct? 
KR. D'lfSOile I •••wae ao, 78•• 
MS. WR.ICH'!a Would ••Y that becauae they dic:ln't have th• 




, D. DWIO!h Well 1 % waen • t then for that, and I a relay in; 
what I wae told from a ... ting from our no~hezn Cal1fo~ia 
counael that beard Shirley '!hayer reepol\4 ))ack to the 
Commi11ioner. So what I auq~t, it aouftda incredible to ae also, 
but ••• 
d • DIGH'l' 1 It ew:e doea to ae ••• , 
(!'PI 8-2) 
KR. DWSOBI , •• But it you want to pu~ that I ~ink it 
ai;ht b8 worthwhile for J'OU to talk to }*"-,.people 1 both people 
Lnvolved who actuall7 discussed •hat. 
liS. WRIQH'l' • Becauae th•n my next queat1on would be to you, 
if the Attorney CJaneral, hia office 1 eaye to rou that we don • t 
have the expertiee, ao therefore n ana not tolnt to go fonard 
with thia p~aal, what otMr avenue do you have? How elae would 
you get a ceaee and deaiat order if it would not be through the 
Attorne, General? 
KR. JdWIOlh '1'he queation would be isauing Cha oz:cler ancl % 
think it ia vetting into tbe area of 111uin; an order without the 
0('0£.~ 
complat• support of the agency that has to defend rou in court, if 
th•r challenge 1t. I am not a complete expe~t in that area but I 
falt this waa important enough to atteM,pt to delivec it. 
w !!~ ~diAlf) 
KS. WRIGHT~!.S§Mf ;~9d'&iif further with it? 
MR. HBWSOMa I didn't sign the order. I vaa on vacation when 
thia happanad.~~~ing ove~ the 10 z'waa bazned out and I 
figured we had it done and thia happenad while I vaa on vacation, 
I aqrae with you that I wae very upeet at it becauae I felt that 
indirectly it would 1.-.diataly atop the aubde~t aal•• and that 
for example in January I believe 110 aillion wae 1old and 1oaabody 
from the Houaa Banking Committee told me that the aalee continued 
thJ:ou;h hbnuy. 
MS. WRIGHT• I certainly would like to hear the Att.oi.'IUiy 
General'• reaponee to ·•omethin; auoh aa thi• beaauae J .t.hlnk it'• 
unconacionable. 
D. JOHHITOB 1 lb:. Lai\Oaeter. 
HR. L.UCASTIRa Thank fOU, Mr. Chairman. % would like to 90 
back to the ~ketin; of tbaae high riek inatrua.nte and that•• 
exactly what they war~ It' • in effect been called junk bond but 
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they had a very low px1o~1ty and the only thing behind tbe•• 
pa~ticular 1natrumenta were a,uppoeedly the ability of &me~iaan 
Continental in o~der to regain them half of everything alae were 
paid. You could equate, I gu.aee, to a eecond mortgage. ~!he fi~•t 
monga;~ ha• !izat claim, in affect. 
The Dap~nt allowed the•• kinds of iftatzumenta to be aold 
on the pzaai••• anct thfiY J.aauacl pa~.f.aaion for .&aerioan 
Conti~antal to ooma on the ~!••• of Lincoln 1avin91 &ftd Loan 
' 
and i~ •om• inatancee according to aOMe taatimoDr allowed the 
peraon 'aelling thaae 1nat1:WD8nt• to tet Hhii\CS tu oount.ar at 
.. 
Lincoln .Savin;• and Loan. Row there ia oJ:wioualy an Ulpreae1on 
'· 
ca:eatecl. .. '!'hey vue buying inetz:umente that were fully ;uuantHcl 
and inau:r:ecs.. ~hi• coaon practtaa for the Dap~nt to allow 
t~i• type of ~ctivity to 90 on in our aavin;• and~ 
\ 
a. BDSOX• ! am probably th8 wrong pezaaon to auwar that •• 
a field epminea:. lt would prot»ably be better ••• 
D. JOIUII'l'ONa xaybe we could hold that ~or Mr. Crawfo:d,. if 
we could, xz. Lanoaeter. 
xa. LA.RCUTD• l raiae the queatJ.on, Jlr. Chairman, to thia 
gantl ... n, becauae he La ~he peraon who •aiel he had all tuae 
• 
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cJ.rcW'Ilatancee au~J:OuncU.ng thaae dU.nture~ and •o it , ... , to M 
that whethe~ ~be Attorney General d1d anything o~ anybody elae d1d 
anything, the De~rtment had tha ab111 ty to go in and 1ay • Stop 
. ~ 
aelling the•• ..a.. L1racoln Savino• and Loan. • 
A . 
D. JOIDISTOHI Again, l thinlc thoae U'8 the app~p:riat• 
questicu. What I would like to do if that •i1 all the que1tiona 
for thJA w1tneaa, 11 to a1Jc Jtz'. Jlal' to teat1fy ancl theft Mr. 
c:rawforct on the policy iaauea and tb• ponaaa of the .Departaant. · z 














State of California 
Department of Savinqs and Loan 
Nove~ber 1,1988 
Attached are our tentative findinvs on Southmark which appears 
at least substandard and which appears to be up to S48 million 
in excess of'Federal unsecured lendinv limits to a sinvle 
borrower.(S63.9-3) Please advise us if you don't avree with 
our evaluation of leqal lendinq limits. Attached is a copy of 
current National Bank law and revulationa.State laws are more 
liberal and less clear however we are wqrkinv on it. 
We.not•d a pattern of discrepancies in the real estate schedule 
of the Southmark 6/30/88 10-K. 
our review of your preliminary Lincoln loan comments doesn't 
include either the Southmark line as a criticized asset or the 
apparent sivnificant requlatory violation. 
Was this an oversight or is the State voinv alone on·this one. 
If an oversivht can we assist you in any way.? 
Attached also are our RA Homes tentative loss classification as 
presented to manavement on the whole 130.000.000 line.W. have 
pot as yet received a response. The tentative federal 
ciassication is substandard. Avain. do we have a difference of 
opinion or is there any way we can assist you? 
I am a new comer on this job however it appears to me that this 
institutions lendinv practices vo beyond unsafe and unsound and 
that there appear to be major diffe~ences between tentative 
asset quality findinvs by State & Federal examiners warrantinv 






To:Mr. T1m Kruckeberq 




State of California 
Department of Savinqs and Loan 
Attached are tentative f~ndin9s on the Southmark concentration 
of credit, most of which is considered a problem·•sset and 
which appears to involve additionally well over S40 million in 
unsecured exposure in excess of the loan to one borrower 
limits set by federal insurance requlation 156'3. 9-3 • 
• We have attached a copy of the relevant Federal insurance 
r-egulation and a copy of the applicable referenced federal 
bankinq laws and regulations. 
We are also reviewinq this transaction for compliance with 
State loan to one borrower limits. 
Please advise of the associations POsition reoardin9 these 
transactions and State and Federal unsecured loan to one 
borrower limits and include manaQment~ plan to 9et this 
concentration of credit in compliance with State and Federal 
Laws and Requilations. 
Please provide a written resPOnse to these findinos within 7 






Parkoate Problem asset 
#91174{partic1cpation purchased with 
rePUrchase aoreement by Southmark) 
(1) 8.929.222 . 8,929.222 
Southmark Life Group,Inc. 
Loan #s 00003.00024.&3011 
(2)25.000,000 * 25.000,000 
(3)24,500.000. * 24,500,000 
Southmark. Corp. 
/;"J;)_/ #00004 
(4)18,723,232 * 18.723.232 
~~~ark Corp. 
(5)1,450,000 1,450.000 
Southmark. Acceptance Corp. 




ational Realty Limited Partnership . 
#2022 &2023 
(8)18,000.000 18,000,000 
Servico, Inc.12 1/4% Sub notes 
(9)19.860,224 • 19,860,224 
Total Southmark Related Problem 
Assets $128,962,278 
* denotes aggregated under FSLIC Regulation #563.93. 
Southmark. is a diversified financial services company that 
incurred a large net loss in ita year ending 6/30/88 
operationa.Continued concerns regarding abilitY to meet 
intermediate and long term debt maturities resulted in the 
discontinu•tion of both common and preferred stock dividends 1n 
1988.The companys abilitY to genenerate cash from asset sales 
has been adverselY affected by depressed market conditions in 
the Southwest which have also increased cash demands on the 
company.(Reference page 6 and 7 on 6/30/88 10-K).The 10-K 
references a number of other problema facing the company 
including losses at ita Texas S&L subsidiary San Jacinto 
Savinoa which is facing FHLB enforcement action. 
Southmark Corporation consolidated financial Statements dated 
June 30,1988 indicate total assets of $9,161,307,000 with a ne~ 
worth of $696.209.000. For year ending 6/30/88 company had a 
pretax loss of $226.182.000 with after tax loss of $164,916,000. 
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It appears that due to continued softness in real estate 
markets the company will continue to face earnings Problems. 
and as noted in the body of these comments in a number of 
instances the carrving values of company assets appear far in 
excess of market values with previouslY syndicated projects 
returning via foreclosure to the companies books. The company 
has been scrambling to offset cash flow problems by sale and 
refinancing of assets howeve~ as noted there appear to be a 
number of. apparent factual c:Uscrepancies in Southmark • s 6/30/88 
10-K report and enough intercompany transactions between 
Liuncoln and Southmark that do not stand on their own merits to 
warrant a complete exptanation by Lincoln management and 
related explanations by Southmark regarding apparent factual 
errors in the 10-K. 
Until this borrower turns itself around it warrants 
consideration as a problem borrower. 
( 1 )This loan participation purchased f·rom Southmark on June 
30,1988 is a wrap around third deed of trust with a balance of 
··approximately $17,809,126(wrapping a 17,633,433 first and a 
$102,997 second with other lenders.) Collateral is a 688 unit 
apartment in Houston operating at a large deficit cash flow. · 
Borrowing entitY has a $21 million deficit net worth as of 
6/30/88, resulting from operating losses. Interest rate is 8 
3/4I.The property appraised at $18,500,000 on June 20,1988. The 
propertY is overencumbered by a fourth DT of 12.500.000 with 
Southmark and a S13 million 5th DT .with a Houston 
bank.Southmark has agreed to repurchase this loan or replace it 
should the underlying loan default. 
The junior lien POSition and deficit cash flow of the subject 
provide little effective collateral protection and the subject 
clearlY is in substance predicated more on the repurchase 
agreement with Southmark which is itself incurring operatin9 
losses. This loan is considered a problem asset due to peor 
collareteral protection and reliance on the uncertain ability 
of Southmark to perform under its repurchase agreement. 
(2)& (3)These loans to Southmark· Life Group, Inc.("Southmark 
Life .. ) a whollY owned subsidiary of Southmark are 
collaterallized by 1,200,000·shares(Aprroximately 100%) of 
Pacific Standard Life Insurance Coaapany,("PSLIC") a whollY 
owned subsidiary of Southmark Life.The collateral doesn't meet 
the testa of national banking regulations to qualify under 
secured lending limits to one borrower and these loans are 
considered unsecured for regulatory purpoaes.Collateral is 
reportedly valued at approximately ISO million dollars however 
according to Best's(Inaurance Comp[any Rating service) a B 
rating on PSLIC was maintained due to parent contributions 





Page 51 of the 10-K refers to .a definltive aqreement by 
Southmark to sell its 89% interest in Inteqon a larqer and 
profitable subsidiary of Southmark Life which accord1n9 to paqe 
54 of the 10-K is already Pledqed along with other Southland 
Life assets to other lenders.Paqe 28 of the 10-K references 
the projected decline in ~•venues and expenses that will 
follow.Page 67 of the 10-K refers to a premium deficiency in an 
unnamed insurance subsidiary ranging from $18.8 million to 
$51.7 million for which additional reserves of only $21.6 
million have been established. 
With many of Southland Life's profita'>le assets pledged to 
other lenders it appears that Southland Life lends less than 
substantive support to these loans. Moreover. it appears that 
operations of Southland Life will be adversely effected by the 
sale of a maJor profitable subsidiary and that the future 
capacitY of Southmark Life or Southmark to support capital 
drains of PSLIC is uncertain. 
Loans (2) & (3) are accordingly considered problem assets due 
to factors noted and the ultimate reliance on Southmark which 
is unprofitable and a questionable sQurce of ultimate repayment . 
. (4)Reduced balance of 128 million loan originally used to 
acquire atock(collateral).Collateral is 1.75 million shares of 
Servico stock moat of which carries a restrictive 
leGend.Southmark owns directly 491 of Servico plus indirectly 
through National RealtY an addition 141 of Servico per page 5 
of the Southmark 10-K.Servico operations have deteriorated 
steadilY under Southmark ownershiP with Subordinated debt of 
Servico classified substandard by federal examiners ikn the 
current examination. ~ 
Page 11 of the 6/30/88 Servico 10-K reflects a deterioration 
from a S9 million profit in year end 1985 to a 16 million loss 
in year end 6/30/88, while lonG term debt increased from 
approximately 1164 million to$235 million durinG the same 
period.Page 15 of the Servico 10-K also refers to deficit 
working capital of $16 million at 6/30/88.Tbis loan is 
considered a problem asset due to the weak and deteriorating 
financial condition of Servico. the restricted nature of the 
collateral supportinG the loan, and the weak and deterioratinG 
financial condition of Southmark.Due to the restricted nature 
of the stock the loan is considered unsecured for purpeses of 
loan to one borrower limits. 
Note: Loans (5),(6),& (7) have as additional collateral 
2.571,429 shares of Pratt Hotel Corporation stock. Southmark 
owns 371 of the stock of Pratt, which would apparentlY impair 
the liquidity of the stock which in any case reportedly had a 
9/13/88 market value of 11.625 per share(For total value of 
S4.2million). Pratt is apparentlY losinG money which adds 
uncertainty to the collatera:value. 
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(S)New loan originated June 29,1988 secured by a first deed of 
trust on a 122 unit apartment complex in Lafayette Lousiana 
appraised for Lincoln on 6/6/88 at S1,025,000.In 1981 Southmark 
sold the property to a limited 'partnership for S3.6 H1llion.In 
May 1987 Southmark took the property back in lieu of 
foreclosure.The property is appararently reflected on the 
6/30/88 Southmark 10-K(Page 76) with a book value of $3.084,000 
with no liens reflected.In view of the distressed nature of the 
project. the appra·ised value only 1/3 of the Southmark book 
value and the ·erroneous free and clear status r·eflected in the 
10-K.the reliabilitY of Southmark financial exhibits appears 
open to question and warranting explanation by Southmark. 
This loan overencumber• the Project by approximately $425,000 
even uatng the associations appraisal. This loan is considered 
a problem asset due to the overencumbered and distressed 
history of the project and ultimate reliance on secondary 
collateral of closely held penny stock in Pratt Hotel which may 
or may not provide a viable source ol repayment. 
· (6)Loan dated June 29,1988 is secured by a 1st DT on a 513 
unit distressed apartment complex in Houston ,Texas with May 
19,1988 appraised value(Lincoln)of. 13,700,000 . Subject loan 
overencumbers the subject property by 1.475,000. The property 
was acquired by the borrower in 1988 via a complicated and 
distressed Process. Page 76 of the Southmark 10-K apparentlY 
reflects a $3,995,000 book value of the subject with no liens 
which raises further questions about·the accuraey of the 
Southmark 10-Ks.Loan is considered a 'problem asset due to the 
weak financial conmdition of Southmark, overencumbered status 
of the project.apparently large deficit cash flow, of the 
Project, and reliance on questionable support Provided by the 
secondary collateral(Pratt Stock previousl:y noted). 
(7)New loan dated June 29,1988 secured by a first deed of trust 
on a 376 unit apartment complex in San Antonio Texas appraised 
for Lincoln 6/30/88 at 14.200,000.Property was apparently 
acquired bY the borrower in foreclosure approximately two years 
·ago.There is evidently a repurchase agreement by Southmark in 
case of default.This loan overencumbers the Project by 
$1,675,000 acording to the associations own aPPraisal. The 
property is apparently referenced on page 76 of the Southmark 
10-K as havinG a carrying value of $5,830,000 with no liens 
against it. As noted in (5) and (6) there appears to be a 
pattern of erroneous information provided in the Southmark 
10-K.This loan is considered a problem asset due to the 
overencumbered status of the project, dependence on 
questionable secondary collateral previously noted(Pratt 





(8)Loans dated June 29,1988 to acquire 1,500 acres of land 1n 
Goodyear Ar1zona form a L1ncolri Subsidiary for a purchase Price 
of $24 million, with cash down of $6.000,000. National Realty's 
net worth declined substantiallY in 1987. The land is not 
reflected on the real estate schedule(paoe 81 &82) in the 
6/30/88 10-K of Southmark which raises further credibility 
problems reoardino the substance of the whole aeries of June 
1988 transactions with Southmark. Given the problems at 
Southmark. the purchase of Goodyear land in Arizona appears 
inconsistant oeooraphicallY with Southmark activities. 
(9) This represents Servico, Inc. Subordinated notes classified 
substandard by FHLB examiners. These are considered as problem 
assets for the reasons noted by FHLB examiners and the 
deteriorating condition·of Service previously noted in this 
presentation.These appear to warrant incluaion under Ins. Reo. 
563.9-3 in loan to one borrower calculationma. 
Jn overall terms this laroe concentration of credit in apparent 
violation of loan to one borrower limits and involvino a 
borrower that is known to be havino serious financial 





EPAitTMeNT Of SAVINGS AND LOAN 
Rlobard Roth, Deputy Inaurance CO..iaaioner 
O.partaeftt of :uu&-anoe 
3410 Wilabin llo\ll.vai'CI, lui~• 201 
tea ~-~··· Cl t0010 . 
Ml WHIR COLLU c:aDII 'l'Uit I'ORCB 
aequ••~ tor xntoraation and 
Poaa,ble •ntoraeaent Action 
· Dear Riqhal'd• 
Pacific ltandazd Life Inauranoe C08Pany, Int.qon Lite Inauranoe 
and other lnaurance aUblidiarlea ot louthaark Corporation 
(•aouthun•) •Y be at eoonoaia tiak. 
Integon Life Inauranoe, tbroufb Kark•tinv one Inoorporate4 
(another lautlUiark aubaidia:y), ha• been autborlzH to aell 
ina~ance produota, inoludlnv tax deferred annultlea, a~ many 
•'•'• and f~ra1 1avlnwe and loan lnatltutiona and throu;h 
thai~ ••rvloe oorporatlona. · 
louthllark (nov in banknptoy) 11 known to beve •nt•9•d in 
recip~cal tran1actiona with ~rican Continental corporation 
(allo in bankrQptcy) and with aany ot ita own IUblidiari••· 
~••e tranaactlona aay have lackad eoonoaio reality and aay 
have aarioualy daaa9ad the aubaidiari••· Pacific ltandard Llfa 
Inauranoe Company, in particular, baa had an inordinate volume 
of tranaactlona wlth aouthmark att111at••· 
Althou9h tbare 1a pr•••ntly no 1paoltlo lntoraat1on to ahow 
that the lnauranoa aUbeidiariea of loutbaark are in financial 
troUble, tbere 11 euftlclant inforaation to ~u.tlty an 
i..adiate earetu1 review ot the aatety and aoundneaa of thea• 
IU~Ildiazolaa. 
It would ba ;reatly appreciat.414 if t.he Dep6ri:Mn~ ot !n•u.rance 
would review tbe condition of ~· naaed louthaark .ubaid1ar1e• 
and any other known eUba1diar1aa and npon any veam•••e• or 
probleaa dlaoovered to the aavlnv• And Loan CO..ie1ioner, in 




aichard Roth, O.puty Ineu~anca Ocmaie•ioner 
aea White collar Cria• Taak •oro• 
Aupat 1G, 1111 
Page 2 
The DeDart.ant of Iavin;• and Loan ia preaently cooparatinq 
with a i•ational TeaaM ot federal ••ving• and loan axaainera in 
an uuination of the tJ:auact.ion• of southaark, wbioh ia a 
aavincJ• u4 loan holdift9 ooapa~y. · 
The oepart.aent of !nauranoe 1• requ.eate4 ~ ebare ~latory 
information with thill team directly or tbrOufb the savings and 
Loan Comaieeioner. Kevin O'Conn•11, Director of lpeoial 
supeniaion, Offioe of Thrift luperviaion (0'1'8), Waab.intlton, 
D.c. 1 may ~· oon~acted at (202) 331•411'' B4war4 lo44an, Bxaa ner, OTS, Dallaa Dietriot, .. Y be oonaot.ed at (713) 
874•00881 Alex Bardolak, riald Bxaainer, 0'1'8, Cl\1oato Dlatr1ct, ••1 be contacted at (312) 16!•111a. 
1 am available to diacuaa thia matter with you at any tlae. 
Ver:y truly your•, 
~ 
W%Lt%1K D. DAVIS 
Chief Deputy savinq• and Loan eoamissioner 
WDD:ta 
001 Kevin O'Connell, 0'1'1, Waebiftt't.onl D. c. 
ldvard lo4Cien, OTI, Dalla• Dl•tr ot 
Alex Bardolak, 0'1'8, Chioawo Dilltr1ot 
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• 
Mr. Chairman and xa1~ara I for the 
cpportW"Ait.y • My n... is aiohard 
!. Newsom. I am a Department 
of savings and LOan baaed in .California. lhortly 
after J:)ein; aaaig'ned ae the of the exuination 
of American continental corporation Septaba~, 1981, a Mrie• 
of avant. a occurred ae t.o bel iwe that the 
Ped.eral Haae Loan Bank examination of lavint• and Loan 
was tavora~ly ~iaaed of zy stay in 
•cover up" were almoat atandin; 
Lincoln loan examination, among 
e1ta. 
Jb:' e loott 1 the YIIIIIB.Ii.\i! 
lank Board, adv!aed. u l\l!llftl!''ll"'l'"'r' 
in Phoenix relating to the· 
red.•ral •xhinua on 
tft .. .eftJa'P!f!ltllill of Lincoln :far t.h 
in Phoenix tbat 
total loan loss cliiUIIificatione am:rra1cra~t:.ad t10 aillion. 
I rempondet.S at 
about the Hotel 
obViously a loaa•. 
effect, "What 
aillion Qft8eGUre4 loaD - it'• 
it vae only 40\lbttul, which 
not require ~~·•· I vaa 1..-41at•ly 
co~~arned a~out the poa~~111ty of a ~itevaah •• tha~l 
Ponc~artrain app.are4;a loss tbe day it was tund~~d 
deteriorate4 since and was perhaps the moat flagrant aelf-4aalin; 
A9Ulatcey violation :z: have ..ver aeen. 
..... 
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federal Lincoln loan examination waa auppoeedly virtually . . 
complete at ~at tiae. 
Ac:lditicnally, my testimony i:nolud.ell'clOOlJ.i\Snte i:ncludin~ an 
extensive written analyllil ot loans described ae the Betel 
Ponchartrain tao ail11on unaeaured loan, the lA Bema $30 •1llion 
and. a aer1ea of loaM ud junk bonds to louthaark 
and related entitles tota11nt an incredible 
o ( wu to on• borrower 
' 
Blal08 W'M"~Wil ·~ 
vu eo ~ad in taot 
stataaefttl to see if 
• I 414 not believe anyone 
vera 41•o1oeect.. It. ia 
' 
• 
d<Sreaaed in EXhibit 2 aa a "willful divareaion.ot aaaociation . 
•••~• benofitin~ affiliated partie• in violation of 
•tJU.lationa•. 
be diloloauroa appeared inadequate and mieleadin; to me and I 
aallenqe4 nu1nagaent in aevual written exhibit• whioh are 
,clu4e4 in this testimony. fta11e ar~ axhibits 1, 2, an« 4. We 
, 110. 
: appeared incomprehanaiblo to a. tor OIA to permit •ontinued 
~ebt aalea ba~ed on tb••• 4iaolosuroa. ln effect, ORA waa 
~tinq "invoatora tet auake4.1nto probable or certain loa•••• 
. 
ich waa absolutely contrary to wy OCtober 14, 1111 
comm•ndation (IXbibit 3) and I underatood contrary to the 
commendations of the hol4in; o~any exaainera to ORA. 
ana to RA Ho:ma1 were almost 1u1 appallinv. .b referenced in 
1ibit 6, RA Homea financial atat.menta ·reflected total aaseta 
$210,ooo,ooo with total 11&b111ties of t20I,OOO,ooo with a net 
~ of only $2 million. Lincoln had provided •30 million, 
Jecured loan to RA Homes t.h&t war~ actually aubor41natecl to Ill. 
.ar creditor• and not evan eupported by penonal ;uarant••• ot 
1 principal•. L1neol.n 1a loan toM Homu totaled approxb\ately 
o •1llion whioh actually exceeded lCC'a own net worth. Gene 
lzer and I 4iacu•••d potential 1oea.e additionally in RA land 
na that clearly needed an appraisal. I un4eratood bu4qeted 
..... 
000941 
atate fun4a tor appraisal• were running out. 
In approximately seven weeks I .Yaelf reviewed approxtmately 
$220, ooo, ooo loana all ot which were co:naidued ao bad they were 
uaed aa evidence of unaate and unsound lending activity in a 
cease and Deeiat Order iaaued by the comaiaaioner in December 
1911. 
• curtail wuaafe and unao\md action, our intention also wa• to 
force ORA to taka action particularly to ~11 aubdebt aalea 
vhioh had beooae ou p¥'1M objaotive. linoe ou order inclu4a4 . 
findin;a that·d .. cribed preferential ter.aa and exceaaive riak 
oharacteriat1a•, oontrary to pUblic 41aoloauzea, it appea~ to me 
that ORA wae 1d.llin; to take no action to 'atop What appeaNCt to 
u probele •~1tiu fftUd. 
Thank you very aueh !or: your tiM.. I · bava been wai tin9 a year 
tor tbie oppportunity to ~. 
000942 
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STA'l1!!11mift OF RICHARD B. JIEWSOII 
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STATE OP CALIPOUIA 
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My name is Richard E. Newsom, 
for the State of California. I was 
Loan Senior Examiner 
Examiner In 
Charge of American continental Co 
September, 1988. This testimo~y 
provided to the Committee pursuant 
October 26, 1989, which was issued 
American Continental Corporation 
Savings and Loan Association (Linco 
on (ACC) Group in 
annnn ing exhibits are 
subpoena dated 
on matters related to the 
I wish to thank the Committee 
testimony relative to experiences 
examination of Lincoln Savings 
American Continental Corporation 
and Lincoln 
to hear my 
during the 
its parent company, 
ing the fall of 1988 
your letter. I hope 
this written 
and relative to other matters requested 
the Committee will forgive the brevity 
testimony as I did not anticipate being 
until a week ago. Nevertheless, I have 
testimony and supporting exhibits which 
called as a witness 
attempted to prepare 
I. submit to you. 
I wish to thank you Mr. Chairman and each member of this 
committee for your courage, independence and desire to learn 
what happened ~t Lincoln. 
I particularly wish to thank Commiss Crawford of the 
California Department of Savings and Chief Deputy 
Commissioner William Davis for their leadership, support, and 
unswerving commitment to protection of the public. 
In September, 1988, I was assigned to Lincoln/ACe 
examination as the Examiner in Charge the examination of 
American Continental Corporation initial in Ir•ine, 
California, and then in Phoenix. The gnment was, I 
believe, based on my general speciali•ation in matters 
involving asset quality evaluation and licts of interest 
and almost 20 years banking and regulatory experience. For 
reasons I will describe later I became ly involved in 
certain areas related to the examination of Li~coln. Because 
of the situation I observed at Lincoln, I made it a practice to 
attempt to commit important matters to ting and leave a 
record of what we knew, when we knew it who else knew it • 
My intention was to leave an audit trail to accordingly 
encourage others to take appropriate These exhibits 
are arranged in chronological order. 
The question of whitewash come up and 
the exhibits speak for themselves as much 
believe records of what we knew then 
are more valuable than testimony created 
I will attempt to let 
as possible. I 

















in related party 
and the 








securities law v 
uninsured subordi 
the public under 
source of cash 
disclosures that 
inaccurate and mis 
I raised my concerns 
Barabalak (FHLBB 
or about October 
Kevin O'Connell 
attorney. Elements 
interim report of 
3) which was transmi 
at Lincoln, and 
Phoenix. Cali 
sub-debt sales was 
be a reluctance 
SEC, . which I 
This interim 
liquidity cris s 
1988", and noted 




insure that this 




6, 1988 letter, 
ACC, my concerns 
disclosures re 
followed up 
1988 to Mr. Kie 
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I decided with the 
the holding company 
expertly by other 
federal) and concentr 
unsafe and unsound 
classified far too lenient 
classified at all. Mr. 
individual loans to Southma 
prepared by our examiners in 
having problems based on di 
recent federal examination. 
supported by poor collateral were 
after Southmark disclosed cash 
problems in its 10-Q. 
largely ignore 
conducted 
ners (state and 
or loan losses and 
had been 
or not 
iminary findings on 
that had been 
was ~own to be 
own 10-Q's and a 
was that new loans 
by Lincoln even 
and other serious 
Loan and junk bond exposure ~o Southmark aggregated almost 
$129,000,000 and my analysis cont work of our Irvine 
examiners. This is an incredible ion of risk in one 
entity and substantially exceeded Acc•s worth. These loans 
were in my opinion all problem assets, afe and unsound, and 
apparently exceeded the federal loan one borrower limits by 
over .$40,000,000. This analysis was to Lincoln on 
November 1, 1988, with a cover memo ln requesting a 
response. I forwarded my memo and ana is to Kevin O'Connell 
in Washington on same day. These are all included in 
Exhibit 6. 
My memo to O'Connell described the f 
loans were not classified at all 
loan comments. I stated that "I 
however it appears me 
practices go beyond unsafe 
be major differences between 
by state and federal war 
the Southmark 
iminary federal 
comer on this job 
ion's lending 
that there appear to 
quality findings 
discussion between 
led a Chapter XI 
addressed the difference 
considered a 
considered only 
the agencies.• Southmark subsequently 
bankruptcy proceeding. This memo also 
in classification on RA Homes 
$30,000,000 loss and 
substandard. 
On or about November 4, 19 
Scholer, Fierman, Hays, and 
my letter to Mr Kielty rega 
provided this response to FHLBB 
response was inadequate 
On November 10, 1988, personnel 
Department of personnel 
raised our disclosure concerns rega 
for assistance in stopping, if 
Copies of the Ponchartrain 
provided to them. Co 
Riff, Robert Rifken,~ Ken 
Mr. Mar, Mr. Stelzer, myself 
personnel attended this ing. 
5 
from. Kaye, 
t 7) responding to 
problema. We 
Kaye, Scholer 
luding myself, met with 
our offices. We 
~uu~uartrain and asked 
sub-debt sales. 







was sent to the SEC 
4 
On March 3, 1989, we sent Exhibit 12 to the F.B.I.referencing 
Hotel Ponchartrain, RA homes, and other Lincoln matters 
including a document that identified one of the principals of 
RA Homes as a long time former employee of U.S. Senator 
DeConcini. 
Approximately the end of April, 1989, we became aware of a 
probable violation of our cease and desist order involving a 
wire transfer and violation of conflict of interest regulations 
that related to the repurchase of an unusual loan participation 
involving Gascon Development that benefitted ACC. This 
$6,000,000 problem occurred on March 31, 1989. 
Approximately July 18, 1989, a follow-up package (Exhibit 13) 
was delivered to the FBI relative to possible dissipation of 
assets through charitable corporations possibly involving u.s. 
Senator Cranston. The documents also reflect the involvement 
of Ms. Pelosi on the board of one of the charitable 
corporations that apparently indirectly received ACC 
contributions. Please review the documents yourselves as we 
are not an agency that over sees political practices . 
. 
I am sure I have left out part of the Lincoln Story but time 
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• • / DATE 
Board of Directors 
American Conti al Co 
ADDRESS 
Irvine, California z 
Gentlemen: 
We have completed 
Co-ntinental Corpo 
pursuant to the Savings 
ACC • s major asse is i 
r 
Savings and Lo (Lincoln) 
concurrant exa nation,the 
a separate De r nt of S 
Directors of Lincoln. 
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STATE .Of CAlifORNIA 
"DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND lOAN 
-.;· COMMONWEALTH AVENUE. LOS ANGELES. CA 90005 f2l3) 736-2198 I' ANSOMf STREET. SAN fRANCISCO, CA 94104 (415) 557·3666 
san Francisco 
November 1'j 1 :M • 
'""'" VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Ms. Barbara L. Gunn, Esq. 
Staff Attorney 
Mail Stop 4-7 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 5th Street N.W. 
Washington D.C. 20549 
,--,..,. .. ~....,-
GfOitGf DWkMf.JIAN. Gowfllor 
Re: Lincoln Savings and Loan Association and American 
continental Corporation - Your Pile Ruaber so-2028 
Dear Ms. Gunn: 
The enclosed materials concern· possible securities violations 
which have previously been discussed . with you. 'l'here is an 
ongoing investigation by our Department. In the future you may 
receive a duplicate of this package with further investigative 
materials or summaries which are not pre~ently available. 
' I 
Because time is important, I believe 'it is necessary to place 
these materials in you hands as soon as possible whether or not 
they are incomplete. 
In the materials you will find two letters addressed to Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Association and American Continental 
corporation, one is dated October 6, 1988 and the other october 
18, 1988. 'l'hese letters provide a summary or overview of the 
issues. 
If I can be of assistance please do not hesitate to call me or 
Richard Newsom, Examiner rv, of this office. I believe you are 
aware that commissioner crawford and Chief Deputy commissioner 
Davis, of our Los Angeltu'l, office, are also very interested in 
these transactions. 









To: Gene Staltzer 
E.I.C. Lincoln savings and Loan 
From: R.E. Newsom 
E. I.C. ACC 
October 14, 1988 
We discussed the material contained in thi repert with FHLB 
people including Kevin o•connell .at al on October 13, 1988. 
FHLB people working on the holdinq company a're equallY 
concerned about the issues and serious iaplications addressed 
herein and we are sharing the finGings in this memo with the 
P'HLB. 
financial OVerview 
While there are a number of variables involved we 
believe.a liquidity crisis at the Holding could occur 
as early as December 1988. Primary variable& are not financial 
factors directly but are POtential events: 
1. At what POint doea the FHLB make a permanent decision on the 
tax sharing arranqement triggering a PYblic disclosure by ACC 
that may reduce subdebt sales to 0 and lead to a holding 
company failure? , 
2. At what paint does the Ponchartrain disclosure problem burst 
with POtential adverae The to these people 
if they don't sell ia a hi9h 
probability that they will The structure of 
tha sale will be aimed at deferring loaa and d..age controllinv 
the d1scloaure problem. Even the propeaed Stroh •a deal 
involved only a sz.s million downpavment and there are still 
disclosure problems bY virtue of the ACC vuar~teea. If one or 
three occur it could kill thia peasi deal by sympathetic 
d•tonation. 
what do•• the SEC get involved. who briefs them, 
and what impact does that have? 
wa are assumin9 that an individual or 
entitY would not provide money to this C:OIIP&nY and 
that an 1ndet~ln'111nate combination of one,· two or three wtU 
moat. likely occur in Noveaber or December creating a crisis. 
Since much of this aubdebt was sold in the branches. we should 
confusion and serious liquidity pressure on Lincoln 
i.e a run. 
is a rather bleak scenario, however. they are runninv out 
of mirrors to create aarninva. Because of the serious asset 
tty at Lincoln, we should anticipate that it would 
be extremely difficult to sell Lincoln. We should also 
that contingent l1ab111tv probleaa in cas• of a 
comp~y lure would go'through the holdinq company 
structure like the qoose and fall on Lincoln. 
le f"f! s_ at the Holdin9 Company. 
' 
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Man~Qement Response to Qur October 6. 1988 Letter 
We have received and reviewed the ACC response dated October 
13. 1988 to our letter dated October 6. 1988 addressing our 
concerns the Ponchartrain. There are no surprises in the 
response 9enarallY ignores the·facts, detail, and 
findings specific,llY referenced in our letter. Attached to 
this rePOrt is an exhibit addressing their resPOnse. The facts 
for themselves. 
advises that subordinated debt sales are currentlY. 
about .ooo par day with management advisin9 that 
las typically involve saall investors. (many 
tizans) who presumablY can ill afford the loss of 
tax 1111harin9 NYIM!lts SWIIPOnd.ed by the nn..B on 
• 1988 and knowin9 what we know about. 1NIIdequate, 
jnaccurata and aislaadin9 information in 10-Ks~ s-2 
Re9illlltrat1on Statements and proxy aatartal as pr~1111anted to ACe 
and managaRHnt. in our October 6th latter we have ·to 
insure that this aatt.ar vats a coordinated sPeedy effort to 
avoid even the appearance that revulatory a9anc1as permitted 
additional investors to oat aucked in to probable or certain 
losliles. 
We recommend that. at. the Monday meatinv with PHLB personnel at 
our ice• that these hard issues ba raised and further 
di•cussed the JI'HLB people. They t. be surprised 
because we iliiCUIIIIIiled thea 9enerallY with Eevin at.al. yesterday. 
These disclosure issues include what. appear to be aatarial 
in the 10-K for Deceabar 31, 1987~ the April 
8, 1988 proxy atat..Mnta and the April 14. 1988 S~I:.C. 
Registration stat86Hnt SUPPOrting the sale of the 8300~000,000 
subordinated debt issue in which the holding coapany is in the 
early stage of sales. W. also noted a FSI..IC Current RePOrt 
H-(b)12 for the aont.h of 3una 1988 indicating that there have 
been no other aaterial important events requiring rePOrting 
si Robart J. Kielty. Executive Vice President and Vice 
Chairman of AOC and Robart s. Svaas. Chai~ of First Lincoln, 




Major concerns revolve t und the nondisclosure of ' Jor 
negative issues surroundinq the Ponchartrain million 
unsecured related party transaction our letter 
dated October 6. 1988 to AOC and in the 
attached exhibits ic rePOrt 
and the specific 
• 
Treasury Stock Actiy~ties 
our review of this area is in process 
tentative. Because of the appearance. 
serious breach of fiduciary 
this up now. 
findings are 
• of another 
bringing 
To explain it crudely. sub debt is uold to ill informed 
and unsoPhisticated investors to
6
suppert stock 
purchases frequently from. insiders ( timed to benefit 
the insiders and not ACC in at least one instance)) and forMer 
insiders of "control stock"' that would otherwise be subject to 
SEC rule 144 restrictions and that would obvioUflY depress a 
thin market. 
our concerns involve the a stock 
purchases, questionable disclosure issues in proxy aaterials 
reqerding these activities. and the appearance at least that 
treasury stock pUrchases are often the desire of 
insiders to diapoae of control stock often and prices 
that appear detrimental to company. edviaes 
that 100 percent of treasury stock ia to be 
retired. 
The April 8. 1988 proxy statement (page 
"Pursuant to a decision by the Board of 
previously announced. in 1 
Shares in the open market and in 
six) advises that: 
Directors and aa 
py.rchaaed Common 
transactions. 11\e Board of Directors that 
Common Sharea are end a good investment for the 
Company. end has authorized aanavament to continua to purchase 
Common Shares in the open end in Privata transactions at 
such times as it deems appropriate, to certain 
restrictions. up to a maximum of 000.000 Common.Sharea. In 
1987 the Company purchased a 768,460 Coamon Sherea; 
approximately 351~460 Common Shares were purchased from the 
ic and approximately 417,000 Common Shares ware purchased 
from certain officera. directors end their lY •amber•." We 
did not see specific that 1 stock acquired 
would be retired. as to us 
We read later on page seven A. 
officer sold $2,500 000 in stock at $8.20 par 
company in 1987. The was based on the 
the date he resivned. trans to 
305,000 shares end accounts for most of the 
This stock would have bean control stock. 
inq, a reaiqnin9 
ahara to the 
price on 
Unusual trading 
1987 with numerous small 
brokers occurin9 within 
of a 300.000 share block 
that wont up about .SO 
noted in ACC stock in J'~~nuery 
treasury atock purchesaea throuoh 
the two week period prior to pyrchase 
froM Charles ~eatinq J'r. at a price 
during two week 
' 




process for the timin~ 00 .957 in writino. The U 
advises us that he 
or a member of the 
is advised 
Executive 
either an ACC .Boa rei 
Committee to enter the 
I 
\ 
market. There is no refer.nce in the minutes (until a November 
1987 purchase) of either Board or Executive Committee specific 
approval of treasury stock purchases. Further. there is no 
evidence of anything provided in writinv to the trader and no 
written guidelines or POlicies to provide consistency. This is 
a matter of considerable concern because aa noted in at least 
one instance a 1"\i,f\ up in price two weeks prior to PUrchase of a 
block of stock from the Keatinvs (the stock price went down 
subsequentlY in the followinv two weeks). This is an area 
that we need to be able to Pick sse peoples' brains on to learn 
more about what to look for. 
Counsel here advises that the company will not acquire stock 
from insiders for a time after the company has been acquirinG· 
treasury stock throuvh brokers to prevent maniPUlation which 
appears inconsistent with tha January 1987 trad1nv activity .. 
In amy cue. we know that over 95 percent of 1987 treasury 
stock PUrchases were from insider or former insiders 




Supporting Exhibita Ragardinq Non-Disclosure 1D 1Q-Ks and Other 
Public Reports. 
The December 31, 1987 rorm 10-E on continental 
Corporation indicat~s on the cover Incorporated BY 
Reference" includtnv the .. Proxy Statement·dated APril 8, 1988 
relating to Re~Jistrant*s Annual in9 to held on May 5, 
1988" to be incorporated into Part II of Form 10-k. 
Part !II of Form 10-K includes aection 





one sentence, .. The information 
Statement. in the section entitled 
Hana.~Jement .. is incorporated herein reference. •• 
The April 8, 1988 Proxy statement- With 
Manaqement•• paqe six includes· in five the followinq 
vague reference to the subject Hotel tran.action: 
"DurinCJ 1987, the and one of its subsidiaries advanced 
funds for.the operations of three apartment complexes and a 
hotel owned by limited partnerships, the units of which were 
offered to members of the PUblic and in which certain officers 
and directors purchased interests. The Company and the 
subsidiary advanced a total of 86 million to the partnershiPS. 
The Company retains interests of 301 to 401 in each 
of the apartment limited • to the 
return of capital with respect to one of the partnershiPS and 
to a cumulative preferred return to the limited partners of two 
of the partnerships. With respect to the hotel, a subsidiary 
of the Company retains a interest of 15%. 
subordinate to the limited ' return capital and a 
cumulative preferred return. 
1. The $20.000,000 unsecured 
2. The ACC warantees of the 
favor of San Jacinto 
were not disclosed including: 
A. A $9,000,000 non recourse 
edged securities {Memorex 
approximately $9.000, This 
February 29, 1988. 
wu not even cU.sclosed • 
• ooo.ooo first mortqa~e loan in 
) whic~ e~cumbereci the hotel 
collateralized by 
with total value of 
executed on 
B. A ss.ooo 000 unsecured recourse guarantee dated .January '16, 
1986 • 
. The reader was not ly informed that Crescent Hotel 
Group of Michi~an. Inc., id was the 9eneral 
partner in the transaction or that POr notes in the March 31, 
1988 partnershiP financial •tateaents referenced in more 
detail in our October 1 that the partnerships 
mana9ement (the qeneral pa~ner) has indicated a coMmitment to 
providinq further financinCJ $20 million.line amount 












n.~ceasbe:r· 31, 1987, 
the C~y, had 
uncxer a 120. 000 ~ 000 line 
been. uaed to f'Wld cash f 1 ow 
" ~ noted that 
four the previous section 






The reader of the 10-K and the Proxy statement would have had 
no chance to ascertain the true risks. potential financial 
impact of loans and guarantees or the preferential terms 
afforded t'o the related parties on this transaction. 
Contrarily. he would be led to believe by specific Manaqement 
representations that this transaction involved terms as 
favorable to the company as transactions with unaffiliated 
parties and that it had resulted in larqe profit to the com~~y. 
\ 
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Management responses to our October 6. 1988 letter. 
In overall terms management either did not answer the specific 
questions in the~letter or categorically denied the issues. ' 
1.Willful violations of regulations 
Manaqement claims that this transaction was covered by the May 
20,1988 agreement. FHLB says it wasn't. 
Management dispUtes the affiliated partY status of the 
transaction which is absurd. 
2.Breach of fiduciary duty 
The affiliated parties clearly intended to benefit from the 
transaction and they clearly benefited from the loan proceeds 
• 
-3. Willful diversion of Association assets. 
Management comments ignore the questions raised in our letter. 
4.Haterial ommissions 
Management denied tha facts but ignored the documentation.Thare 
are numerous sound reasons for denying this application to 
transfer the nota to the holding company. 
S.Potential conflicts 
The holding company will fund future cash deficits.(lf the 
holding company goes under Lincoln will still have contingent 
liability. 
G009S3 
M~. •!chard 1. N•vtoa 





1 Thlt 0 million loan 
aaaert. tho equivalent 
any partnerahip -- whether 
affiliated reoaa -- to ................... 
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------------------------------- Mail,ng History-------------------------------Date: 12115/88 
T1 me : 1 0 : 18 am 
Subject: Lincoln C&D 
From: HARVEY SHAMES 
Distribution: 
JOSEPH KAWASAKI 
cc TOMMY F. MAR 
cc HARVEY SHAMES 
cc SHIRLEY THAYER 
cc JERRY TRAVIS 




ui~..k Newsom called me thh morning to aslr nbout the sta.lus of subj~ct. 
I 1 nformed him that the "final L.A. version" wu delivered to the AG yesteruay 
dfternoon. This "version" incorporates the standard 1anguage adopted several 
years ago ln the first two pages. This was done at Shirley Thayer's request, 
~nJ 1n no way alters the substance of the findings. 
I am including a copy of the final version with this package 1n case 
Dick wants to review 1t and comment. I expect 1f the AG passes on this, we 
will issue 1t next week. I w111 make certain that you get a ~opy. 
Thanks to you and Dtck for you help on this monumental task. 
hs 12115/88 
cc: GLT, TFH. SHT 









VS OFFICE E1ectron1c Mail Friday 12/16/88 11:14 am 







In the Matter of: 





liNCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION Ca11fornta F1nanc1a1 Code 
18200 VON KARMAN ) ORDER TO WSE MD DESIST 
IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 94714 ) 
-AND- ) Sectton 8200 
AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION ) 
2735 EAST CAMELBAO::: ROAD ) 
PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85016 ) ______________ ) 
HHEREA$: Pursuant to Section 8152 of the Ca11forn1a F1nanc1a1 Code <CFC>, the 
C:O.iss1oner of the Depart.nt of Savtngs and loan, State of Caltforn1& <the 
•C0111111hs1oner•) hu received tnfon~~~t1on nsu1t1ng frOIII the exam1nat,ons of 
the practices and operat1ons, of lincoln Sav,ngs and Loan Association 
(AL1nco1n") and Amer1can Cont1nental Corporation (ACC). ("Uncoln" a.nd "ACC" 
sha.ll be understood to 1nc1ude all of the'r subs1d1ar1es unless a. contrary 
mea.n1ng h apparent.) Included 1n the tnfonu.t1on received by the 
C:O.hs,oner wen the following' facts: 
1. Lincoln is author1zed to operate a. Ca.1tforn1a savings a.nd loan 
assoc1at1on under the supervtston of the ComMissioner; 
2. ACC, an Oh1o corporation, 1s a. reg1stered Sa.v1ngs and loan loan Holding ... 












3. Charles R. Keattng, Jr. 1s cha1r~~~.n of the board of dtrectors of ACC, 
owns 22l of 1ts stock, and ts a director of a number of subs1d1ar1es of 
Uncoln; and 
4. Charles R. Keattng III h executhe vtce prestdent of and owns 131. of 
the stock of ACC, and h. an offtcer and/or director of a number of ACC' s 
subs1dtar1es. 1nclud1~g l1nco1n and tts substd1ar1es. 
Based on the above-referenced exu\nat1ons and reports, the CoM1ss1oner f1nds 
that the fo11ow1ng practices and operations, when taken as a whole, result tn 













Transact1oo with Affi11Attd Persons 
Through 1ts subs,dh.ryl, lincoln funded a $20 mi1Hon unsecured loan to a 
111111ted partnershtp (Hotel Pontchartra1n l1a1ted Partnership, hereinafter 
•Pontchartra1n"), Jf which ai'!Other Unco1n subsidh.ry2 was the only general 
partner and of which the lim\ted partners tnclude Charles Keating, Jr., 
Charles Keat1ng III (hh son and then d\rtctor of Phoenician Financial 
Corporat1on>. and other. officers and d1rectors of l1nco1n, its parent (First> 
. ' 
and afftltates. This loan 1nvollles a nU!Ilber of unfavorable characteristics 
which de1110nstrate unsafe and unsound practices or violations' of SAl Section 
7450 and Federal Insurance Regu1attons (•I.R.w) Sections 563.43 and 571.7 (lZ 
C.F.R. Sections 563.43, 571.7), 1nc1ud1ng but not 1taited to the following: 
1. Below aarket rate of interest. g1ven the r1sk character1st1cs and terms 
wh1ch requtre no pr,nc1pa1 or 1nterest payments for f1ve years; 
2. Pontchartrain had a negative partner's cap1tal when the unsecured loan 
was coam1tted and funded; 
3. Pontchartraht had a h1 of operating losses pr1or to' and after the 
Joan was funded; 
4. The loan represents, a conflict of tnterest transact,on 1n wh1th 
af'filhted persons of Uncoln personally benefitted, 1n v1o1at1on of 
I.R. Sections 563.43 and 571.7~ 
Phoen1c1an F1nanc1a1 Corporat~on, a wholly-owned subs1dtary of L1ncoln, 
incorporated 1n Ca11fornia. 
2 The Crescent Hotel Group 'of H1ch1gan, Inc., a wholly-owned 2nd tier 
subs1dtary of Ltncoln, 1ncorporated 1n M1ch1gan. 
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5. The purposes of this unsecured loan vera to cover Pontchartra1n's 
operat1ng losses 'and cash flow deftc:hs: ·Pontc:hartrah'lts ·only JMjor 
asset, the Pontchartra1n Hotel, was already encumbered by ,: securid loan 
w1th another lender. ·The U!Ount c:c.itted under the unsecured loan when 
added to the uount of ·,rae secured loan subshnt1a11y exceeded the 
appraised value of th;s asset; and 
6. Lincoln estab11shed a loss reserve on tt,e Pontchutra1n loan for accrued 
1nterest which exceeded $3,000,000. 
Furthermore, pub11c d1sc1osure stateaents3 lacked complete and accurate 
dhclosures regardtng the above-referenced POOtchartratn transact,on, wMch 1n 
add1t1on to be1ng potential secur1t1es law v1o1at1ons, aay result tn 11ab111ty 
to ACC, and thereby may adversely affect the safety·and soundness of l1ncoln. 
Matertal om1ss1ons and/or 1naccurac1es tn these reports 1nc1ude: 
1. Failure to d1sc1ose that the Pontchartra1n Hotel was heavily encu.bered 
by a $35 M111ion mortgage with another lender; 
2. Fa11ure to dhclose a $5 M1111on guarantee by ACC of the $35 111t1Hon 
f1rst mortgage held by another hinder on the Pontchartra1n 'Hotel. (An 
add\ttonal $9 11U1ton secured guarantee was later provided by ACC 1n 
1988.) 
3. Fa11ure to disclose the below Mrket interest rate, the preferentfal 
teflls. and the unsafe and unsound rhk character1stfcs of the 
above-referenced Pontchartrain loan. 
3 Proxy uterh1 dated AprU a. 1988, a 10-K report dated December 31, 1987, 
and offer1ng circulars for $300 a1111on 1n subordinated debt filed w1th the 








4. Investors and potenth1 1nvestors w~re advhed 1n one report4 that: 
•M&nageaent belteves that tht te~ of'the transact,ons set forth \n the 
precedtng paragraphs were· u favorable to the tC~~Pany as those which 
could be obta1ned 1n llr tnnntUons with unaffi Hated parties•. 
Th1s stateBent 1s ats1ead1ng the far ts of the transact\ on: and 
5. Due to an error (described u " by Act's counsel), ACC's 
proxy stateeent ~dated Apdl ~~ 1988 erroneously dhc1osed that Act and a 
subs1d1ary advanced a toi:a1, of $6 anHon to a Ha1ted partnership 1n 
wh1 ch off1 cers and en rectors had 11.11 1 ntenst, when t n fact the tota 1 
llllOunt advanced was $16 11111H1on under the $20 111UHon Hne of cred1t 
here1nbefore referenced. 
Other tUgb R1 sit l£;11'! toncti.Uratlons 
loans to RA Kalis. Inc. 
On June 30. 1987, l1ncoln made an unsecured loan (No. 91077) 1n the amount of 
$30 million to RA Homes, Inc. Under the terms of the note. lincoln agreed to 
subordinate its loan to virtual &11 other unsecured cred1tors, 
notwithstand1ng the fact RA Homes' ftnanciat cond1tton was extremely weak. RA 
Homes had a nom1na1 stated net worth of $3.2 m\111on as of October 31, 1987, 
1n relation to stated Habt11ths of $134.2 1111t1Hon. F1nanc,a1 state111ents a.s 
of October 31, 1986, also reflected a noBina1 net ~rth of $1.2 a1111on, w1th 
stated 1h.b1Ht1es of $80.5 111l1lion. Net ~rtll u of April 3o: 1987 totaled 
$2.2 m1111on. 'Due to operattng losses, the tOII!Plny's ftnancial cond1tion has 
deteriorated, w1th stated net worth of $2.4 m1111on coapared to 1tabi11t1es of 
$208 111111on as of July 31, 1981L The HaMHthls of RA Horaes represent 
primarily secured creditors. In spite of the weak financtal condition of the 
company, ltncoln d1d not obtain 
pr1nc1 pals . 
guarantees from the company's 
.,# 
The loan teras are extr~Rtly 11bera1 ca11tng for interest only payments 
through 1992, at lfflh:h t1~~~e quarterly principal P4.YI"I'Its start and 
subsequently hcnase. wUh a $20 1111111ton balloon payaent due h 1997. The 
stated source of repayaent on the subject loan was 
, ' 
4 ACC's Aprtl 8, 1988 Stat~Rtnt. 7. 
... 
l 
·~ ' . 
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income of RA Homes. However, the historical 1nc011e from opent1ons of RA 
Homes, as was known or should have been known to Lincoln at the t1me the loan 
was made, was not adequate to Met the interest and scheduled pr,nc\pal 
payments on the $30 m\111on at the stated rate of 131. 
loan No. 91087 to RA H~es. secured by land ,n Arh~ona, was extended and 
increased fr011 approximately $27 llidl Hon to $46 1111t1Hon on July 11, 1988, .. 
whtch resulted tn an unsafe' and unsound 1oan-t~v&1ue rat1o of 100'1, ghen the 
financial cond\tton of the borrower and the s1ze of exposure to.l1nco1n. 
As of June 30, 1988. total lo&ns to RA Homes equalled apprbllhi'ah1y $79.5 
111111l1on, or about one-third of l1nco1n's net worth, wh1ch represents an unsafe 
and unsound concentration of unsecured or thinly co11atera11zed loans to such 
a ftnanc1ally weak company. 
Loans to Soutbmark Corporatfon ind AtfJ ltdes 
Uncoln and/or \h subs1dtarhs ude a series of loans to and tnvestments 1n 
Southmark Corporat1on, 1ts subs,d1ar,es, and aff11,ates tota11ng approx\mately 
$108 111t111on. Of thh a1110unt, approximately $49.5 Million has been 
collatera11zed by stock 1n clos~ly held or wholly-owned subs,diaries and 
aff111ates of Southmark. 
lincoln made three of the above loans· tota11ng $12.5 aH11on on distressed 
property owned by Southmark and its subs1d1a~ies in June 1988. The properties 
are apartment bu1 1 d1 ngs 1 n . depressed parts of the country and are 
characterized by high vacancy,' cash flow problems, deferred maintenance and 
detertorat1on accord1ng to lincoln's own analysis. According to lincoln's own 
loan underwr\ting presentat1ons, the $12.5 a1111on 1n loans exceeded the 
current $8.9 m1111on apprahed values of. the propert1es by $3.6 Million . 
Stock wMch was pledged as additional security for. these new loans consisted 
of restdcted and unregistered stock valued at $4.5 111Hl1on in a Southmark. ... 
aff11tate and ,, of reduced and quest\onable aarketab111ty. according to 
lincoln's own loan agreeaents. The level of collateral protection afforded 
these loans h unsafe and unsound due to the unfavorable characterht1cs of 
the collateral, the tMn collateral margin, the known finanCial. diff1cu1t1es 
of Southlllrk, .. and the Jar9e L1,.co1n exposurJ to Sou~hlllrk. 

















l1nco1n's IIU1t1p1e borrower 1ht as of June 30, 1988 indicates an unsafe and 
' . ' l ' 
unsound concentrat1on of loans to SoUthiH.rk·. t ts aff1 nates and subsidt ar1es 
1n the a.oUnt of $98.8 •11T1on.' ~arttcularly 1n 11ght of lincoln's knowledge 
of South~~~&rk•s detertorat1ng financial cond1t1on IS evidenced by Southmari(.'S 
Fona 10-Q 'report dated March 31, 1988. . 
c~~ J!'~~' r.-J'· 
Based on the forgoing f1nd1ngs~_·a~d a1.1,.gaUons, the Cllalhstoilers concludes 
that l1ncoln, ACC, and 1ts nued sl.lbs1d1ar1es havl engaged , tn . unsafe and 
unsound bus1nesi pract1ces. '· ' 
'0 p_,~t fL, 
THEREFORE. pursuant to the provts1ons of CFC Section 8200, the Com1ss1oner 
orders L t nco 1 n, ACC. any of their subs1 d1arhs. and the1 r d1 rectors, officers 
eaployees and agents, to CEASE AND.DESIST frOM the fo11owtng: 
1. Making loans, representfng e1ther new or add1Uona1 extensions of 
credit, to Pontchartra1n,'R. A. HOllies, Inc. ·and Southma.rk Corporation, 
or any of the1r subs1dtar1es, directors, offfcers, or other affiliates. 
2. Hak1ng loans or creat1ng concentrat1ons· of cred1t to any borrowers 
contrary to CFC Section 7450. 
3. Making loans or enter,ng 1nto transactions of any kind that violate I.R . 
Section 563.43 or I.R. Sectt_on 571.7 dealtng with conflicts of interest. 
4. Penn1tttng erroneous, 1ncC~~p1ete, lllh1ead1ng or 1naccurate fnfor~~~at,on 
of any k1nd to be 1nc1uded in pubHc reports <1nc1ud1ng Fon11 10-Q), 
offer1ng c1rcuh.rs. proxy uter1ah :Or any other pubHc 1nformat1on. 
This order tnc1udes. but h not H1111ted to, matirhJ 01111u1ons regarding 
related or affi11ated person transact1~ns. 
s. Maktng unsecured loans to.borrowers wh1ch have ~ef1ctt or tnadequate net 
~ . 
worth to prudently suppert reasonable expectations of rep&y~~~ent 










., . ·:'· ·. 
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FURTHER, the eo..tss1oner orders .the board o~ directors of L1n~o1n and ACC to 
fully exerche their f1duc1ary duty conshtent: w1th CFC Sectton ~150. _) 
\ FURTHERMORE, Lincoln and ACC are d1rected to apply to the C:O.hs1oner for 
exceptions, wahers. adjustMents or relief fr011 any provhton of thh Order 
wMch they beHt!ve h detrhtental to the best interest of the Assoc1at1on or 
detrimental to the best tnterest :of· the public. 
. ! 
Thh Order shall be effective 1..1adtate1y upon service. 
DATED: 
HILLIAM D. DAVIS 
Chief Deputy Sav1ngs and Loan Comm\ssioner. 
600 South Collonwealth Avenue. S~1te 1502 
Los Angeles, CA 90005 
HDD:hs 
cc: Darrel H. Dochow, ORA 
Recetpt h hereby atknowltdged by: · 








STATI: OF CALIFOUIA 
DEPA:R'DJDT SAVIRGS ARD LOU 
In the Matter of: ) 
ORDER . ) 
LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,) 
FIRST LINCOLN FINANCIAL CORPORATIOR ) 
AND AMERICAN CORTINDTAL CORPOIU\TION ) 
California Financial Code 
Section 8200 
-------------------------------> 
To: Board of Directors and Managing Officers 
of American Continental Corporation 
To: Board of Directors and Managing Officers 
of Lincoln Savings and Lban Association 
. . 
is a 
california-licensed savings and loan association under the 
; 
( supervision of the California Savings and Loan Commissioner (the 
' 
a [state of incorporation] COrporation, is a aaYingl an4 loan 
holding company under the supervision of the COmmissioner; and 
American Continental Corporation ("Ace•), an Ohio COrporation, is 






Charles R. Keat 
()./(}6 
ACC, owns 22\ 
ACC, Lin Fin, 
Charles a. Keating III 
owns the stock of ACC, 




Lincoln is a [wholly-owned?] subsidiary 
a [wholly-owned?] subsidiary 
ACC are in violation 




lifornia or of the United States or are en;a;ing 
unsound business practices as set forth below: 
C0097 
2The Crescent Hotel Group of Michigan, Inc., a 






funded, through a • 1 
loan to 
Charles !teat in;, Jr.. (Chairman of the board 
stockholder of ACC), Charles Keating (his son ana 
II 
ita parent 
i a number of unfavorable 
( 
an Financial Corporation, a wholly-owned 




NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 4 
characteristics which demonstrate uzun1fe and unsound. 
practices or violations of SAL 57450 and Federal Savings 
~lt_ I .0."30 
q_, and Lf'lan Corporation Regulations (•I.R.") 5563.43 and 
P..l.t r r.;~.11.. 
~>+) §571.7 (12 C.F.R.- 55563.43, 511.7) including but not 
8 
F;J~ t .;-;,."!~'-/ limi.ted to the following: 
(q}-{p.) ; 
( 
13e I u~) h\&, x:c-+ 
~~-· 
... c.~ d t? ~ iP, rd- J s,\,D_ h .... ~1<.. c~~c..Yn·:-1~}:,..£ 





NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 5 I'D~ ·t'· ,. , I' 
B. Pontchartrain had a negative D~WOTbh when 
unsecured loan was committed and funded. 
"\"'·,.~ ~!'· 4,..,. ,-a-c., Pontchartrain had a history· of operating losses prior 
~- .,_,<' . I".~ 
fa.. 71 ""'": 
~;~ to and after· the loan was funded. 
. . 
This loan represents a conflict of interest 
transaction in which affilifte4 parties of Lincoln 
personally benefitted not in conformity with Insurance . 
Regulation 1563.43 and 5571.7. 
The unsecured loan waa to cover Pontchartrain's . 
operating loaaea. Pontchartrain • a only ujor aaaet, 
the Pontcbartrain Hotel, was already enewlbered by a 
secured loan with another lender. The amount 




NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 6 
amount of the secured loan substantially ezceeded the 
appraised value of this asset. 
F. Lincoln established loss reserve on the 
Pontchartrain loan for accrued interest wbich ezceeded 
$3,000,000. 
3. Public disclosure statemants3 lacked complete and accurate 
';),..41 .t;:;,.-s'l . 
a;( .(!) " disclosures the Pontchartrain transaction . 
~;1 .. ~ 1 "2 7"' referenced -:i. ::J• ~ e 
t 
in Paragraph 4 which, iD a4dit1oa to beiDg 
(~~~potential securities law violations, may result in 
p~ 
~J."'!:. :·· #~ ~3Prozy material dat_, April 8, 1988, a 10-X report dated 
.~·\~ 
01·· · December 31, 1987, and offering circulau·s for $300 million •;.:..·. • 
subordinated debt filed with the SEC on April 14, 1988. 
C00982 
( 
LINCOLN SAND LA 
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NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 7 
liability to ACC, which in turn may adversely affect the 
safety and soundness of Lincoln. Material omissions and/or 
inaccuracies in these reports include: 
A. Failure to disclose that the Pontchartrain Hotel was • ,-s-
heavily encumbered by a $, million mortgage with 
'!. 
another lender. 
Failure to c!isclose a $5 millie~. guarantee by ACC of 
I J $" 
the til million first mortgage held br another lender 
. --~~ 
, ·· ~,,'on the Pontchartrain Hotel. (AD ad~ltional $9 million 
e,'i-,:o; .ll.t: ... t • • a·c.c.) . ,~ . ·~' a A I ""I CJ 0 
~· .~··· secured guarantee was later provlc!e4 br ACC~) 
c. Failure to disclose the below urket interest rate, 
the preferential tenm, anc! the unsafe anc! unsound 
risk characteristics of the Pontchar~rain 1oan~~:t:t;.9.c\;,.f 
~ct!l'e+."'f.J~ -· t -·. ~i~l~ · ,.. D~ f 




NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 8 
D. Investors and potential 
these reports4 that: 
were advised in 
believes that the 
terms of the transactions set forth in the preceding 
paragraphs were as favorable the company as those 
which could be obtained in similar tran1actions with 
unaffiliated parties•. 
given the facts of the transaction. 
E. ACC's proxy statement dated April 1, 1981 erroneously 
disclosed that ACC and a subs advanced a total 
of '' million to a partnership in which 
the total amount was 
l ; '1" uf co .r 411 Jl.: t ~r~r,...,,..41FJ' 
I ..;. 'f'i*) / a ,.P &)'1.(1 
4. On June 30, 1981, unsecured 191077 in the 
B-t 




NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 9 
4Acc•s April 8, ~988 Proxy Statement, Page 7. 
Mict 
Lincoln agreed subordinate its 
virtually all other unsecured creditors notwit~standing 
the fact RA Homes• financial condition was extremely weak. 
RA Homea had a nominal stated net worth of $3.2 million as 
of October 31, 1987, in relation to stated liabilities of 
. a:~· a;.&i~'K-
$134.2 million. Financial statements as of October 
31,1986, also reflected a nominal net worth of $1.2 (j 
~Jl\...,~ c.~trF Ai"";a i1i?'7 
llion, with stated liabilities D~ $80 million.~ The 
deteriorated due to operating los1e1 with a stated net 
worth of $2.3 million in relation to liabilities of $208 
mil .. The li&~bilities of RA Homes represent priurily 
secure4 creditors. In spite of tbe weak financial 
of the company, Lincoln tlid not obtain personal 





NOVEMBER I 1988 
PAGE 10 
B-1 The loan terms are reme l al calling for interest 






prin~ipal payments start and subsequently increase with a 
$21 million balloon payment in stated source of 
repayment on the subj act loan was income of RA Homes • 
However, the historical income from operations of RA Homes, 
o,.,<:lw...Uiu,..,.., AtH.,..IC_.., 
. ~ 
as was known to Lincoln at the was 
$30 
Loan 191087 to RA Home's secured by land in Arizona, was 
extended and increased from app:rozimately million to 
$46 million on July 11, 1988, which resulted in an unsafe 
s ''(J~ "~" t.. fi'""'"' r- ~~ ( 
and unsound loan-to-value of 100\,MLIF££2 ] '' -
t'o,.J,•tiw... oT t4 ,J'.rd~to,..... e;,,.,~ +~t. c.·a.~# aJ<pr~s .. -D 
lQ!a uadef!l"lng fi!SeR_e,lga. 
't.,} L ~r,. c u t""' , 
C00986 
( 
LINCOLN SAND LA 
DRAFT 6 
NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 11 
As of July 11, 1988, total loans to RA Homes approximately 
enualle4 $98.5 million or one-third of Lincoln's net worth, G2J 6 .. 'lll 
which represents an unsafe and unsound concentration of 
unsecured or thinly collateralized loans to 11uch a 
financially weak-company. 
. . 
~incoln-and/or ita subsidiaries made a series of loans to 
and investments in soutbmark Corporation, ita llubaidiariea, 
~-6- ,,: 
',, j 
B--~M and affiliates totalinQ approzimatel:r llion .. 
&B""#l :thiB amount approximately $68 million baa been 
.... -. '*"" 
I) ~-a. 
collateralized by atoek in eloeel:r held or wbollJ'-ouDed 
. &IJ 7 ; subsidiaries and affiliatea of Soutburk .. 














according to Lincoln • s own loan underwriting 
G-•3 Lincoln's multiple borrower list as of June 30, 1988 
···""'· 
indicates an .. unsafe and unsound concentration of loans to 
Southmark, ita affiliates and aubaidi~riea in the amount of 
; 
~.. .. · ... ~~·I(,.~··· f.· 
$98. e million, particularly in light of " SOutblurk • • 
·-<:c..:~'f'..\.L d~teriorating financial condition JUB evidenced 
.. 0 -'1>of~'l;iv 
-.'' .... ::. 
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The Commissioner orders Lincoln, ACC, or any of their 
subsidiaries, cease and desist from the following: 
lo Making loans or creating . concentrations of credit to 
borrowers contrar.r·to SAL §7450. 
2. Making loans or entering into transactions of any kind that 
violate I. R. 55&3.43 or I. R. 5571.7 dealing with conflict 
of interest. 
3. Permitting erroneous, incomplete, •ialeading or inaccurate 
information of any kind to be include4 in public reports 
including 10-Q, offering circulars, proxy materials or anr 
other public infomation. This or4er 1nclu4es but 11 not 
limited to material omissions regarding related or 





NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
PAGE 14 
'6. 
S. Makino uns•cured · loans to borrowers Jthich have deficit or 
inadequate. net worths to prudently ·support reasonable 
ezpectations of repayment consistent with SAL 17450. 
( Further, the Commissioner orders the bQard of directors to 
fully ezercise its fiduciar,r duty consistent with SAL 56150. 










r I I UO.:J II!.. I Vl..t !.IIJ V4., <-V .... , ,. O.~t.. 
To: 
Subject: lincoln C & D 
01 s tri but1 on: 
None, this item is In Progress 
--------------------------------------------·----------------------------------
To: SHEILA SAKAMOTO From: SHIRLEY THAYER 
Subject: Lincoln C & D Date Sent: 12/02/88 
Dick Newsom gave 1s presentation and 1nd1cated there \lfU docu~~entation to su-
pport the allegations. He h bringing back. to you the 11Rster• copy for 
preparation of Draft 18. · · 
... 
It 1s my understanding that since Tommy Mar had an emergency and had to. 
leave after two hours that there \11111 be opportunity given to h1m to look. 
at the supporting documentation before a-ftna1 ~ecis1on is made to prepare 
a f1na1 draft and prepare and index a copy of the supporting documents. 
for final review and contacting the AG. · 
Call \s you have any questions. 
Shirley 
-------------------------- Reply ------ ----------
1 just spoke w1th Harvey Shames \lfho indicated that Draft 18 would be prepared 





. . . 




-.~, > ,~·- .. '~ 
'f~;~*.J: ~ 
~:to 
CC: SHEilA SAKAMOTO SF 
From: RICHARD NEHSOM 
Subject: Changes to lincoln C & D Date: 12/13/88 
Distribution: 
Not Requested 
--------·-··--·---·---------------· :lliL ------...-.---------- -· --------
Key points of d1sagre.-ent 
Page 8-"Due to Typographical error• ts being 1nserted.Insert1ng this doesn't ma 
ke sense. however, if you are gotng to insert 1t like it factual-i.e. •oue to a 
alleged typograpM cal error• . . , 
Page 11- •and scheduled principal PI.YMrits• h be1ng deleted. Inc1ud1ng thh Ill 
kes it more attftcult for lincoln to argua agatnst·as and I don•t understand th 
· e rationale of deleting a fact that w111 support our argUMent. 
Page 12-•Restrtcted and -unreghtered stock" ·h bei~Bg changed to publicly trade 
d. It is iaportant that you understand the concept of •restricted stock".The ac 
tual certtf1cates he1d as collateral are .arked as restricted. Turn the cert1f1 
cates over<we have copies referenced)and read 'the: 1111\tation at the bottom of e 
ach cert,f1cate.Our cert1f1cates ·cannot be •publicly traded" because of these 1 
1m1tat1ons.· Incidently. the stock price deterr1orated to a new low for the year 
r last week, e11m1nat1ng our cushion 1f you use erroneously the Alltr1can Stoc 
k exchange quote whtch 1s for Marketable securttes<not restr1cted) 
Since the Lincoln loan documentation referenced ts Yellow ~~arked in the section 
addressing the reduced marketability and u~reg1stered nature of the co11atera 
1 I don't understand why we are 1gnortng a llljor and s1gntftcant negative facto 
r that 1s documented • 
If you have any further questions please ca11.I think '1t would be worth discuss 
1ng the restricted stock issue on the phone. 
C00992 
. "'! ........... ! . ~. 
~~~?~·2·:·~ 
--•"*:>">:ic 
v ..J Vf r .!. .._... L. I t:O.,. "' 1Jtl I 1.. 1'10. I I • i f """"""J ' ..... , v .... , \,..''....0 ....,..,.; ~....,. ~··· 
To: SHEILA SAKAMOTO SF 
From: HARVEY SHAMES 




I made a mistake. Shirley's arrangement 1s to have Dick come up with 
Draft 18 in consultation with you and Harv. Once that 1s done. he can arrange 
to forward it via E-Ma11 to me and I w\11 make the L.A. distribution. 
Shirley also thinks it would· be helpful in dealing with the AG if Dick can 
·prepare· a brhf llelftQ <no more than bto pages) highlighting the major concerns 
and safety/soundness issues 1nvo1v1ng the Pontchartra1n. R.A. Homes and 
Southmark transactions. Together with Draft 18, we will then proceed to 
hopefully finalize the drafting, vh1t the AC and present the C&D to the 
Comm1ss,oner for approval. 
H. Shames 
cc: WTS. GLT. SMT 
------- .... ------·--· -------- Reply --------- -------------------
CC: HARVEY SHAMES From: SHEILA SAKAMOTO 
Subject: lincoln C l D Date Sent: 12/02/88 
I just spoke with Harvey Shames who 1nd,cated that Draft 18 would be prepared 
down there. Per h1s request. I am transmitting Draft 16 v1a computer. 
----------~------------------~--Original Memo-----·----------------~--------
To: SHEILA SAKAMOTO From: SHIRLEY THAYER 
Subject: lincoln C l D Date Sent: 12/02/88 
Dick Newsom gave 1s presentation and indicated there was documentation to su-
pport the allegations. He is bringing back to you the •master• copy for 
preparation of Draft 18. 
It is my understanding that since Tommy Mar had an emergency and had to 
leave after two hours that there w\11 be opportunity given to him to look 
at the supporting documentat,on before a f1na1 dec1s1on is made to prepare 
a final draft and prepare and index a copy of the supporting documents. 
for final review and contacting the AG. 






Mr. Robert J. ~ie 




Thank you for e~preaBln~ your concerns the Companies 
lettftr dated 13, 
letter reoardino H~tel 
have 4ddressed adequately 
ommissions in 
statement, and the 
sales. 
( response to our Oct. 6,1988 
transaction.) may not 
our concerns over apparent material 
public 10-k. proxy 
Subordinated debt 
we are attachinG as exhibit 1 the onal information you 
requested supporting our comments re to material 
ommissions in ated partY disclosures. We are incorperating 
by reference our October 6~1988 letter to insure there is a 
complete ino reoardtno our concerns in this • transaction. 
The low and concessionArY rate subject appears worthy 
of special comment.A projection by the accociation 
indicates that amount lY payable at maturitY 
including accrued interest will approximate 129,837~207 
absent any principal OF interest which are not 
required until . The Nat izable value calculation 
conducted by association on July 7,1988 estimated that 
future accrued tn addition to:the existing $2.8 
million at the ,would need to be reserved unless these was 
an improvement operations.This certainly appears 
material.The of a luap sua payment of 
interest five years of a loan discounted for as 
(as the est funds) $6.7 million whiCh which 
would result-1«. a ·1/3 ~1scountia~ from the note rate of 
10%. which is th the management representations 
in both April 1 Years PrOXY material which 
advised transactions with 
management were on and conditions with those 
afforded the oeneral 
In short , -cQntrarv 
company subsid 
concessionary 
draft suppartino a 
the FHLB ( 
43-44 indicates 






This also appears inconsistant with prevtous disclosures. 
While we have additional question~ this seems to address the 
key issues 
These appear to be material errors and omissions in past 
disclosures relevevant to an investors perception over both 
financial matters and exercise of fiduciary respansibilitY by 
corporate insiderL. 
Thank you for·requastin9 this 1nfor.ation and followin9 up on 
o~,c~ce~ 
~e. . 
RiChard E. Mewaom 
Examiner. 
State of california 










1 b 1 ""<~> R•aardipq Npn-Discloaur• in 1P-Ks and Othtar SuPPOrting Exh ~· -•- · 
fubl1c Reporta. 
The December 31 
Corporation ind 
Reference'" inclYdinO' the~ 
relating to Registrant's 
1988" to be incorporated 
inental 
Iru::orporat.od By 
APril 8, 1988 
held on May 5. 
10-IC. 




The April 8, 1988 Proxy atat ... nt-· With 
Management" page six include• 1n Para9raph the followinsJ 
vaoue reference to the subject Hotel transaction: 
"During 1987, the 
funds for the 
hotel owned by limited 
offered to members 
and directors purchased 
subsidiary advanced a 
The Company retains 
of the apartment 1 
( -eturn of capital . .o a cumulat.i ve preferred 
of the partnerships. 
of the Company 
subordinate to the 
cumulative preferred 
1. The $20,000.000 
2. The ACC guarantees 
favor of San Jacinto 
were not disclosed 
A A $9,000,000 non recourse 
pledged securities (Me.c,re~ 
approximately S9~ooo. 
February 29, 1988. 
a. A ss.ooo.ooo 
1986. 
advanced 





t.o 401 in each 
to the 
Nrtnerahtpe and 
partners of two 
, ·a subsidiary 
of 151, 
cut tal and a 
aortnve loan in 




3 . The reader wu Crescent. Hotel 
Group of Michigan., a wu general 
partner in transaction per notes the March 31, 
1988 partnershiP (as referenced in more 
·~tail in our October 6. letter) that the.P&rtnershiPS 
\ .ma9ement (the general has indicated a commi tJNnt to 
providing further financing beyond the SlO million line amount 
to cover future loaaea of the partnership. 
C00996 
c 
was not informed of the extraordinarilY liberal 
subJect loan including but ~ot limited to: 
$20 million revolving l it with S year 
terms requiring no payment principal or 
to maturitY in five years. 
in relation to risk. 
demonstrated ability to repay the 
appreciation 1n value only 
letter. 
on pave .seven, P&ravraPh four of the Proxv Stat.-.nt 
"ManacrMRent b«<U.evea that thG tenas of the 
set forth in the precedin~ para.grChs were u 
to the Company- as thoaa whieb could be obtained in 
tranaact1ons with unaffiliated parties." 
ncndiscloaure 1tams are obviously .aterial u the 
or inv•tor who relied on the "Tnm.aactions W1 th 
disclosures in this proxy atat...nt would be 
that the company had placed 134 aillion in loans and 
at risk sUPPGrtino a related party transaction 
ready h19hlv loveraoad by a 136 mi ion secured 
{ ACC' a exposure reprasonted onr 201 of net worth) • 
would also not have been aware of the extreae risk 
transaction u addressed in cur October 6, 1988 lett•r 
Association and the Holdinv Coail~NDY. Also u ref•nmc..S 
1 in our October 6th lett•r, on J'uly xxxx 19U, am 
officer rec~ed the internal classification of 
of the loan and a total r•erva of all acci'Wid 
on the subject which UOW'lted to al110at. 13 llillion. 
interest reserves total 13.2 aillton at 9/30/88. 
reader of the 10-J: would find ac:a~Mfbat. aon 
in a different. section on Ntre 2l of the 1 0-JC in 
three: 
Creacent Hotel Group waa fo~ ··in 1984 to accauire 
proNrties aftd to develop new bot•l•. ln 
, crescent acquired Pontcbartratn Hotel in 
• The Pontchartrain is a 420~uni t lWNI"Y 
in the downtown business district near the 
••~•~u Center. The Company The Pontchartrain for 
to a vrouP of invHtonjl iDClw.::Ung certain of the 
s officers and directors (with an agvravat• ownershiP 
, reault.1DG in a groaa profit of approx1matalY 
The Company completed substantial renovat1ons to 
in February 1986. At Dec...,_r 31, 1987, 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the COIIPMY, had 
.ooo to tba partnerabiP unct•r a sao,ooo~ooo line 
Such line of credit hu been used to fund cub flow 
the partnership since inception." We noted that 
items two. three and four from the previous section 
as undisclosed issues in this 10-K section. 
( ' 
CONCLUSION 
be reader of the 10-K and the Proxy statement would have had 
.,o chance to ascertain the true risks. potential financial 
impact of loans and quarantees or the preferential terms 
afforded to the related parties on this transaction. 
Contrarily, he would be led to believe'by specific mana9ement 
representations that this transaction involved terms aa 
favorable to the company as transactions With unaffiliated 
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VS OFFICE Electronic Ha11 
' CC: RICHARD 
From: RICHARD 
Subject: lincoln C & 0 
Distribution: 
Not Requested 
By the time you receive s we assume 
proposed lincoln C&D. This should be 
coln to make any additional vorkpaper add1t1ons 
7 D for court purposes. 
More seriously I have ved a copy of TOBIY. 
111 
8 regard 1 ng h h analysis of the wort papers "'"""'"''" 
received a draft of the 
asap to the exui ners at U n 
footnoting to the Revised C 
• ~emo dated November 17,198 
the propos~d C & D in par 
tfcular support1ng.the Homes, loan. 
It 1s very clear to ae from reviewing thh that TOM)' h totally com 
.m1ted to thwarting and delaying the proposed D,for unknown reasons. as he d 
elayed the ma111ng of the board report of the. previous enm1nat1on. wh1ch was ne 
ver delivered to the assoc1at1on~S1nce Tommy has· ~een adv1sing the comm1s1oner 
<even before Tommy saw the work.papers> that there is no basis for enfocement ac 
tion. I believe this also 1nd1cates m1ndset. - · · · 
·Examiflat1on and legal has put 11tera11y thousands of-hours into this exam1nat, 
on and the outcome 1s too important to have 1t wasttd due to Mindset ~1ch 1s c 
contrary. in any case • to the comm1s1oners attempt to take action to protect t 
he public. . 
This memorandum addresses Tommy 1 s memo wh1ch 1s attached.Under the circumstance 
s I believe further 1nvo1ve.ent by myself or Northern C&lifornta legal would b 
e an excerc1se 1n frustration and fut111ty ven the predi on of Tommy to 
delay or block C .0 on.Hhile it is a management decision that needs to be 
made down there. I don•t be11eve any effect,ve act1on or report w111 come out o 
f this examination unless a more objective and action oriented supervising exam 
1ner is appointed s case. 
Section 1 of the memo c1 f1 on. 
Section 2 addresses •unusual and SetB1ng1y Inverted exa.ination procedures.• 
The memo question how I could write a draft of the C 10 on November 10, while t 
he workpapers support1 C & D were not 1y prepared and assemled unt1 
1 November. The •emo suggests that unt11 I provide a stateaent explaintng how I 
did this "we are vulnerable to counterattacks based on bias. prejudg1ng. lack o 
f professional object1v1ty,etc.~ The answer is obvtous1y that I xeroxed the d 
ocumenta1on weeks ago I submitted the RA Hoaes wr1teup to aanagement on Oc 
t.21,1988 wh1ch 1s attached. He received aanag~a~nts response this week and I 
discussed the inadequacies at a fon~al aeettng with management 
in Irvine. ca1. which was tzer, et a1. 
Section 3 addresses ~Abscence and Expected Summary of ftnd1ngs" .I ad 
dressed this in ous paragragh. Our findings left no doubt about our r1 










From: Dick Newsom 
Subject: Lincoln C & D Violations 
This is a follow up to your request for a memo on the 
apparent C&D violations at Lincoln. 
I have reviewed Shirley Thay•r's opinion regarding the C & D 
and :believe it is in error. I understand that ORA people 
have advised Jerrold that ORA -eonsiders it a . violation of 
its d-irective against violating Section 563.43. I believe 
that.communication between our counsel and Washington would 
be cappropriate. J'errold advises that ORA personnel were 
advis-ed two days before the pur·.J..~-~ · Lt lean officer Randy 
Conte ·t:hat Lincoln woula not fN4 rd··.qf'l ·f. J... i~ f;t -ticipation. 
The ri~Jht to repurchase the P:irt i·; ~ ;~~ _cr.l was a ric;rht, not 
an oblic;ration to repurchase. LincolTJ • b attorney's 
opinion identified it as a nonrecou~ par~icipation. Since 
ACC had a contractual responsi bi 1 i ty to l·epurchase the 
participation from Saudi European uppn demand by Saudi 
European (pursuant to the put agreement), this put agreement 
















was a nonrecourse 
Lincoln's ion of the loan 
i 
) . 








loan partie on. 
is 
i i 
liability (that was 
ously an indirect 
transaction represents 
prior to bankruptcY 
detrimental to Lincoln 





Additionally prelimary evidence suggests that Lincoln/ACC 
violated the C&D by advancing additional funds to the Hotel 
Pontchartrain partnership subsequent to the issuance of the 
C & D. 
For· example loan payable to Crescent Lending reflected on 
the 1/31/89 and 2/28/89 • Pontchartrain financial statements 
show an in crease from 20,802,825 to 21,777,825 in the 
period (see attached). These would appear to be specific 
violations of the C & D. 
I would recommend a meeting on Monday with yourself, H.R. 
Harvey, Sheila, Shirley(by squack box) to discuss the 
foregoinc.;;.I would also recommend a follow up call to ORA to 
c.;; at these issues resolved and conmfirmed. 
I continue to have concerns that the predisposition of 
southern California personell against taking action against 
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. Participant • a . 
\ 
'• intereat also ~cquired -
~t!U!maent 
, not. 
~ Lincoln exerc~cef 
repurchase r.;;hen SF..B r-r: :·~i::?ed 
encumbrance.. Thi.s -.:~n:1ot 
an affiliated p·-<i~ B•)fl. 
C01005 
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with the Commi 
committee. 
As aoon as the 
testimony was 
publicly by the 
to Mr. Van. de 
"'either doesn't 

























on the· matter 
the Assembly 
was ~iven in 
in compliance 
fully with the 
of Ill'.. llewsom• 1 
later that 4ay 
A quote attzoibuted 
newspapers -- &ewsom 
about or is 1 liar .. • In 
created the clear 
the co.Uttee. 
CODftu:ence call betnu 
to 1saue a pzoeaa 
in tM p»eal, 
affecting 111'. Bwaom • a 
the Depart.ent, but 
• D. Peterson of the 
releaae.. I:auatead of 
the probl• .. 
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- The cnse and 
.. 
that wae iaaued on uec,._Del' 3 lVII; a~es..C to Linooln 
lavinqll llnd :Lo&ft AIWII~I.I.S 
continental corporation (.leC)· -"~ 
and ~loan 
California linanoial Code 
section 1200 aa by'Williaa D. Davis, Chief Deputy 
.... ~· .. ~ .. --. "'~ 0- . 
savinc,a and· Loan Coaiaaiot'er, a :copy of vhiob. ne aent to . 
· the Office of bqulatoey Activit.~~ l~ ·vallhin~n, D .. c., ia 
an Ol'dar 1S8UM . ·on .. infomtioh:'result.11\f .tra the 
examinations ot practioes and. operations ot Linooln and 
"-, . . . 
ACe by the Commiaeionar'• office and 
California. Th!a waa a 
judgment of 
time and was '"Ulli'l!'llffA? axruancaea 
product based on the )eat 
usin; facta available at the 
it waa issued and wa• never 
challen;ed. 
Ra;anU.nq the -aia611 
transmitted to the 
referred to 
letter• 
1989, we bel 
delay. 
... _.~~.,,.,.,. of the workpaper• vue 
November 1111, ~8f&~int potential 
:regulator. l'nn tbo\ifb the exam 
ia~suact until renary 
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1111 
D«~r~,,u, .. ,!!MI'\t Staff. 
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. ·~ ... 
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' . .... - .. ~ ~ . · . ~ ... .,. ' . .. . • . • . .•, t.-. '\'l'>t ~·. t ' .'" ,., . .... '" ... 
. '.. . -l' " . 
cornntttee .COntacts. . 
..... . . 
hereto fs J memo regarding the Cease and Desist Order that was 
Ltneoln Sav1ngs and Loan Aasccfation and American Continental 
Decllbtr 21, 1188. . 
w'th the press or the Assembly Finance and Insurence Committee 
through W1111e~ D. Davts, 1f avai1Ab1•• or W1111am ~. Crawford. 
1 speak to the press without the •~press perm1sa1on of the 






Communication with members and employees of the § 19251.5. 
legislatwe 
All state employees· and employees of the University of Califor-
nia and the California State University and Colleges shall have the 
right to communicate·with Members and employees of the Legisla-
ture . . 
A state employee, employee of the University of califomia, or 
· employ~ of .the California State University and Colleges may raise as 
a_.defense,. at .a punitive· .action. hearing, the right to communicate 
with Members and employees of· the Legislature as proVIded for in 
this section whenever believes that the basts· for such punitive ac· 
tion is. retaliation for communication. 
. . . . 
(Added by Stats.1974, c. 8127, § 1.) 
- .. ~ .J . .. 
.. ·,· ..... 
'\-. :,• .. ~:.,._, .. , ... -.-~··':·''• ~;.~ ~;. ··:."'"·t . . :. ;~~,.:~~j:; ;1',~~: .·.:: . ~.:: .... •,--·,·,,~ ... ,,::.:..~.,:;~ ~;~~ . .,.7..,;:~(• 
. .. . 




Al'I'Jilll<!!.-. GJU~~IOA GOOn' 
have been able 
on this file, 
's 
were 
by federal regulators • 





The Honorable William Crawford ! 1\ ·' 
November 2, 1989 . , ( ~- ·.; , , .. : 't 
Page 2 
' i ~·· .., ' '' ( II·. ' ., I ; ,·.,.:'' 
As I am the regulator with responsibility for.enforcement of the 
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, I would be very 
interested in any information that you may have now to support 
the conclusion you or your staff members have expressed that the 
sale of ACC's debentures was "a scam". 
/ 
Very truly yours, 
~w~,,. 
CHRISTINE W .. BENDER, • . . • ,, , 
:· r--,·· ;» J ,:~:1t 1or: f-· ~\:. >~ · ~ ~ 
r i •·. ~. :, -. ~~ ~ .. j_ t: ~ j ~ y .. '~ f,:; •n ; ' •·. :·· ,;.: 
Commissioner of Corporations / 
CWB:ad ' \. : ~~ \ : i•_, :: ',_-,.. f'. ·~ '•. 
-~ \ J 
cc: G. w. McDonald, Assistant Commissioner· 
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CRAWFORD· 
loner of savings and Loan (LA) 
May 4, 1988.' 
30'4 5211 
..... . . " .. 
AMERICAN OONTININTAI 
CORPORATION 
·"'~ ... -·. : 
ur~IN ·, 
Corpor.:~ t ion~. ~oun~~ ~· :- _ (LA). ~· :· (; , , . I' 
. . ·' 
hereto is a copy of the application and exhibits filed 
rican Continental Corporation ,vi~h the D•partaent of 
ions. 
. . 
representations in conn•ction therewith 'should be aade as soon 
since the applicant expects to go effective with our 
nt during the week commenci.ng May 23, 1988 • 
• •. t 
; . ', ·~ . -:: ' (, ....... ·""~ . ·:~:;. ' .. ·'. 
:! 
t· l '1' ;,.• ~t ... 
', 
' c 
. ~. i ~ ': 
~·;~>HI in COf\t\C..."':b '~-· •. 
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DEPARTMENT OF lOAN 
1100 5. C~LTM A~ lOS ~. CA KIOO,_.H21~ 736-2791 
UO ~ maT. SAN AU.HOSCC. CA NUM-4411} W~ 
• Ba :ra 
Mail Stop 4 
u.s. Secur 
450 Fifth 
Washington, D.C .. 











American Continental Corporation 
ansaction.s 
your letter · of · October 




related to this matter was 
Federal Home Loan Bank System 
our initial belief that this 
completed a field review of these 
r of fact, we have generated no 
concerning the transactions, 
have been in contact with FHLBS 
, we trust that your initial 
been met. 
'r '). 
an Examiner .. 
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me that • 
exhibits 
be iminated from 
a heated telephone 
by s. Sakamoto 
me that my exhibits 
these exhibits were 





she advised me 
. testimony, the 
screen out if she 
for review and I 
is essentially the 




Given letter from Corporations Commisioner 
r, ·· 2,1989, whom my testimony seems to have 
put in an awkwa position, I am requesting a discrete( if 
possible) investigation by you to determine whether the actions 
of Thayer ,Janice Brown, and perhaps others potentially 
vi ated state or federal laws or regulations. 
If your investi tion warrants it, please make the appropriate 
referalls to law rcement agencies to insure that we are not 
involved in a cover up. To my mind the mess warrants 
rP.fP.rral.With Phvsical assault that occured on Chief 
to have ry information in niy mind that might give 
somon.e an ive to eliminate information sources •. The 
ial involvement in a cover up by the Governors office 
9 me more concern than being •black balled•in seeking 
employment in ate service which is already a done deal. The 
timing of the rtments announcement relative to probable 
mass layoffs at this department is another troubling 
coincidence involving Agency • 
... 
C01018 
VS OFFICE Electronlc Mail Friday 11/03/89 09:53am 
CC: SHEILA SAKAMOTO SF 
From: RICHARD NEWSOM 




Pursuant to our earlier conversation, you are welcome to review my proposed s 
testimony. provide tt to the AG. and share 1t with Business, Transportation and 
agency and you are invited to review the exhibits which Ire being overnighted 
however unless I hear to the contrary from the AGs office in the form of a sign 
ed opinion identifying what we can•t legally provide to Congress, I am assuming 
that the same verbal instructions provided to the comm1ss1oner apply • permitt 
1ng me to testify and provide exhibits, assuming of course that the supena arr 
ives. If you have any legal objections get them cleared with the AG. 1n writing 





- (21J) 136-2711 
557-16&6 
Associations, Savings Banks and 
- Personnel Policies 
responsibilities of financial institutions dictate the need for 
a free exchange of eritlcal or sensitive information 
and its statutory auditors, and regulatory agencies. This 
some instances of unreported violations of law and 
n 1""'"n.n ..... Y which have contributed to significant financial losses. 
to Section 8050 of the California Financial Code (CFC), 
soundness, the board of directors or board of trustees 
aaJe~a·uca Ulld aYiap blmt ~ball: 
, 1985, adopt a resolution directing publication and 
board's policy and information on how staff can 
ncJ.aeJnts violations of law and regulations and other 
statutory auditors and regulatory agencies. The published 
least the name. local address and telephone number of 
name of the official with whom eonfidential contact 















2. On or before December 31, 1986, and thereafter, upon hiring of new staff, Or 
revision of the personnel policy as required hereby. distribute a copy of the ................. ,._ 
policy to each of its employees. 
3. Annually the association shall review Jts policy and recommend either retention as 
written or changes as necessary for action by its board of directors or board of 
trustees. The board's deliberations on the recommendation shall be recorded in its 
official minutes. 
To monitor compliance with the foregoing directive, pursuant to CFC Section 8151, we 
have developed the attached report form (SL 104), which each savings and loan association 
and savings bank shall file with the Department on or before December 31, 1986, and 








Department of Savings and Loan 
600 So. Commonwealth Avenue, Suite 1502 
Los Angeles. CA 90005-4085 
(Name ol Institution) 
Report of P~ PoUeies 
As directed by your Issuance No. 86-10. dated October 17, 1986, attached are two true 
and correct copies of our published personnel policy as set forth and approved by our 
board of directors (or board of tr~stees) at Its meeting held on __ __,"'~""""!' ___ _ 
<date) 
As of this date. a copy of the attached publication has been distributed to each or 
our employees. 
• 
We eertlfy (or deda.re) under peaaltJ of perjury under tbe laws of the State of California 
that the foreactna 1.1 true ud eorreet. 
Dated ---------------------- Signature 
Typed Name 
Corporate Title 
Dated ---------------------- Signature 
Typed Name 
Corporate Title 
Bote: This declaration must be signed by the institution's president or vice president 
~ its secretary or treasurer or assistant secretary or assistant treasurer. 
SL 104 C01022 

